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Parents' Religion and Children's 
Welfare: Debunking the Doctrine of 
Parents' Rights 
James G. Dwyert 
The scope, weight, and assignment of parental rights have been the 
focus of much debate among legal commentators. These commentators 
generally have assumed that parents should have some rights in connection 
with the raising of their children. Rarely have commentators offered justi-
fications for attributing rights to persons as parents, and when they have 
done so they have failed to subject those justifications to close scrutiny. 
This Article takes the novel approach of challenging parental rights in their 
entirety. The author explores the fUndamental questions of what it means to 
say that individuals have rights as parents, and whether it is legitimate to 
do so. In defining existing parental rights, the Article focuses on parental 
rights in religious contexts, because it is in this arena that the notion of 
parental rights takes on its strongest form. The author contrasts parental 
rights with other individual rights that receive protection under our legal 
system. He concludes that the claim that parents should have child-rearing 
rights is inconsistent with certain principles underlying all other individual 
rights recognized in our society. After demonstrating this theoretical short-
coming of the notion of parenting rights, the Article challenges the sound-
ness of the commonly advanced justifications of parental rights. The 
author concludes that all of the proffered justifications for parents' rights 
are unsound, and recommends a substantial revision of the law governing 
child-rearing. The author proposes that children's rights, rather than par-
Copyright © 1994 California Law Review, Inc. 
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ents' rights, serve as a basis for protecting the legal interests of children. 
The law should confer on parents only a child-rearing privilege, limited to 
actions that do not harm the child's interests. Such a privilege, coupled 
with a broader set of children's rights, satisfies parents' legitimate interests 
in child-rearing while providing children with a more appropriate level of 
protection than they receive under the current legal approach. 
lNTR.ODUCTION 
Parents' rights play a prominent role in any discussion of the law relat-
ing to child-rearing. For those who would have the State use its power and 
resources to improve the lives of children, parental rights constitute the 
greatest legal obstacle to government intervention to protect children from 
harmful parenting practices and to state efforts to assume greater authority 
over the care and education of children. Legal commentators, whatever 
their views on the proper distribution of child-rearing authority between 
parents and the State, universally assume that parents should have some 
rights with respect to the raising of their children. 1 They debate only what 
the scope of those rights should be,2 how to balance them against state 
interests or children's interests and rights,3 who should have them,4 and 
when people who have them should lose all or some of them. 5 
I. This Article deals exclusively with child-rearing rights-rights to direct the life of a child in 
one's custody-which are distinct from child-bearing rights-rights to conceive and give birth to n 
child. The latter raise discrete issues in addition to some of those discussed below in relation to child-
rearing rights. See, e.g., Onora O'Neill, Begetting, Bearing, and Rearing, in HAVINO CHILDREN: 
PmwsoPmCAL AND LEoAL REFLECTioNs oN PARENTHooD 25 (Onora O'Neill & William Ruddick eds., 
1979) [hereinafter HAvmo CHILDREN]. Custody rights also differ somewhat from ehild-rearing rights. 
Custody rights concern entitlement to formal recognition as the principal child-rearer, rather than 
entitlement to engage in particular practices or to make particular decisions regarding n child's 
upbringing. Custody rights are often at issue in divorces and in abuse or neglect proceedings. They arc 
also at issue when biological parents seek to reclaim children from adoptive parents, as happened 
recently in highly publicized cases in Iowa, lllinois, and Florida. See infra note 20. The arguments of 
this Article apply equally against claims of parental custody rights. 
2. See, e.g., Susan B. Apel, Custodial Parents, Child Sexual Abuse, and the Legal System: 
Beyond Contempt, 38 AM. U. L. REv. 491, 526-29 (1989); Paul Schwartz, Note, Parental Rights and the 
Habilitation Decision for Mentally Retarded Children, 94 YAU?. L.J. 1715 (1985). 
3. See, e.g., Elizabeth J. Sher, Note, Choosing For Children: Adjudicating Medical Care 
Disputes Between Parents and the State, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 157 (1983); Ronald A. White, Note, 
Divorce: Restricting Religious Activity During Visitation, 38 OKLA. L. REv. 284 (1985). 
4. See, e.g., John L. Hill, What Does It Mean To Be a "Parent"?: The Claims of Biology as the 
Basis for Parental Rights, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 353 (1991); Katheryn D. Katz, Majoritarian Morality and 
Parental Rights, 52 ALB. L. REv. 405 (1988); Lucy S. McGough & Lawrence M. Shindell, Coming of 
Age: The Best Interests of the Child Standard in Parent-Third Party Custody Disputes, 21 EMORY L.J. 
209 (1978); Irma S. Russell, Within the Best Interests of the Child: The Factor of Parental Status in 
Custody Disputes Arising From Surrogacy Contracts, 21 J. FAM. L. 585 (1988-89). 
5. See, e.g., Marsha Garrison, Why Terminate Parental Rights?, 35 STAN. L. REv. 423 (1983); 
David J. Herring, Inclusion of the Reasonable Efforts Requirement in Termination of Parental Rights 
Statutes: Punishing the Child for the Failures of the State Child Welfare System, 54 U. Prrr. L. REv. 
139 (1992); Nancy B. Shemow, Comment, Recognizing Constitutional Rights of Custodial Parents: The 
Primacy of the Post-Divorce Family in Child Custody Modification Proceedings, 35 UCLA L. REv. 677 
(1988). 
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Those who do pause to consider why parents should have any child-
rearing rights at all uniformly point to justifications that they believe to be 
compelling, but fail to subject those supposed justifications to careful scru-
tiny. The usual justifications for parental rights fall into three categories, 
based on the interests they invoke: 1) children's interests in intimate rela-
tionships and in receiving care from those who know them best and care 
most about them; 2) parents' interests in intimate relationships and in mold-
ing a new life in accordance with their ideals; and 3) society's interests in 
pluralism and in the family as an essential building block of democratic 
culture.6 
This Article takes a step back from debates over the scope, balancing, 
and attribution of parental rights to ask at a fundamental level what it means 
to say that individuals have rights as parents, and whether it is legitimate to 
do so. As a starting point, I closely examine judicial treatment of parental 
child-rearing rights and contrast this with judicial treatment of other legal 
rights. Through this analysis, it becomes apparent that the claim that par-
ents should have child-rearing rights-rather than simply being permitted 
to perform parental duties and to make certain decisions on a child's behalf 
in accordance with the child's rights-is inconsistent with principles deeply 
embedded in our law and morality. Specifically, there is in our legal culture 
an inherent limitation on the permissible scope of individual rights, confin-
ing them to protection of a right-holder's personal autonomy and self-deter-
mination. This limitation on legal rights embodies the moral precept that no 
individual is entitled to control the life of another person, free from outside 
interference, no matter how intimate the relationship between them, and 
particularly not in ways inimical to the other person's temporal interests. 
The incongruity between parents' rights and established principles 
regarding the nature and inherent limitations of individual rights compels us 
to seek other moral and/or legal principles to support and legitimize this 
anomalous set of rights. Absent such justification, we might be forced to 
conclude that parents' rights, like the plenary rights of husbands over their 
wives in an earlier age, ultimately rest on nothing more than the ability of a 
politically more powerful class of persons to enshrine in the law their domi-
nation of a politically less powerful class, and on an outmoded view that 
members of the subordinated group are not persons in their own right. 
Thus, after demonstrating the theoretical difficulties associated with the 
6. See Francis B. McCarthy, The Confused Constitutional Status and Meaning of Parental 
Rights, 22 GA. L. REv. 975, 1017 (1988). Commentators have also advanced arguments from natural 
law, see, e.g., Mary V. Dobson, The Juvenile Court and Parental Rights, 4 FAM. L.Q. 393 (1970), but 
these are becoming increasingly less common and are "not very well received today," McCarthy, supra 
at 984. I do not directly address natural law arguments in this Article, but I do consider whether states 
should give deference to parents' religious views of their parental role. Nor do I directly address the 
view that children are the property of their parents. Almost no one seriously maintains this position 
today, although the language of some court decisions may still reflect such a view. William Ruddick, 
Parents and Life Prospects, in HAVING CHILDREN, supra note 1, at 123, 127. 
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notion of parents' rights, this Article challenges the empirical and norma-
tive premises underlying the justifications typically offered in support of 
parental rights, and the reasoning that proceeds from these premises. 
Concluding from this analysis that all of the proffered justifications for 
parents' rights are in fact unsound, I recommend a substantial revision of 
the law pertaining to child-rearing. I propose that children's rights, rather 
than parents' rights, be the legal basis for protecting the interests of chil-
dren? I propose further that the law confer on parents simply a child-rear-
ing privilege, limited in its scope to actions and decisions not inconsistent 
with the child's temporal interests. Such a privilege, coupled with a 
broader set of children's rights, is sufficient to satisfy parents' legitimate 
interests in child-rearing. 8 
As this proposal suggests in making the case against parental rights, I 
draw importantly on the distinction between a right and a privilege. In 
doing so, I follow Wesley Hohfeld's seminal work on the description of 
legal relations.9 Hohfeld urged the legal community to confine the use of 
the term "right" to what he called "claims," which entail corresponding 
duties in other persons of non-interference (a negative claim) or assistance 
(a positive claim). Thus, a parent has a "negative claim-right" against the 
State with respect to a given action when the State is under, a duty owed to 
the parent not to interfere with the parent's performance of that action. A 
parent has a "positive claim-right" against the State when the State is under 
a duty owed to the parent to provide some form of assistance to the parent. 
The parental rights of primary concern in this Article are parents' negative 
7. Among the most important of these interests is a child's interest in enjoying an intimate 
relationship with her parents, free from any state intervention that would entail greater costs than 
benefits for the child. It is widely believed that state intrusion into the family in and of itself takes a 
significant PSYChological and emotional toll on the child. Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit emphasized this 
consideration in their influential work on legal advocacy on behalf of children. JosEPH GoLDSTEIN Bf 
AL., BEFORE nm BEST lNTEREsTs oF nm CHILD (1979). Other scholars have contended that these 
writers overstated and failed to support adequately their concern about state intervention. See, e.g., 
Marsha Garrison, Child Welfare Decisionmaking: In Search of the Least Drastic Alternative, 15 GEo. 
LJ. 1745, 1762-66 (1987); MichaelS. Wald, Thinking About Public Policy Toward Abuse and Neglect 
of Children: A Review of Before the Best Interests of the Child, 78 MICH. L. REv. 645, 667-71 (1980); 
see also Judith G. McMullen, Privacy, Family Autonomy, and the Maltreated Child, 15 MARQ. L. RBv. 
569, 589-92 (1992) (citing evidence of correlation between family isolation from the community and 
child abuse). In addition, little if any consideration or study has been given to the possibly beneficial 
effects of state intervention on the parent-child relationship-for example, greater respect by parents for 
the children in their care and a greater appreciation by both parents and children that parents are not 
entitled to do whatever they want to their children. This Article assumes that state intervention in the 
family is potentially costly for children, and that this too must be considered in deciding whether the 
State should intervene to protect a child from harmful parental practices and decisions. 
8. Part m suggests a principled means for distinguishing between legitimate parental interests 
and morally illegitimate parental desires. In brief, the former are consistent with the child's temporal 
interests, while the latter entail the sacrifice of the child's temporal interests in order to satisfy the 
parents' wishes. Parts II and m demonstrate that even legitimate parental interests cannot properly give 
rise to parental child-rearing rights. 
9. Wesley N. Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 
23 YALE LJ. 16, 30-36 (1913). 
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claim-rights against state interference in their child-rearing practices and 
decision-making. 10 
Hohfeld rejected use of the term "right'' to refer to what he called a 
"privilege," which is simply the absence of any duty to refrain from a given 
activity. If, for example, I allow my neighbor to borrow my shovel, she 
then enjoys a privilege to take and use it; she is no longer under a duty to 
me not to take and use my shovel. This privilege does not entail any claim 
against me should I interfere in her use of the shovel or take it away from 
her.U 
Similarly, a parental privilege, unaccompanied by any parental rights, 
would merely legally permit parents to engage in the types of behavior 
normally associated with child-rearing, e.g., housing, feeding, clothing, 
teaching, or disciplining a child. It would thus simply exempt parents from 
10. Judges and, to a much greater extent, the general public sometimes use the term "right" very 
loosely to refer to anything that a person is not prohibited from doing (i.e., privileges) as well as to refer 
to Hohfeldian elaim-rights. As the analysis below reveals, the "rights" that the courts have accorded 
parents clearly include claim-rights and not merely privileges. If, by ''parental rights," courts and the 
public meant nothing more than a legal privilege to carry out parenting responsibilities, there would be 
less reason to object to the concept. However, insofar as the term ''right" conveys a sense of 
entitlement, its use would remain morally problematic in connection with child-rearing authority. See 
discussion infra Part 11. 
11. A few additional terms also warrant clarification. The term "liberty'' frequently appears in 
constitutional interpretation. See, e.g., Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & 
Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 793 n.2 (1986) (White, J., dissenting) ("[P]arents have a fundamental 
liberty to make decisions with respect to the upbringing of their children."), overruled in nonrelevant 
part by Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992); Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503 
(1976) (noting that the ''right to a fair trial is a fundamental liberty''); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 14 
(1965) ("[r]he fact that a liberty cannot be inhibited without due process oflaw does not mean that it 
can under no circumstances be inhibited.''). Judith Jarvis Thomson explains that what we commonly 
mean by a '~liberty'' is a combination of a privilege and a negative claim-right. Junrm JARVIS 
THOMSON, THE REALM oF R.iGHrS 53-54 (1990). Thomson criticizes Hohfeld's characterization of a 
liberty as identical to a privilege, based on the implausibility of thinking that when we say someone 
possesses a liberty to do something, such as travel to another state, all we mean to say is that that person 
is under no duty not to travel to the other state. We also mean, Thomson insists, that other persons are 
"under a duty toward him to not interfere with his doing of it in some appropriately chosen set of ways." 
/d. Thus, for example, if a parent has no legal duty to refrain from teaching his child creationism, and 
the State has a duty not to interfere with his doing so, then the parent possesses a liberty to teach his 
child creationism. 
Hohfeld termed a ''power'' the legal authority to modify, waive, or abolish a claim-right or 
privilege. One exercises a power by, for example, releasing a party from a contractual obligation and 
thereby abolishing one's claim-right against that party. An "immunity," on the other hand, is a 
protection against someone else changing the nature of one's own claim-rights or privileges. It entails 
the lack of a power in others with respect to one's claim-rights and privileges. The First Amendment, 
for example, accords individuals an immunity which prevents Congress from abolishing their liberty to 
practice their religion. 
Finally, packages of claim-rights, privileges, powers, and/or immunities will often attach to persons 
with respect to a given activity. For example, typieally when a person possesses a claim-right against 
others interfering in her doing some act, she also enjoys the privilege of doing that act-i.e., she is not 
under a duty to refrain from that act-and she may also enjoy the power to waive that claim-right and an 
immunity against others extinguishing the claim-right and privilege. For simplicity of exposition, the 
term ''right" is sometimes used in this Article to refer generically to such packages that have a claim-
right at their core. 
HeinOnline -- 82 Cal L. Rev. 1376 1994
1376 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82:1371 
certain duties adults are under with respect to children generallyP The 
privilege would not give parents themselves any legal claims against state 
efforts to restrict their behavior or decision-making authority. Under the 
legal regime I propose, such claims would repose only in the child. Parents 
would be authorized to act as agents for the child and to assert the child's 
rights against inappropriate state interference with child-rearing practices. 
From a moral perspective, a parental privilege would not convey or reflect a 
sense of entitlement to direct a child's life, but instead would represent a 
benefit contingent upon the ful:fillment of attendant responsibilities.13 
It is important to recognize that this alternative approach would not 
entail doing away with the institution of the family in favor of collectivized 
child-rearing. 14 Nor would it transfer to the State vastly greater control 
over child-rearing or enable the State to intervene whenever social workers 
think a parent is performing less than optimally.15 Finally, the elimination 
of parental rights would not entail the "liberation" of children from all 
parental governance and discipline. If it is true, as virtually everyone 
believes, that children require some governance and discipline for healthy 
development, it would be senseless and improper to attribute to children 
rights against all forms of parental control, or to exclude appropriate disci-
pline from the scope of duties parents owe to their children. 
Abrogating parents' rights would, however, substantially alter the way 
that courts analyze conflicts between parents and the larger community over 
child-rearing. Rather than balancing parents' rights against state interests in 
the care and education of children, as presently occurs, judges would decide 
these conflicts solely on the basis of children's welfare interests. Doing so 
would be likely, in tum, to alter the precise limits of parental freedom and 
authority and to shift the boundary between permissible and impermissible 
state interventions. 
12. These duties are embodied in laws such as those prohibiting kidnapping. In the present legal 
environment, such duties also arise as the corollary to the exclusive right of parents to perform child-
rearing functions free from interferenee by other adults. In the legal regime advocated here, these duties 
would instead be a corollary to the rights of children to be under the continuous care of a parent, free 
from interference by other adults. 
13. In this light, a parent's role would be analogous to that of a lawyer appointed to represent a 
child in legal proceedings, such as a custody dispute. The lawyer enjoys the privilege of directing a 
certain aspect of the child's life-namely, the child's participation as an interested party in the legal 
proceedings-but herself acquires no rights in the proceedings by virtue of representing the child. The 
rights the lawyer advances and predicates claims upon are the rights of the child, never her own. There 
are obvious and important differences between the parent-child relationship and an attorney-client 
relationship, but the distinctive features of the parent-child relationship constitute no justification for 
attributing rights to parents. See discussion infra Part III. 
14. Analogously, the fact that lawyers appointed to represent children do not possess a right to 
represent those children does not render the practice of child ndvoeacy impossible or unstable. We 
impute to the children a positive claim-right to legal representation and a negative claim-right against 
third party interferenee in that legal representation. 
15. For an argument that the threshold of state intervention should be quite high even from an 
exclusively child-centered perspective, see Michael Wold, State Intervention on Behalf of "Neglected" 
Children: A Search for Realistic Standards, 27 STAN. L. REv. 985 (1975). 
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Under this approach, a community seeking to restrict parents' child-
rearing freedom or authority would not need to argue that the interests of 
the child and of the rest of society outweigh the rights of the parents in a 
given case. Rather, the State would need only to argue that the harm to the 
child that non-intervention would allow is greater than the harm to the child 
that intervention would cause. The latter approach is likely to be more suc-
cessful in protecting the interests of the child than is the current approach. 16 
This Article focuses in the first instance on parental rights in religious 
contexts-that is, in situations where parents' religious beliefs shape their 
child-rearing preferences. It is in this context that the principal aspects of 
parent-state conflicts over child-rearing take on their most extreme form. 
Many people, including judges, find parents' claims to exclusive child-rear-
ing authority to be at their most compelling when motivated by religious 
belief. State child welfare laws accord particular deference to parents' 
religiously motivated child-rearing decisions.17 Moreover, the societal val-
ues of pluralism and state neutrality toward differing belief systems are 
most clearly at issue in the free exercise context. Focusing on situations 
that put these considerations into sharpest relief helps to draw out the moral 
implications of the notion of parents' rights. 
Part I of this Article therefore concerns "parental free exercise 
rights"-rights predicated on religious belief enjoyed only by parents in the 
context of child-rearing. Parents may claim these rights when state child 
welfare laws or schooling policies conflict with their religiously grounded 
preferences regarding the care and education of their children. The courts 
have interpreted parental rights under the Free Exercise Clause of the First 
Amendment to extend the child rearing authority and independence of par-
ents beyond that which they enjoy under the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. This means that in most cases courts have been 
unwilling to allow either the State's determination or their own judgment of 
a child's best interests to supplant parental free exercise rights. Indeed, 
only when according decisive weight to parental free exercise rights would 
threaten the child with death or grievous bodily injury or would result in the 
child receiving a grossly inadequate education will the State prevail under 
the current legal regime. 
Part II explains why ascribing special rights to persons as parents is 
16. Consider, for example, a child in need of surgery to correet a non life-threatening physical 
deformity, but whose parents object to the procedure on religious grounds. A court faced only with 
weighing the costs and benefits of ordering the procedure to the child might very well conclude that the 
benefits of living a normal, healthy life outweigh the costs to the child, if any, which might arise from 
her parents' frustration, resentment toward the rest of society, and anxiety about their own salvation or 
that of the child. On the other hand, when courts have in similar cases balanced the State's interests in 
the child's welfare against the constitutionally protected rights of her parents, they have often concluded 
that the parents' rights trump the State's interests. See discussion infra notes 108-14 and accompanying 
text. 
17. Judicial and legislative deference to parents' alleged rights is certainly not limited, however, to 
the context of religiously motivated child-rearing. See discussion infra notes 19-20. 
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anomalous within our legal system. Providing for such rights implicitly 
endorses the proposition that one person may be entitled to control, use, or 
direct the life-course of another, non-consenting person, and may assert on 
his own behalf a valid legal claim against any third-party interference in the 
exercise of that control. Judicial interpretation of constitutional rights in the 
parenting context is unique in this regard, and fundamentally at odds with 
other, well-established constitutional and common-law principles. 
Even if they accept the conclusions of Part IT, defenders of parental 
rights might contend that there are very good reasons for treating children 
differently from adults, and for creating an exception in the parenting con-
text to general principles regarding rights.18 In Part ill, therefore, I consider 
a number of potential justifications for parental rights. Ultimately, each is 
deficient, particularly in regard to parental rights under the Free Exercise 
Clause. Justifications based on the necessity of protecting children's inter-
ests are logically flawed, because a more appropriate approach is avail-
able--namely, ascribing to children any rights necessary to protect their 
important interests. Justifications based on parents' interests or on societal 
interests, such as pluralism and the preservation of traditional communities, 
are morally flawed, because they implicitly adopt an instrumental view of 
children, treating them as mere means to the furtherance of other persons' 
ends. 
Two final points about methodology deserve mention. First, in dis-
cussing interests and rights, I treat them as attaching to individuals, rather 
than as attaching to relationships as unitary entities. This is consistent with 
the way the courts generally interpret rights and construe interests in the 
context of parent-state conflicts over child-rearing, as well as in other con-
texts involving intimate relationships, such as marriage. It is also the most 
sensible approach, given the undeniable fact that a parent and a child are 
two non-identical persons whose interests at any point in their relationship 
may differ and even conflict. This individual-oriented approach to discuss-
ing interests and rights in no way denies, however, that the interests of 
parent and child are ordinarily consistent with one another and are, in fact, 
largely interdependent. Nor is it inconsistent with an understanding that 
familial relationships constitute a large part of the self-conception of young 
children. 
Second, the most objectionable aspect of the courts' construction of 
parents' rights is the extension of these rights in some cases to entitle par-
ents to treat children in ways contrary to the children's temporal interests. 
18. A few commentators have aclmowledged the anomalous nature of parents' rights, but 
endorsed them nonetheless. See, e.g., Andrew J. Kleinfeld, The Balance of Power Among Infants, Their 
Parents and the State, Part II. 4 FAM. L.Q. 410, 411 (1970); Martha Minow, Pluralisms, 21 CoNN. L. 
REv. 965, 969 (1989) ("[D]eference to parental decisions about their children stands as the nearly 
universal exception from self-determination under the Constitution.''); Developments in the Law-The 
Constitution and the Family, 93 HAR.v. L. REv. 1156, 1353 (1980) [hereinafter Developments] 
(declaring a parental right unique "in that it protects the ability to control another person''). 
HeinOnline -- 82 Cal L. Rev. 1379 1994
1994]' PARENTS' REliGION AND CHILDREN'S WELFARE 1379 
The solution offered in this Article is to dispense with the notion of parental 
rights altogether. An alternative way to counter this phenomenon would be 
simply to argue that courts should narrow the scope of parental rights. 
However, merely narrowing the scope of parental rights would not cure two 
problems: first, inherent in the very notion of parental child-rearing rights 
is a morally dubious notion of parental entitlement; and, second, because of 
the rhetorical power of parental claims to child-rearing rights, judges would 
be unlikely in practice to contain those rights within carefully defined lim-
its. Continuing to focus on parental claims would in all likelihood continue 
to distract judges from the interests of children, which should be the pri-
mary focus in any dispute concerning child-rearing. 
I 
JUDICIAL lNTERPRETATION OF pARENTS' RIGHTS UNDER THE 
FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE 
A. The Supreme Court Decisions 
In a series of cases in the 1920s, the Supreme Court invalidated state 
regulations pertaining to private schools on the grounds that these regula-
tions violated parents' traditional liberty, protected by the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, to direct their children's education.19 
These cases established the rule that state action materially interfering with 
this liberty must bear a reasonable relation to a legitimate state purpose.20 
19. Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284 (1927) (invalidating Hawaii's regulation of curriculum, 
textbooks, teacher qualifications, and language of instruction in private schools); Pierce v. Society of 
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (invalidating Oregon's compulsory public school attendance law); Meyer v. 
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (invalidating state prohibition of instruction in a foreign language). 
20. See Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534-35. The courts have continued to recognize a constitutional right 
of parents to the custody and control of their children under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. See, e.g., Halderman v. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 707 F.2d 702, 707 (3d Cir. 1983) 
(holding that a state may not require the placement of a mentally retarded child in a specific facility over 
tbe parents' objection, and noting that the Court has "consistently applied a heavy presumption in favor 
of parental decisions''). In fact, this right of control has become so entrenched in recent years that it now 
appears to be treated as a ''fundamental" right triggering strict scrutiny rather than mere rationality 
review. See McCarthy, supra note 6, at 985-92. 
It is clear that as parents' rights have expanded, children's rights have contracted. For example, in 
proceedings to commit a child to a state mental institution against the child's wishes, the Supreme Court 
held that the child was not entitled to an adversarial hearing on the matter. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 
584, 602-04 (1979). Rather, even though the child had a ''protectible interest not only in being free of 
unnecessary bodily restraints but also in not being labeled erroneously [as mentally ill]," id. at 601, the 
parents' right to decide for the child trumped those interests: "the parents ... retain a substantial, if not 
the dominant, role in the decision, •.. [and] the presumption that the parents act in the best interests of 
their child should apply," id. at 604. 
The Court has also interpreted parental rights to increase the burden states must meet, from a 
preponderance of the evidence to clear and convincing evidence, in order to prove allegations of abnse 
or neglect See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982) ("The fundamental liberty interest of 
natural parents in the care, custody, and management of their child does not evaporate simply because 
they have not been model parents or have lost temporary custody of their child to the State.''); see also 
Alsager v. District Court, 406 F. Supp. 10,21-24 (S.D. Iowa 1975) (holding that termination of parental 
rights without a showing of a very substantial degree ofharm to the child violated parents' due process 
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In 1944, the Court for the first time addressed a challenge to state 
action that coupled a substantive due process claim with a First Amendment 
free exercise claim in a parenting context. In Prince v. Massachusetts, 21 the 
Court affirmed the conviction of a woman who had violated a statute that 
prohibited parents or guardians from directing or permitting their children 
to sell publications in public places. An obvious purpose of the statute was 
to keep children out of potentially dangerous situations. Mrs. Prince was 
the guardian of her nine-year-old niece, Betty, and both she and Betty were 
ordained Jehovah's Witness ministers. At Betty's insistence, Mrs. Prince 
permitted her niece to join her in distributing religious literature at night on 
the streets of Brockton.22 
Writing for the majority, Justice Rutledge was somewhat ambivalent 
about whose free exercise liberty was at stake, that of Mrs. Prince or her 
rights), aff'd, 545 F.2d 1137 (8th Cir. 1976); In re Cannaleta B., 579 P.2d 514, 518 (Cal. 1978) 
(holding that even evidence of a parent's mental illness was insufficient to meet the high threshold 
required for tennination; ''Parenting is a fundamental right, and accordingly, is disturbed only in extreme 
cases of persons acting in a fashion incompatible with parenthood.''); Blackburn v. Blackburn, 292 
S.E.2d 821, 825 (Ga. 1982) (overturning an award of custody to a grandmother where evidence of the 
mother's unfitness did not satisfY the ''high burden of proof" required by mother's substantive due 
process rights); Carvalho v. Lewis, 274 S.E.2d 471 (Ga. 1981) (requiring a finding of parental unfitness 
in order to tenninate parental custody, even where it had been shown that termination was in the best 
interests of the children). Under this regime, courts and social welfare agencies routinely return children 
to abnsive and neglectful parents. See Patricia Edmonds, Young and in Danger: Why Kids Get Sent 
Back to Abusive Homes, USA ToDAY, Apr. 7, 1994, at I A, 2A; Michele Ingrassia & John McCormick, 
Why Leave Children With Bad Parents?, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 25, 1994, at 52-58; Mary-Lou Weisman, 
When Parents Are Not in the Best Interests of the Child, ATLANTic MoNrnLY, July 1994, at 43, 46, 62-
63. 
In addition, there have been many instances, some highly publicized, of biological parents 
successfully claiming a right to the custody of children who have lived with adoptive parents for a 
number of years. For example, in In re Doe, 638 N.E.2d 181 (Ill. 1994), Illinois' highest court awarded 
custody of a three-year-old boy known as ''Baby Richard" to the boy's biological father, even though the 
child had been with his adoptive parents almost from the day of his birth and had never met the 
biological father. The court ruled that 
since the father's parental interest was improperly terminated, there was no occasion to reach 
the factor of the child's best interests .... These [state adoption] Jaws are designed to protect 
natural parents in their preemptive rights to their own children wholly apart from any 
consideration of the so-called best interests of the child. 
!d. at 182. Similarly, in In re B.G.C., the Iowa Supreme Court ordered adoptive parents living in 
Michigan to cede custody of 19-month-old "Baby Jessica" to her biological father, who had never 
before seen her, because a lack of evidence of his abandonment of the child rendered the initial adoption 
invalid; the adoption statute did not permit a court to terminate the biological father's rights based solely 
on the best interests of the child. 496 N.W.2d 239 (Iowa 1992), application for slay denied sub nom. 
DeBoer v. DeBoer, 114 S. Ct. I (Stevens, J., Circuit Justice 1993) (mem.) (upholding Michigan 
enforcement order), 114 S. Ct. II (1993) (Blackmun & O'Connor, JJ., dissenting) (mem.); see also In re 
Baby E.A.W., No. 93-3040, 1994 Fla. App. LEXIS 6137 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. June 22, 1994) (finding 
evidence insufficient to support finding of abandonment by natural father), withdrawn, substituted op., 
on reh 'g, 1994 Fla. App. LEXIS 11522 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Nov. 30, 1994) {affirming trial court's 
finding of abandournent by natural father and certifYing question to state supreme court). 
21. 321 u.s. 158 (1944). 
22. !d. at 161-63. According to the Court, ''Betty believed it was her religious duty to perform 
this work and failure would bring condemnation 'to everlasting destruction at Armageddon.' " !d. at 
163. 
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niece.23 Ultimately, however, the Court's discussion of the scope of Free 
Exercise Clause protections focused exclusively on what that Clause does 
or does not entitle parents to do to their children, rather than on what it 
entitles children themselves to do.24 The Court held that the State's author-
ity to restrict parents' freedom in child-rearing by means reasonably related 
to legitimate state ends "is not nullified merely because the parent grounds 
his claim to control the child's course of conduct on religion or con-
science .... The right to practice religion freely does not include liberty to 
expose the community or the child to communicable disease or the latter to 
ill health or death."25 The Court then stated with rhetorical flourish: "Par-
ents may be free to become martyrs themselves. But it does not follow they 
are free, in identical circumstances, to make martyrs of their children before 
they have reached the age of full and legal discretion when they can make 
that choice for themselves."26 
These statements, standing alone, suggest that the Court recognized an 
inherent limitation on the scope of the free exercise right-namely, that this 
right does not extend beyond religious self-determination to include situa-
tions where one person wishes, for religious reasons, to direct another per-
son's life. One could also interpret these statements to mean that a claim of 
religious liberty does not extend the scope of parental autonomy beyond 
that secured by the Due Process Clause nor increase the State's burden of 
justifying any restrictions it imposes on parental freedom. The Court, how-
ever, limited its holding by indicating that the Free Exercise Clause might 
in some situations serve parents as an additional shield against state inter-
ference in child-rearing, even in situations that threaten the health and wel-
fare of the children. The Court asserted: 
Our ruling does not extend beyond the facts the case presents. 
We neither lay the foundation "for any [that is, every] state interven-
tion in the indoctrination and participation of children in religion" 
which may be done ''in the name of their health and welfare" nor 
give warrant for "every limitation on their religious training and 
23. The opinion first stated that the two liberties at issue were ''the parent's, to bring up the child 
in the way [s]he should go"-that is, a general right of parental authority not grounded in religious 
freedom-and the child's, to observe the tenets and practices of the faith her aunt had taught her. /d. at 
164. The opinion later invoked the liberty of parents to give children religious training and ''to 
encourage them in the practice of religious belief." /d. at 165. As support for this liberty, however, the 
Court here cited two of its 1920s substantive due process decisions, which turned on constitutional 
provisions other than the Free Exercise Clause and established more generally ''the private realm of 
family life which the state cannot enter." /d. at 166 (citing Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 
(1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923)). 
24. Jnstice Murphy, in dissent, did focus on the child's free exercise liberty, contending that the 
criminal sanction imposed on Mrs. Prince operated as an indirect restraint on that liberty. /d. at 172. 
25. Id. at 166-67. 
26. /d. at 170. 
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activities."27 
Further, there is no hint in the opinion that children have rights to protection 
from harms to which parents might subject them in acting on their religious 
beliefs. In Prince, the Court treated the danger to the child's welfare as a 
public policy concern, a threat to the interest of society as a whole in ''the 
healthy, well-rounded growth of young people into full maturity as citi-
zens," rather than a threat directly to the child.28 
The lesson of Prince, therefore, is that the Free Exercise Clause pro-
tects parents' efforts to indoctrinate their children and to include their chil-
dren in various religious practices so long as they do not expose their 
children to particularly grave dangers, even if this may result in some lesser 
harm. befalling the children. 
In Jehovah 's Witnesses v. King County Hospital, the Supreme Court 
affirmed a district court ruling applying Prince to mandate blood transfu-
sions for the child of Jehovah's Witness parents.29 Over the free exercise 
and due process objections of the parents, the district court upheld a statute 
granting authority to declare children wards of the State for purposes of 
authorizing an emergency transfusion.30 While recognizing that the Free 
Exercise Clause gives parents a right to "train and indoctrinate their chil-
dren in religious matters," the district court found that putting a child in 
mortal danger was not a form of training or indoctrination, and so was not 
constitutionally protected conduct.31 At the same time, the district court 
reiterated the cautionary note in Prince that not every state intervention to 
protect the health and welfare of children would survive constitutional scru-
tiny. 32 And like Prince, this decision makes no mention of any rights the 
children in question might have possessed. 
Thus, Prince and King County Hospital recognized, but imposed lim-
its on the scope of, parental free exercise rights. They held that these rights 
do not include a right to endanger seriously a child's physical health or 
safety. They also suggested that parents' free exercise rights are limited to 
indoctrinating their children and involving them in religious practices. As 
shown below, subsequent lower court decisions have not adhered to, or 
even acknowledged, this latter limitation. Even within these limitations, 
however, parents would have a right to control their child's mind, even in 
ways the rest of society deems harmful to the child, and to involve their 
children in practices that cause the child less serious physical harms. 
These cases thus endorse an interpretation of certain constitutional pro-
visions as conferring on some persons rights to control not only their own 
27. Id. at 171 (alteration in original). The Court did not, however, suggest a guiding prineiple for 
determining which types of harm to a child's health or welfare would justifY state intervention. 
28. Id. at 168. 
29. 278 F. Supp. 488 (W.O. Wash. 1967), ajJ'd, 390 U.S. 598 (1968) (mem.). 
30. Id. at 500-01, 505. 
31. Id. at 504. 
32. Id. 
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behaviors and life choices, but also those of certain other persons-namely, 
their children. 33 Both cases appear to prescribe a balaricing test, weighing 
the parents' interest in fulfilling their religious aspirations through their 
children against the State's interest in protecting the welfare of children and 
in promoting other societal values. Neither decision considered whether 
children have a right to protection from such manipulation by others. 
In Wisconsin v. Yoder, 34 the Supreme Court for the first time explicitly 
established that the Free Exercise Clause confers on parents more extensive 
rights to control children's lives than does the Due Process Clause, and 
prescribed a balancing of state interests against these parental rights. 
Because this is the :first, and only, Supreme Court decision upholding a 
parental free exercise claim, it is important to understand the precise nature 
of the rights that the Court recognized in this case. 
In Yoder, Amish parents claimed that Wisconsin's compulsory educa-
tion law, which required parents to ensure that their children attend a public 
or private school until the age of sixteen, violated their free exercise 
rights.35 The Amish parents had sent their children to public schools 
through the eighth grade, but refused to allow their children to attend any 
high school, public or private, for the additional two years that the law 
required. The parents defended their decision on the ground that their faith 
required them to raise their children for "life in a church community sepa-
rate and apart from the world and worldly infiuence."36 Attendance at a 
regular high school, they argued, would expose their children to worldly 
33. The tenn "self-detennining behavior" will hereinafter be used to distinguish actions and 
decisions concerning solely or primarily one's own person, property, and life-course, from "other-
detennining behavior," or decisions and actions directed primarily at others, including efforts to control 
the person or life-course of another. Self-determining behavior includes, for example, wearing 
religiously symbolic clothing, abstaining from eating meat on certain holy days, going to temple, and 
smoking peyote. Although any such behavior might indirectly affect people other than the actor, it 
generally does not constitute an effort by the actor to control the life of another or to decide what another 
person will do. Courts properly interpret the Free Exercise Clause to include sucb self-determining 
behaviors within the scope of liberty protected from state infringement. However, as argued in Part 11, 
infra, religious liberty should not be understood to include other-determining conduct. Thus, for 
example, were someone to claim that his religion required him to enslave or murder non-believers, the 
courts should not treat such actions as within the scope of that person's religious liberty, and then 
proceed to weigh his liberty against the State's interest in protecting the non-believers. Rather, courts 
should find that the Free Exercise Clause is irrelevant because it simply does not encompass such other-
determining behavior. 
In the discussion below, parenting decisions and practices are treated as other-detennining. Of 
course, some decisions parents might make for religious reasons have both self-determining and other-
detennining components, such as a decision to join a religious cult as a family. Analyzing such 
decisions requires breaking them down into their component purts to discern which aspects of the 
decision are self-determining, e.g., entering oneself into the cult, and which are other-detennining, e.g., 
bringing one's children into the cult Thus, we should say that the parent has a free exercise right (not as 
a parent but simply as an adult) to join the cult herself, but no right to bring her child into the cult. 
34. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). Other than Prince and King County Hospital, this appears to be the only 
Supreme Court Free Exercise Clause decision to date involving parenting. 
35. Id. at 207-09. 
36. Id. at 210. 
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influences during the critical adolescent stage of development, and to 
"higher learning [which] tends to develop values [the Amish] reject as 
influences that alienate man from God."37 
Thus, the parents' free exercise claim had two principal elements: 1) 
that no one, including their children, had a claim-right to the parents' assist-
ance in ensuring that the children attend school (or, in other words, that they 
held a privilege not to send their children to school), and 2) that they pos-
sessed a liberty, immune from abridgment by the State, to train their chil-
dren at home to become Amish adults. The majority in Yoder held that a 
court must begin by determining whether the challenged state action 
encroaches on "legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion."38 The 
Court's discussion of the burdens that the Wisconsin law imposed on 
Amish parents reveals that the Court accepted both facets of the parents' 
objection to that law-their opposition to the imposition of a duty, and their 
claim to possess a liberty to engage in home-based education-as "legiti-
mate" claims to the free exercise of religion.39 
In assessing the law's burden on parents, the Court found that "the 
Wisconsin law affirmatively compels them, under threat of criminal sanc-
tion, to perform acts undeniably at odds with fundamental tenets of their 
religious beliefs.'..;o The Court failed to explain, though, what acts the law 
required of parents. In fact, the Court suggested that the relevant acts were 
ones that the children would have to perform, such as attending school and 
participating in classes that would subject them to certain infiuences.41 
37. !d. at 212. The values allegedly emphasized by secular high schools included "intellectual and 
scientific accomplishments, self-distinction, competitiveness, worldly success, and social life with other 
students." !d. at 211. 
38. !d. at 215 (emphasis added). 
39. See id. at 215-19. 
40. !d. at 218. 
41. The Court noted that 
secondary schooling, by exposing Amish children to worldly influences in terms of attitudes, 
goals, and values contrary to beliefs, and by substantially interfering with the religious 
development of the Amish child and his integration into the way of life of the Amish faith ... 
contravenes the basic religious tenets and pmctice of the Amish faith •..• 
!d. at 218. 
To be more consistent, the Court could have argued that, by referring to "acts," it meant acts that 
parents themselves customarily perfonn, such as accompanying the child to register at the school and 
filling out school forms. These acts, the Court could have argued, were inconsistent with the parents' 
belief that they themselves should" 'be not conformed to this world.'" !d. at 216 (quoting the "Epistle 
of Paul to the Romans" without citation). However, neither the Court nor the Amish parents appear to 
have taken this position. Undoubtedly the parents would not have been satisfied simply to be relieved of 
the responsibility to perform such acts, and to allow others-e.g., social service workers-to take the 
necessary steps to get the children to school each day. 
It is worth noting in this context that the action/inaction distinction one might point to as significant 
in discriminating between self-determining and other-determining behavior (e.g., by arguing that the 
Amish parents simply claimed a self-determining privilege not to perform certain acts) loses meaning in 
a context, such as parenting, where the legal appamtus of the State confers on one person exclusive 
authority to act on behalf of another person. When a dependent ehild is in need of a parent's aid, the 
parent's refusal to provide that aid is clearly other-determining. For example, "[i]n the prosecution of a 
parent for the starvation death of her infant, it was no defense that the infant's death was 'caused' by no 
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Such a view of where the burden lay would, however, be inconsistent with 
the Court's later insistence that the children's religious liberty was not at 
issue, since the parents alone were vulnerable to prosecution "for failing to 
cause their children to attend schoo1."42 
The true burden on the Amish parents, it seems, was that the compul-
sory school attendance law would deny them the liberty to indoctrinate their 
children at home in the Amish faith, free from outside interference. The 
opinion set the stage for the free exercise analysis by invoking the tradi-
tional ''values of parental direction of the religious upbringing and educa-
tion of their children" and the ''traditional interest of parents with respect to 
the religious upbringing oftheir children."43 Ultimately, the Court's hold-
ing turned on an assessment of whether the State's interest in the children's 
education "is so great that it is paramount to the undisputed claims of 
respondents that their mode of preparing their youth for Amish life ... is an 
essential part of their religious belief and practice."44 
The Court also referred repeatedly in its burden analysis to the 
encroachments of modem society on the Amish way of life and the danger 
of extinction that the community faced.45 The community would survive 
ouly if it remained set apart and free from government intrusion· into the 
way its members raised their children. The Court asserted: 
[C]ompulsory school attendance to age 16 for Amish children car-
ries with it a very real threat of undermining the Amish community 
and religious practice as they exist today; they must either abandon 
belief and be assimilated into society at large, or be forced to 
migrate to some other and more tolerant region. 46 
Given that the Wisconsin law could not conceivably have coerced the 
Amish parents into assimilating into society at large, and given that the 
action of the parent but by the natural process of starvation, or by the infant's natural inability to provide 
for itself." Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261,297 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
42. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 230. The Court was emphatic that it was the religious liberty of the parents 
which was at stake: "It is the parents who are subject to prosecution here for failing to cause their 
children to attend school, and it is their right to free exercise, not that of their children, that must 
determine Wisconsin's power to impose criminal penalties on the parent." !d. at 230-31. 
43. Id. at 213-14. 
44. Id. at 219. 
45. See, e.g., id. at 217-18. 
46. Id. at 218. In this passage, and others in the opinion, the Court suggests that the interests of 
the Amish as a community, e.g., to survive from one genemtion to the next, and not just the interests of 
particular parents, weigh in the balance against the State's interests. In response to the argument that 
gmnting Amish parents an exemption to the compulsory attendance law would constitute an 
establishment of religion, the Court asserted that the ''purpose and effect of such an exemption are not to 
support, favor, advance, or assist the Amish, but to allow their centuries-old religious society, here long 
before the advent of any compulsory education, to survive free from the heavy impediment compliance 
with the Wisconsin compulsory-education law would impose." Id. at 234 n.22. At other times, the 
Court weighed against the State's interest in the well-being of the Amish children a coneem with 
preserving values and ways of life: "We must not forget that in the Middle Ages important values of the 
civilization of the Western World were preserved by members of religious orders who isolated 
themselves from all worldly influences against great obstacles." Id. at 223. 
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children's religious liberty was allegedly not at issue in the case, the only 
reasonable reading of Yoder is that the free exercise burden consisted of 
state interference in the Amish parents' affirmative efforts to control the 
minds and lives of their children. 
Thus, the Court in Yoder established that the right guaranteed by the 
Free Exercise Clause is more than just the religious individual's right to 
control his own beliefs and self-determining behaviors, and a freedom from 
state-imposed duties to take actions inconsistent with his beliefs. Under 
Yoder, the right also includes a liberty to control the lives and minds of 
one's children, to keep them to oneself, isolated from outside influences, 
and to make them the type of persons one wants them to be in light of one's 
own religious beliefs. The Court also implicitly recognized as a legitimate 
element of parents' free exercise rights the power to waive their children's 
positive claim-rights to government benefits, such as a state-provided 
education.47 
Having determined that the Wisconsin law burdened the Amish par-
ents' free exercise rights, the Court balanced the interests protected by these 
rights against the State's interest in requiring school attendance, which the 
Court understood to be principally a societal interest in children one day 
"meeting the duties of citizenship'>48 and not becoming "burdens on society 
because of educational shortcomings.'>49 In reaching its holding, the Court 
made clear that the Free Exercise Clause extends the scope of constitution-
ally-protected parental rights beyond that arising from the Fourteenth 
Amendment Due Process Clause, 5° and increases the State's burden in justi-
fying the imposition of constraints on parental control over children's lives: 
"[W]hen the interests of parenthood are combined with a free exercise 
claim of the nature revealed by this record, more than merely a 'reasonable 
relation to some purpose within the competency of the State' is required 
• • • .''51 Wisconsin officials would have to show that the State had an 
interest "of the highest order ... not otherwise served" in applying its regu-
lations to the Amish, however reasonable those regulations might be as a 
47. The Court had recognized this parental power to waive the positive claim-rights of children in 
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). There the Court held invalid an Oregon statute 
requiring parents to send their children to publie rather than private schools of the parents' choosing. /d. 
at 534-35. 
48. Yoder. 406 U.S. at 227. 
49. /d. at 224. 
SO. The Court intimated that absent a free exercise claim the Amish parents would have had no 
case: "A way of life, however virtuous and admirable, may not be interposed as a barrier to reasonable 
state regulation of education if it is based on purely secular considerations .... " /d. at 215. Further, the 
Court, alluding to its decision in Pierce, stated: 
[W]here nothing more than the general interest of the parent in the nurture and education of 
his children is involved, it is beyond dispute that the State acts "reasonably" and 
constitutionally in requiring education to age 16 in some public or private school meeting the 
standards prescribed by the State. 
/d. at 233. 
51. /d. (quoting Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535). 
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means of securing an appropriate education for children.52 
Significantly, the State did argue that granting the parents' claim for an 
exemption from the school attendance law would fail to recognize the posi-
tive claim-rights of the children to a secondary school education. The 
Court, however, reinterpreted this argument as one positing negative claim-
rights of children to be free from grievous harm. 53 It then placed the burden 
on the State to demonstrate the likelihood of such harm, and found that the 
State had not met this burden. 54 The State also failed to show that exempt-
ing the Amish would result in harm to ''the public safety, peace, order, or 
welfare."55 Thus, the Court held that the State had not provided sufficient 
evidence to show that overriding the religious rights of the parents was 
necessary to further its interests, and so awarded the Amish an exemption 
from compulsory school attendance laws.56 
It is of particular significance that, according to the majority in Yoder, 
parents' free exercise right to control their children's lives also trumps any 
conflicting preferences or interests of the children, except where a state 
demonstrates that the children are at risk of serious harm. Even if the chil-
dren in this case wanted to attend school (the trial court never developed a 
record of the children's wishes), granting the State authority to enforce the 
wishes of the children, or to protect what the State deemed to be the best 
interests of the children, ''would, of course, call into question traditional 
concepts of parental control over the religious upbringing and education of 
52. /d. at 215. \Vhile the Court did not explicitly state that strict scrutiny applies to state action 
burdening parental free exercise rights, i.e., whether "interests of the highest order" meant "compelling 
interests," that is the most reasonable reading of the case. In support of this "highest orde;." standard, 
the Court cited Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963}, which employed a "compelling state 
interest" test in its free exercise analysis. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215; see also id. at 214 (noting that free 
exercise of religion is a ''fundamental right''). Moreover, subsequent judicial interpretations of Yoder, 
including that of Justice Burger (who wrote for the Court in Yoder), have almost uniformly interpreted it 
to require strict scrutiny under a "compelling state interest'' standard. See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi 
Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217, 2246-47 n.5 (1993) (Souter, J., concurring); 
Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 894-95 (1990) (O'Connor, J., cOncurring); Thomas v. Review 
Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981) (opinion of Burger, C.J.); Duro v. District Attorney, 712 F.2d 96, 97 (4th 
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1006 (1984); North Valley Baptist Church v. McMahon, 696 F. Supp. 
518, 524 (E.D. Cal. 1988}, aff'd, 893 F.2d 1139 (9th Cir.}, cert. denied, 496 U.S. 937 (1990); 
Blackwelder v. Safuauer, 689 F. Supp. 106, 128-30 (N.D.N.Y. 1988); State v. Whisner, 351 N.E.2d 750, 
771 n.l7 (Ohio 1976); State v. Corpus Christi People's Baptist Church, 683 S.W.2d 692, 696 (Tex. 
1984), appeal dismissed, 474 U.S. 801 (1985). But see Davis v. Page, 385 F. Supp. 395, 399 (D.N.H. 
1974) (interpreting Yoder as a departure from the "compelling state interest" test normally employed in 
free exercise cases). 
The Supreme Court has also regularly applied strict scrutiny in other free exercise cases. See, e.g., 
Frazee v. Illinois Dep't of Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829, 835 (1989); Hobbie v. Unemployment 
Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136, 141 (1987); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257-58 (1982). But cf 
Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. at 878-79 (holding that facially neutral and generally applicable 
laws that incidentally burden religious exercise do not implicate free exercise rights at all, and so need 
not be subjected to any level of scrutiny). 
53. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 229-30. 
54. /d. 
55. /d. at 230. 
56. /d. at 234. 
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their minor children" and ''would give rise to grave questions of religious 
:freedom."57 The Court thus suggested that parental free exercise rights can 
operate to limit the religious liberty of children. 58 
In sum, Yoder established a very peculiar interpretation of a constitu-
tional right-one that attributes to some persons a right to engage in con-
duct and make decisions aimed at controlling the lives of other persons. It 
is important to note that the parental free exercise rights the Supreme Court 
recognized in Prince, King County Hospital, and Yoder are not a by-prod-
uct of parents' legal responsibility for the welfare of children. Instead, 
these rights rest solely on the religious beliefs and preferences of the par-
ents. 59 Moreover, these rights give parents the legal authority to override 
the preferences of children and to treat them in ways contrary to state laws 
and regulations reasonably designed to protect children's interests. Parents 
can do so as long as the State is unable to demonstrate a compelling inter-
est-the likelihood of life-threatening or grievous physical harm to the chil-
dren or a grossly inadequate education. As such, parental free exercise 
rights actually constitute an entitlement to act in ways contrary to the nor-
mal legal responsibilities of a parent. 
57. /d. at 231. In denigrating the preferences of children who wish not to follow the dictates of 
the Amish faith with respect to education, the Court appears to suggest either that the parents' free 
exercise rights would trump the child's free exercise liberty, or that children have no free exercise 
liberty that would give force to their preferences. In this context, it is of interest to note that the Amish 
themselves apparently did not regard their children as having chosen their religion. The Court's 
summary of the facts states that "[a]dult baptism, which occurs in late adolescence, is the time at which 
Amish young people voluntarily undertake heayy obligations, not unlike the Bar Mitzvah of the Jews, to 
abide by the rules of the church community," id. at 210, and that the Amish regard adolescence as the 
crucial period of religious development, id. at 223. 
58. See also Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 600-04 (1979) {holding that the due process rights of 
children do not necessitate formal adversary proceedings when parents seek to commit their children to 
state mental institutions, because the rights of parents to direct the upbringing of their children operate to 
circumscnoe the rights of children). 
59. The Yoder decision does refer to parental duties when it invokes an oft-quoted passage from 
Pierce:" 'The child is not the mere creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny 
have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations." 406 
U.S. at 233 (quoting Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925)). The Yoder Court 
interpreted the parent's "high duty'' to prepare a child for "additional obligations" as including 
inculcation of religious beliefs. Id. But neither the language from Pierce nor anything in the Yoder 
opinion suggests that this parental right to prepare the child for additional obligations rests on or is 
justified in tenns of the duty, rather than merely being coupled with it. The passage appears to state 
simply that parents generally feel, and perhaps actually have, a moral obligation to train their children to 
fulfill the requirements of the parent's religion. As such, the Court's statement is at best superfluous 
rhetoric, and at worst borders on establishment of religion. Moreover, the Yoder opinion, as noted 
above, goes on to say that this "interest of the parent in the nurture and education of his children," by 
itself is insufficient to challenge the compulsory education law; it is the Free Exercise Clause that 
enables the parents to sunnount this reasonable state regulation. ld. As I explain infra Part III, it is a 
mistake to conclude from the fact that parents bear child-rearing responsibilities that parents must also 
have child-rearing rights, even rights that are limited in scope by the interests of the child (as parental 
free exercise rights clearly are not). 
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B. Lower Court Decisions 
Though the Supreme Court has not addressed a parental free exercise 
claim since Yoder, lower federal courts and state courts have done so on 
numerous occasions. This Section shows how lower courts have applied 
the doctrine of parental free exercise rights that the Supreme Court firmly 
established in Yoder. 
In Yoder, the Court placed great weight on the unique characteristics 
of the Amish community, a group isolated from the rest of society that had 
survived in a relatively unassimilated condition for centuries. Careful to 
limit its holding to the specific factual situation presented, the Court also 
reiterated the general power of the states to regulate schooling of any kind 
to ensure that it satisfies reasonable standards for the education of chil-
dren.60 However, subsequent lower court rulings have generally invoked 
Yoder to advance the position that the Free Exercise Clause guarantees par-
ents extensive rights to control the minds and bodies of their children. 
In the survey of lower court decisions that follows, it is apparent that 
societal interests in the welfare of children have often been found suffi-
ciently compelling to trump parental free exercise claims. Even in such 
cases, though, courts have continued to ignore or minimize the rights and 
interests of the children themselves. In many other cases, lower courts have 
allowed parental free exercise rights to prevail over state objections to par-
ticular child-rearing pratices. Thus, lower courts have continued to advance 
an interpretation of free exercise rights that effectively treats children as 
non-consenting instruments or means to the achievement of other persons' 
ends, rather than as persons in their own right, with interests of their own 
that are deserving of equal respect.61 It is this anomalous interpretation of 
constitutional rights that is challenged in Parts IT and ill. 
Because the vast majority of parental free exercise decisions in the 
lower courts arise in the context of either education or medical care,62 the 
60. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 236. 
61. At no point in this Article do I mean to attribute to parents raising free exercise challenges to 
state interference with their child-rearing practices wholly self-regarding motives or an instrumental 
view of their children. Rather, I contend that the courts treat children instrumentally insofar as they are 
willing to sacrifice what they view as the best interests of children to satisfy the desires of parents. 
Section lli.A, infra, suggests a more appropriate judicial approach to resolving these cases, and 
discusses the implications of the presumption of state neutrality in religious matters. 
62. An additional category of judicial decisions and legislation related to religious child-rearing 
comprises what might be called ''transfer-of-custody'' situations, e.g., adoption, foster care, and divorce. 
This category of cases is not included in the discussion below because legislation pertaining to those 
situations addresses the question of who is to possess child-rearing rights, rather than that of which 
particular child-rearing practices or decisions are permissible. In addition, the relevant judicial decisions 
involve either challenges to such legislation or conflicts between the parents themselves regarding 
particular practices, rather than conflicts between parents and the State over particular practices. 
It is worth noting, however, that legislative deference to parental free exercise rights has produced 
statutes in many states that accord biological parents the power to decide the religious upbringing of 
their child even when the child will be raised by someone else. These statutes require that state adoption 
and foster care agencies place children, when practicable and when the natural parents prefer (which is 
HeinOnline -- 82 Cal L. Rev. 1390 1994
1390 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82:1371 
discussion that follows focuses on these two types of cases. 
1. Education 
At least two states have codified a so-called "Amish exception" to 
their compulsory school attendance laws, permitting the Amish and mem-
bers of any similar religious community to educate their children at home, 
and to do so without meeting certain requirements the states impose on 
other "home schoolers."63 Courts have been reluctant to extend this narrow 
exception to non-Amish religious groups. For example, one federal court 
found that the Iowa statutory exception did not apply to non-Amish parents 
because they were not members of a centuries-old, unassimilated, and iso-
lated religious community. The court pointed out that the children of the 
assumed unless they indicate otherwise), with adoptive or foster parents of the same religion as tho 
biological parents. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CoDE § 8708(c) (West 1994) {adoption); CoLo. REv. STAT. 
ANN. § 19-3-101(2) (West Supp. 1994) (adoption); CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17a-93(e) (West 1992) 
(adoption); DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 13, § 9 I 1 (Supp. 1992) (adoption); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 4063 
(West 1992) (adoption); Mo. CoDE ANN., FAM. LAW § S-S20(a) (1984) {adoption); NEV. REv. STAT. 
ANN. § 432B.SS0(2) (Michie Supp. 1993) (adoption); N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAW§ 373 (McKinney 1992) 
(foster care and adoption); R.I. GEN. LAws § 15-7-13 (1988) (adoption). 
Courts, too, have been very deferential to parental free exercise rights in transfer-of-custody cases, 
which usually do not involve threats to children's well-being. See, e.g., Wilder v. Bernstein, 848 F.2d 
1338, 1346-47 (2d Cir. 1988) (holding that the free exercise rights of parents are satisfied when the 
State makes a reasonabl,e effort to ensure the "religious needs of the children are met" while in foster 
care); Pfoltzer v. County of Fairfax, 775 F. Supp. 874, 885 (E.D. Va. 1991) (noting that a "state should 
attempt to accommodate parents' religious preferences in selecting a foster care placement''), aff'd 
without op., No. 91-1844, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 14,447 {4th Cir. June 19, 1992); Wilder v. Sugarman, 
385 F. Supp. 1013, 1026 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (finding that a foster care matching statute did not violate the 
Establishment Clause because it was "reasonably necessary to satisfy Free Exercise rights" of parents 
and foster children); Dickens v. Ernesto, 281 N.E.2d 153, 157 (N.Y.) (allowing surrendering parents to 
express their religious preferences regarding adoptive parents), appeal dismissed, 401 U.S. 917 (1972). 
There may be a secular justification for these statutory provisions, insofar as they benefit a child 
whose natural parents might not otherwise be willing to put the child up for adoption or foster care. An 
additional justification in the case of foster care placements may be that, since the State makes such 
placements with a view ultimately to returning the child to her parents, religious matching allows for 
some continuity and stability in the child's otherwise disrupted life. In Sugannan, however, a federal 
court reviewing a New York statute found that the matching requirement did not have a solely secular 
purpose and might have the effect of advaneing religion. 385 F. Supp. at 1024. 
When divorced parents have conflicting religious views regarding some aspect of child-rearing, 
courts have tried to accommodate the religious liberty of both parents, but have generally given 
preference to the custodial parent where they have felt compelled to favor one parent or the other. See 
Donald L. Beschle, God Bless the Chf/d?: The Use of Religion as a Factor in Child Custody and 
Adoption Proceedings, 58 FoRDHAM L. REv. 383, 403-04, 421-22 (1989). For a review of legislation 
and judicial decisions concerning religious issues in child custody law, see Jordan C. Paul, "You Get the 
House. I Get the Car. You Get the Kids. I Get Their Souls." The Impact of Spiritual Custody Awards On 
the Free Exercise Rights of Custodial Parents, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 583 (1989). 
63. IowA CoDE ANN. § 299.24 (West Supp. 1994); S.D. CoDIFIED LAws ANN. § 13-27-1.1 
(1991). The Iowa law requires that the religious community's tenets "differ substantially from the 
objectives, goals, and philosophy of education embodied in" a list of required subjects for private 
schools. IowA CoDE ANN. § 299.24. If a religious community satisfies this requirement, and has been 
iu existenee since at least July I, 1957, its members need not comply with the regulations imposed on 
other home schoolers, e.g., those relating to certification of teachers and periodic reporting to state 
officials. /d. 
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plaintiffs were likely to make their way in the world at large when they 
reached adulthood, rather than remaining in a sheltered environment, and 
would have to be prepared to cope with modem institutions and to interact 
with people of diverse beliefs and ways of life.64 _ 
In a similar vein, the State' of New York recently took the extraordi-
nary step of creating a new school district, coterminous with the boundaries 
of a village established by an Hasidic Jewish community. The purpose of 
this measure was to allow the community to send its developmentally dis-
abled children to a school within the village, without having to incur the 
entire cost of the children's education.65 The community had long com-
plained to the State's Department of Education that they were compelled to 
send these children to public schools outside the village to receive special 
services. In the public schools, the children had to associate with people 
"'whose ways were [very] different from theirs'" and consequently suf-
fered" 'panic, fear and trauma.' "66 New York's highest court invalidated 
the State's effort to accommodate the religious preferences of the commu-
nity as a violation of the Establishment Clause,67 and the Supreme Court 
recently affirmed that holding.68 
In addition to these special legislative provisions for particular reli-
gious groups, most states permit almost anyone who satisfies certain 
requirements to educate a child at home.69 By one estimate, roughly one 
64. Fellowship Baptist Church v. Benton, 815 F.2d 485, 496-97 (8th Cir. 1987); see also Duro v. 
District Attorney, 712 F.2d 96 (4th Cir. 1983) (upholding North Carolina's compulsory school 
attendance law over a Pentecostalist's request to educate his children at home, emphasizing that the 
Pentecostal religion does not require that children be taught at home), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1006 
(1984); Howell v. State, 723 S.W.2d 755, 757-58 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986) (upholding the State's 
compulsory school attendance law where the parents failed to show that the law substantially burdened 
the exercise of their religious beliefs). 
65. See Grumet v. Board ofEduc., 618 N.E.2d 94 (N.Y. 1993}, aff'd, 114 S. Ct. 2481 (1994). 
66. !d. at 97 (quoting its earlier decision involving the same religious community, Board of Educ. 
v. Wieder, 527 N.E.2d 767, 770 (N.Y. 1988)). 
67. /d. at 101. The New York court did not clearly state whose religious preferences the State was 
accommodating-those of the parents of the children involved, those of all adults in the community, 
those of the children, or those of the community as a whole. Two judges dissented. contending that the 
state action was a permissible accommodation of the free exereise rights of the members of the 
community, including, they appear to suggest, the free exercise rights of the children. !d. at 118-19. 
68. Board of Educ. v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. 2481, 2492-93 (1994) (treating the legislation as an 
accomodation of tbe religious preferences of the community or sect as a whole). 
69. As of 1986, the laws of thirty states and the District of Columbia explicitly authorized home 
schooling, while the laws of eleven other states allowed for "instruction equivalent or otherwise similar 
to that provided in the public schools." Kara T. Burgess, Comment, The Constitutionality of Home 
Education Statutes, 55 UMKC L. REv. 69, 75 (1986). The nine states that did not authorize home 
education as of that date were lllinois, Kansas, Kentucky, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Mexico, 
North Dakota, Texas, and Wyoming. !d. at 75 n.58. Half of the states that gave explicit authorization 
did so for the first time between 1982 and 1986. See State v. Schmidt, 505 N.E.2d 627, 629 n.6 (Ohio), 
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 942 (1987). This trend reflected a groundswell of interest in opting out of the 
increasingly secularized public school system. Burgess, supra at 69, 71. 
Professor Lupu argues that the Supreme Court's line of substantive due process decisions regarding 
parental liberty, see eases cited supra note 19, do not support a constitutional claim to engage in home-
schooling, since those decisions invalidated state legislative efforts to limit the opportunities for 
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million families in this country presently do so.70 Most of these states 
require official approval of one or more aspects of the schooling that par-
ents intend to provide, but the requirements are generally quite minimal, 71 
doubtless signifying deference by these states to the putative rights of 
parents. 
Courts have upheld such minimal statutorily-imposed conditions on 
home schooling in most cases, even over the free exercise-based objections 
of parents.72 In doing so, however, they have reaffirmed that parents can 
claim substantial constitutional protection of their efforts to raise their chil-
dren in their own way. Further, courts have placed on school distriets the 
burden of showing that restrictions on home-schooling are the least restric-
tive means of serving a state interest sufficiently compelling to overcome 
parents' rights to direct the education of their children. 
transmission of knowledge to children, not efforts to expand such opportunities. Ira C. Lupu, Home 
Education, Religious Liberty, and the Separation of Powers, 67 B.U. L. REv. 971, 974-75 (1987). 
Professor Lupu further argues that there is no support in Yoder for a constitutional right to engage in 
home schooling. The Amish sent their children to school through the eighth grade. Further, the 
education they gave their teenagers was communal, and therefore involved a socializing component, 
rather than one limited to the individual family home. '"The state's interest in adequately socialized and 
educated children was thus more likely to be satisfied in the Yoder context than in the typical home 
education ease." !d. at 976. In addition, courts have rejected claims by parents that a state's 
authorization of private schooling without also authorizing home schooling violates the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Scoma v. Chicago Bd. ofEduc., 391 F. Supp. 452,461-62 (N.D. 
111. 1974); State v. Edgington, 663 P.2d 374, 378 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 662 P.2d 645 (N.M.), 
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 940 (1983). Nevertheless, state legislatures have liberalized laws relating to 
home schooling in response to parents' objections to existing regulations. See Burgess, supra at 83; 
Mark Murphy, Note, A Constitutional Analysis of Compulsory School Attendance Laws in the 
Southeast: Do They Unlawfolly Interfere With Alternatives to Public Education?, 8 GA. ST. U. L. RBv. 
457, 480, 482 (1992). 
70. Murphy, supra note 69, at 457. 
71. See Burgess, supra note 69, at 75-77. State regulations pertaining to home schooling vary 
considerably in their stringency. As of 1986, only eleven states mandated any form of certification of 
the home instructor, and only nine required periodic academic testing of the children. !d. at 76. 
Alabama's regulations are among the most restrictive; home schooling parents or private tutors must 
hold a teaching certificate equivalent to that held by a public school teacher, must give instruction in 
each of the subject areas taught in public schools for a total of at least three hours a day for at least 140 
days a year, and must keep a register of work completed and ''make such reports as the state board of 
education may require." ALA. CoDE § 16-28-5 (1987). Florida, in contrast, does not require home 
schooling parents to themselves have any education whatsoever. It does require parents without a 
teacher's certificate to maintain a portfolio of the child's work and to have their child undergo an annual 
educational assessment. Parents of children who fail to progress at a level commensurate with their 
ability are given one year to get the child back on track before they must send the child to an approved 
school. FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 232.02(4)(b) (West Supp. 1994). In Georgia, borne schooling parents need 
only possess a high school diploma or GED equivalency diploma and complete attendance and progress 
assessment reports. GA. CoDE ANN. § 20-2-690(c) (Harrison 1990). Missouri bas neither a certification 
requirement for home instructors nor a requirement that students in home schools take periodic tests. 
Instead, state law simply mandates that children receive a minimum number of hours of instruction in 
certain academic subjects and that parents maintain a record of instruction, evaluations, and a portfolio 
containing samples of the student's work. Mo. ANN. STAT.§ 167.031.2(2) (Vernon Supp. 1994). 
72. E.g., State v. Rivera, 497 N.W.2d 878, 880 (Iowa 1993) (upholding reporting requirement); 
Care & Protection of Charles, 504 N.E.2d 592 (Mass. 1987) (same). 
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For example, Blackwelder v. Safoauer13 concerned objections by 
Fundamentalist Christian parents to the State's minimum educational stan-
dards for home schools. The parents claimed that their faith commanded 
them to provide their children with a Christian education that interwove 
their religious values into every area of study. The parents contended that 
the State's power to approve or disapprove the way in which they educated 
their children would impermissibly burden their faith. In other words, they 
demanded a privilege to train their children however they wished and a 
negative claim-right against any oversight by state education officials. 
The Blackwelder court noted the 
tension between the desire of parents to prevent the exposure of 
their minor children to "attitudes, goals, and values contrary to [the 
parents' religious] beliefs" ... and the interest of those children in 
having access to ideas that might conflict with their parents' notions 
of religious propriety so that those children are better able to make 
informed choices later in life. 74 
The court ultimately rejected the parents' claim. But rather than suggest 
that the parents' desire to control the minds of their children is an inappro-
priate basis for a constitutionally protected liberty, the court simply found 
that the compelling interests of the State in regulating home schooling out-
weighed the parents' constitutionally protected interests in giving their chil-
dren a religious education.75 Significantly, the court pointed out that there 
might be "cases in which the manner the state enforces [its education regu-
lations] unnecessarily infringes the free exercise rights of ... parents,"76 as 
would have been the case had the State required "the teaching of secular 
matters that [we ]re inconsistent with their fundamentalist Christian 
beliefs."77 
The great bulk of lower court free exercise decisions in the education 
context has not involved home schooling, but rather parents' objections to 
various state regulations of private, church-run schools. State regulation 
and oversight of private schools is generally even more minimal than regu-
lation and oversight of home schools,78 again no doubt reflecting deference 
73. 689 F. Supp. 106, 128 (N.D.N.Y. 1988), appeal dismissed, 866 F.2d 548 (2d Cir. 1989). 
74. /d. at 131 (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 218 (1972)) (alteration in original) 
(internal citation omitted). 
75. !d. at 130-31, 135. 
76. !d. at 135. 
77. !d. at 130. 
78. Burgess, supra note 69, at 76 (noting that of the eleven states requiring certification of home 
instructors, six do not require certification of teachers in private schools). Some states in recent years 
have eschewed regulation of private schools altogether, instead monitoring performance by requiring 
simply that students in these schools take standardized achievement tests. North Carolina even permits 
each private school to choose whatever nationally standardized test it wishes to administer to its 
students, and to define the minimum acceptable score. Denise M. Bainton, Note, State Regulation of 
Private Religious Schools and the State's Interest in Education, 25 Aruz. L. REv. 123, 145 (1983); see 
also PAUL F. PARSoNs, INSIDE AMERICA's CHRISTIAN SCHOOLS 146-50 (1987). 
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by state legislators and school boards to the supposed rights of parents. 
Courts have generally upheld state regulations of private schools against 
free exercise challenges. However, in the rare instance when a state has 
made more than a superficial effort to monitor the quality of the education 
children receive in religious schools, courts have found the State's efforts to 
be an unwarranted burden upon parents' free exercise rights. 
For example, in State v. Whisner, 79 the Ohio Supreme Court heard a 
challenge by a Fundamentalist Christian school to the State's minimum 
education standards, and held that these standards unduly burdened parents' 
free exercise of religion. The court found that a regulation allocating 
instructional time for required subjects was unconstitutional because it 
would interfere with " 'rights of conscience,' by requiring a set amount of 
time to be devoted to subjects which, by their very nature, may not easily 
lend themselves to the teaching of religious principles (e.g., mathemat-
ics)."80 The court also struck down Ohio's requirement that all activities of 
a non-public school conform to policies adopted by the boru:d of education 
and that such a school "cooperate with elements of the community in which 
it exists."81 The combined effect of the State's regulations, the court con-
tended, would be to "repose power in the state Department of Education to 
control the essential elements of non-public education in this state."82 
A decision by a federal district court in Massachusetts provides further 
evidence that courts view parental free exercise rights as a barrier to sub-
stantial state regulation of religious schools. In New Lifo Baptist Church 
Academy v. Town of East Longmeadow, 83 the court ruled that the State's 
school approval requirement, which entailed "considerable surveillance of 
the school" and turned in part on the qualifications of teachers, burdened 
the free exercise rights of parents and was not the least restrictive means for 
accomplishing the State's objective of ensuring an adequate education for 
children. 84 The court recognized that this case presented ''the question of 
whether it is legitimate for the state to require that children be educated 
79. 351 N.E.2d 750 (Ohio 1976). One commentator has described this decision as having 
''profound importance to Christian schools in Ohio and elsewhere." James C. Carper, The Whisner 
Decision: A Case Study in State Regulation of Christian Day Schools, 24 J. CHURCH & ST. 281, 282 
(1982). 
80. Whisner, 351 N.E.2d at 765 (footnote omitted). 
81. Id. at 767. This last requirement conflicted with the Fundamentalists' belief in the importance 
of separation from the rest of society. See Carper, supra note 79, at 288. 
82. Whisner, 351 N.E.2d at 770. 
83. 666 F. Supp. 293 (D. Mass. 1987), rev'd on other grounds, 885 F.2d 940 (1st Cir. 1989), cert. 
denied, 494 U.S. 1066 (1990). 
84. Id. at 294-95. Relying on Yoder and Plyler v. Doe, 451 U.S. 202 (1982), the court construed 
an adequate education as one that provides simply a " 'basic education' imparting 'basic skills.' " New 
Life Baptist. Church Academy, 666 F.Supp. at 318. The Court of Appeals reversed the district court's 
decision in New Life Baptist Church Academy only because the district court erred in concluding that 
standardized testing of students and individual follow-up, perhaps coupled with a teacher certification 
requirement, would be both less restrictive and adequate for the State's purposes. The higher court did 
not challenge the finding that the approval process burdened the parents' free exercise rights. New Life 
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to assure that they can, and likely will, make an intelligent choice between 
submitting to their parents' religious beliefs or selecting a more con-
ventional, secular style oflife."85 In answering this question negatively, the 
district court relied on Yoder for the proposition that a religious interest 
extends the scope of parental liberty beyond that protected by the 
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause. Under Yoder, the State is not 
empowered to save a child from his parents by ensuring the child's growth 
toward intellectual autonomy. Allowing the State this power would conflict 
with what the court deemed a fundamental interest of the parents " 'to guide 
the religious future and education of their children.' "86 
In those cases where courts have rejected parents' free exercise chal-
lenges to private-school regulations, they have done so only after subjecting 
the regulations to heightened scrutiny.87 Of particular note is a 1985 Iowa 
decision that, while recognizing the constitutionality of a state law requiring 
merely that all school teachers possess state certification and make periodic 
reports to the State, carved out for parents expansive child-rearing authority 
and independence under the Free Exercise Clause.88 The court agreed with 
Baptist Church Academy v. Town of East Longmeadow, 885 F.2d 940, 946 (1st Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 
494 u.s. 1066 (1990). 
85. New Life Baptist Church Academy, 666 F. Supp. at 318. 
86. ld. at 318-19 (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972)). 
In Moody v. Cronin, 484 F. Supp. 270 (C.D. Ill. 1979), the court sustained a parental free exercise 
objection to co-ed physical education. The court found that "daily exposure of the children to worldly 
influences in terms of attitudes and values of dress contrary to their religious beliefs ... interferes with 
the religious development of ihe Pentecostal children and their integration into the ••• Pentecostal ... 
community at the crucial adolescent stage of development" ld. at 276. 
Another court refused a request by Apostolic Lutheran parents that a public school allow their 
children to leave the classroom whenever teachers used audio-visual equipment for educational 
purposes. Davis v. Page, 385 F. Supp. 395, 399, 401 (D.N.H. 1974). The court recognized a burden on 
the parents' free exercise rights, arising from the fact that the use of such equipment "allow[ed] to be 
done in the school what [was] prohibited at home." ld. at 399. However, it found that, because teachers 
used such equipment in the classroom quite frequently, allowing the children to leave the classroom in 
all instances would deny them an effective education since there was no reasonable alternative means 
available for giving the children the same instruction. !d. at 401. The court did rule, though, that the 
school must allow the children to leave the classroom when audio-visual equipment was used for 
entertainment purposes, beeause "[i]n this sitnation, the parents' interests become predominant." Id. 
87. See, e.g., Murphy v. Arkansas, 852 F.2d 1039 (8th Cir. 1988) (statute requiring standardized 
testing of students schooled at home passes strict scrutiny mandated by Yoder); Fellowship Baptist 
Church v. Benton, 815 F.2d 485 (8th Cir. 1987) {upholding reporting and teacher certification 
requirements for non-public schools); North Valley Baptist Church v. McMahon, 696 F. Supp. 518,526, 
529 (E.D. Cal. 1988) {finding state licensing regime for private pre-schools necessary to satisfy state's 
compelling interest in health and safety of children), aff'd, 893 F.2d 1139 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 496 
U.S. 937 (1990); Sheridan Road Baptist Church v. Departmeut ofEduc., 396 N.W.2d 373 (Mich. 1986) 
{upholding certification requirement for teachers in parochial schools), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1050 
(1987); State ex rei. Douglas v. Faith Baptist Church, 301 N.W.2d 571 (Neb.) (upholding requirements 
for school approval, reporting of children's names, teacher certification, and state inspection), appeal 
dismissed, 454 U.S. 803 (1981); State v. Corpus Christi People's Baptist Church, 683 S.W.2d 692 (Tex. 
1984) {upholding licensing requirements imposed on church-run day-care facility), appeal dismissed, 
474 u.s. 801 (1985). 
88. Johnson v. Charles City Community Schs. Bd. ofEduc., 368 N.W.2d 74 (Iowa), cert. denied 
sub nom. Pruessner v. Benton, 474 U.S. 1033 (1985). 
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the State that the law constituted only a minimal interference in the affairs 
of the school, but cautioned: 
We agree with plaintiffs' contention that the religious freedoms 
guaranteed them under the first amendment entitle them to educate 
their children at the private religious school they have established. 
The same guarantees accord them the right to operate the school 
with minimal necessary supervision by the state . 
. . . The whole purpose of such a school is to foster the devel-
opment of their children's minds in a religious environment. If the 
state were to unnecessarily control teacher selection a free exercise 
right could be threatened . 
. . . The parents have the clear right to select for [their children] 
teachers with religious convictions which are consistent with the 
purpose of the school. 89 
In upholding the regulation, the court emphasized that the legislation at 
issue would not prevent the school from selecting Fundamentalist Christian 
teachers, nor from teaching required subjects "in its own way,"90 which 
meant permeating all curricular materials with biblical teachings, presenting 
all subjects only from a biblical point of view, and requiring all parents of 
students, as well as all teachers, supervisors, and assistants, to agree with 
the church's doctrinal position.91 Thus, the Iowa court clearly understood 
the Free Exercise Clause to protect the Fundamentalist parents against any 
but the most minimal state requirements.92 Whether the schooling to which 
the parents subjected their children was on the whole conducive to their 
well-being, let alone whether it was the best available educational alterna-
tive for the children, was apparently rendered irrelevant by the religious 
motivation of the parents. 
2. Medical Care 
Both before and since the King County Hospital litigation,93 a great 
number of states have provided exemptions in their child abuse and neglect 
laws for parents who sincerely object to particular forms of medical treat-
ment on religious grounds. Many states first enacted such exemptions after 
the United States Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, in imple-
89. Id. at 76, 80-81. 
90. Id. at 83. 
91. Id. at 76. The aspects of public school education that these fundamentalists most emphatically 
opposed were the Darwinian theory of evolution, id. at 77, and "a multicultural non-sexist approach for 
the teaching of subjects,'' id. at 82 n.2 (internal quotation omitted). 
92. The mandated reports were to include only the name and age of the child, the period of 
instruction, a description of the course of study, and the name of the teacher. See IowA Cooa ANN. 
§ 299.4 (West Supp. 1994). 
93. See supra text accompanying notes 29-32. 
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menting the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act of 1974,94 
mandated such an exemption as a condition for receiving federal funds 
under the Act.95 As of 1993, a total of forty-four states and the District of 
Columbia included such exemptions in their abuse and neglect laws, 
thereby precluding prosecution under those laws of parents whose children 
die or become ill as a result of the parents' failure to obtain medical care.96 
Despite the typically blanket nature of these statutory exemptions,97 
states have effectively limited their scope to non-fatal cases by successfully 
prosecuting parents under criminal statutes other than their abuse and 
neglect laws. States have convicted parents under manslaughter or felony 
endangerment laws where children have died for lack of treatment, even 
where the child neglect laws included a "spiritual treatment" exemption.98 
This back-door approach has recently come under attack, however, as some 
courts have overturned manslaughter or murder convictions of parents on 
due process grounds. These courts have found that the religious exemp-
tions in neglect laws lead parents to believe that they are free not to seek 
medical care for their children, so that the laws of the State as a whole do 
not give parents unambiguous or fair notice of their legal duty.99 
Among the judicial decisions addressing such spiritual treatment 
94. 42 U.S.C. § 5101 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). 
95. Eric W. Treene, Note, Prayer-Treatment Exemptions to Child Abuse and Neglect Statutes, 
Manslaughter Prosecutions, and Due Process of Law, 30 liARv. J. ON LEGIS. 135, 141 (1993). This 
requirement was eliminated in 1983, but no states repealed their exemptions as a result. Id. 
96. Id. at 140. One typical statute reads: 
Any parent, guardian or other person having care, custody, or control of a minor child 
who in good faith is under treatment solely by spiritual means through prayer in accordance 
with the tenets and practices of a recognized church or religious denomination shall not, for 
that reason alone, be considered in violation of this section. 
VA. CooE ANN.§ 18.2-37l.l(C) (Michie Supp. 1994). 
97. Only Oklahoma expressly limits the scope of its spiritual treatment exemption in terms of the 
degree of danger to the health of a child, confining it to cases in which there is no danger of permanent 
physical damage. Treene, supra note 95, at 145. 
98. See, e.g., Walker v. Superior Court, 763 P.2d 852 (Cal. 1988), cert. denied, 491 U.S. 905 
(1989); Funkhouser v. State, 763 P.2d 695 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1066 (1989); 
Commonwealth v. Cottam, 616 A.2d 988 (Pa. Super. Ct.), appeal denied, 636 A.2d 632 (Pa. 1993); 
Commonwealth v. Barnhart, 497 A.2d 616 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985), appeal denied. 538 A.2d 874 (Pa.), 
cert. denied, 488 U.S. 817 (1988); State v. Norman, 808 P.2d 1159 (Wash. Ct. App.), review denied, 
818 P.2d 1099 (Wash. 1991). 
There was precedent in early English common law for completely excusing parents for allowing 
their children to die for lack of medical care because their religious beliefs were opposed to the required 
treatment. See Regina v. Downes, I Q.B.D. 25,29 (1875) (citing Regina v. Hines, 80 Central Crim. Ct. 
Sessions Paper 309 and Regina v. Wagstaffe, 10 Cox Crim. Cas. 530). American courts, however, 
began to take a different view early in this century. See Judith Inglis Scheiderer, Note, When Children 
Die as a Result of Religious Practices, 51 Omo ST. L.J. 1429, 1431 (1990). · 
As the discussion of permissible state interventions to order treatment below reveals, the Free 
Exercise Clause clearly does not compel states to create an exemption applicable to fatal cases, but on 
the reading of some courts it may compel an exemption applicable to non-fatal cases. See infra notes 
108-14 and accompanying text. 
99. See, e.g. Hermanson v. State, 604 So. 2d 775, 776 (Fla. 1992); State v. McKown, 475 N.W.2d 
63 (Minn. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 882 (1992). 
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exemptions, one is extraordinary for its unique appreciation of what is 
wrong with those provisions from a child-welfare perspective. In State v. 
Miskimens, the court prospectively invalidated the religious exemption in 
Ohio's neglect laws, in part on equal protection grounds. The court found 
that the exemption denied the equal protection of the neglect laws to the 
children of parents whose religious beliefs direct them not to seek medical 
care. 100 Manifesting a rare recognition of the separate personhood and dis-
tinct interests of children, the court stated: 
This special protection should be guaranteed to all such children 
until they have their own opportunity to make life's important reli-
gious decisions for themselves upon attainment of the age of reason. 
After all, given the opportunity when grown up, a child may some-
day choose to reject the most sincerely held of his parents' religious 
beliefs, just as the parents on trial here have apparently grown to 
reject some beliefs of their parents. Equal protection should not be 
denied to innocent babies, whether under the label of "religious free-
dom" or otherwise. 101 
The Miskimens court thus rejected the idea that the exemption might 
be an appropriate accommodation of the religious interests of parents, in 
terms suggesting just the sort of in-principle limitation on rights that this 
Article urges. Picking up on the language in Prince suggesting that free 
exercise rights protect only self-determining behavior, 102 the court drew a 
line between exercising one's religious rights by refusing medical care for 
oneself, and preventing another person from receiving medical care. 103 It is 
particularly noteworthy that the court put children on the same footing as 
adults, implicitly recognizing children as full legal persons. Unfortunately, 
this decision is unique among free exercise cases in its recognition of equal 
protection rights for children, its in-principle limitation of the religious 
rights of parents, and its respect for the morally distinct personhood of 
100. 490 N.E.2d 931, 935 (1984). The parents were charged with child endangerment for 
neglecting to obtain medical care for their infant son, who died of a bacterial infection. The court 
dismissed the charges on the ground that the laws of the State pertaining to parental failure to obtain 
medical care were unconstitutionally vague. !d. at 937-38. The court also held that the State's religious 
treatment exemption violated both the Establishment Clause, by favoring one religion over others 
(Ohio's exemption, like that of many other states, is drafted in such a way as to apply almost exclusively 
to Christian Scientists}, and the equal protection rights of parents not entitled to the exemption. !d. at 
935. 
10 I. !d. at 935-36. 
102. 
Parents may be free to become martyrs themselves. But it does not follow they are free, in 
identical circumstances, to make martyrs of their children before they have reached the age of 
full and legal discretion when they can make that choice for themselves. 
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944), quoted in Misldmens, 490 N.E.2d at 934. 
103. Misldmens, 490 N.E.2d at 934 (noting that "[T]he right to hold one's own religious beliefs, 
and to act in conformity with those beliefs, does not and cannot include the right to endanger the life or 
health of others, including his or her children."). 
HeinOnline -- 82 Cal L. Rev. 1399 1994
1994] PARENTS' REliGION AND CHILDREN'S WELFARE 1399 
children.104 
More important than prosecuting parents for allowing their children to 
die, however, is the ability of courts to intervene to secure treatment for 
children before they die. At least ten states with prayer exemptions also 
explicitly provide by statute that such exemptions do not preclude a court 
from ordering treatment for a child despite her parents' religious objec-
tions.105 The laws of most states include more general provisions empow-
ering courts to declare a child who is not receiving proper care a dependent 
or ward of the court for the limited purpose of giving the court authority to 
order necessary medical treatment.106 Courts have done so even over the 
religious objections of parents.107 
What is troubling, however, is that when parents assert a claim of reli-
gious freedom against state intervention, courts are willing to step in and 
order treatment only in extreme cases. Their reluctance to intervene typi-
cally arises not from concern that state intervention might be more trau-
matic for the child than the threatened injury, but rather from deference to 
the supposed religious rights of parents. Courts have uniformly permitted 
state officials to order medical treatment where necessary to save the life of 
a child, but have divided over the question of whether the State may order 
medical treatment to avoid grievous injury short of death. 108 And no court 
has decided that it is constitutionally permissible to override the religious 
objections of parents to medical treatment when the danger is ofless serious 
injury. 
A Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision is representative of the minor-
ity view that the Free Exercise Clause precludes state intervention to order 
104. The bulk oflegal commentary relating to spiritual healing likewise manifests a greater concern 
with the rights of parents than with the well-being of children, containing frequent recommendiltions for 
legislative changes to better protect the due process or free exercise rights of parents. See, e.g., 
Christine A. Clark, Religious Accommodation and Criminal Liability, 17 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 559,585-
87 (1990); Edward E. Smith, Note, The Criminalization of Belief: When Free Exercise Isn't, 42 
HAsnNos L.J. 1491, 1521-24 (1991); Treene, supra note 95, at 197-99. 
105. Treene, supra note 95, at 144-45. 
106. McCarthy, supra note 6, at 1020-21. 
107. See, e.g., Novak v. Cobb County-Kennestone Hosp. Auth., 849 F. Supp. 1559 (N.D. Ga. 1994) 
(rejecting federal and state causes of action based on court-ordered blood t;ansfusion for 16-year-old 
Jehovah's Witness against the wishes of the child and his mother); People ex rei. Wallace v. Labrenz, 
104 N.E.2d 769 (Ill.) (affirming order appointing guardian to consent to blood transfusion necessary to 
prevent death of child of Jehovah's Witnesses), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 824 (1952); In re Hamilton, 657 
S.W.2d 425 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983) (State may require cancer treatment for twelve-year-old child despite 
religious objections of parents). 
108. Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit endorse the view that courts should override the medical 
decisions of parents, whether religiously motivated or not, only when denial of treatment would result in 
death for a child who could otherwise enjoy "a life worth living or a life of relatively normal healthy 
growth." See GoLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 7, at 92. Professor Wald criticizes these authors for being 
more concerned with preventing judges from exercising value judgments than with protecting the 
welfare of children, Wald, supra note 7, at 682, and proposes that courts order medical treatment when 
necessary to prevent seriqus physical injury or severe emotional damage, Wal~ supra note 15, at 1019, 
1030. For a more comprehensive presentation of cases prior to 1983 involving religious or non-religious 
objections by parents to proposed forms of medical treatment of children, see Sher, supra note 3. 
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medical treatment over the religious objections of parents absent risk that 
the child will die. 109 The In re Green decision, which followed closely on 
the heels of Yoder, allowed a mother to deny her sixteen-year-old son an 
operation that would have corrected his paralytic scoliosis, a curvature of 
the spine that made the son unable to stand or walk and that would soon 
have made him bedridden. The mother, a Jehovah's Witness, initially con-
sented to the corrective procedure but, because of her religious beliefs, 
refused to consent to the blood transfusions that would have been necessary 
to perform the operation. The court acknowledged that Prince held that the 
State may in some situations limit parental authority where necessary to 
protect the health or safety of the child, but found in the Yoder opinion 
evidence that the standard for state intervention is danger of death, not 
merely grievous injury or illness.U0 Absent such a danger, the court 
asserted, the State's interest in ordering the medical care is not sufficient to 
outweigh the religious preferences of the parent. 111 
Fortunately, the majority view today is to the contrary. In a decision 
representative of this view, Muhlenberg Hospital v. Patterson, 112 a New 
Jersey court ruled that the State can intervene to order a blood transfusion 
for a child over the religious objections of the child's parents when the 
transfusion is necessary to prevent grievous injury. In dictum, however, the 
court stated that the government could not intervene if only the likelihood 
of a lesser injury existed: "The Courts have been and will continue to be 
109. In re Green, 292 A.2d 387 (Pa. 1972); see also In re D.L.E., 614 P.2d 873, 874 (Colo. 1980) 
(overturning juvenile court adjudication of 12-year-old as a dependent of the State arising from mother's 
refusal on religous grounds to comply with program of treatment for son's seizures, stating: "In reaching 
our decision, we emphasize by way of limitation that this is not a case where D.L.E.'s life is in imminent 
danger through a lack of medical care.''); cf. In re Cabrera, 552 A.2d 1114, 1120 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) 
(ordering blood transfusion for six-year-old was consistent with In re Green where there was substantial 
risk of death). 
110. In re Green, 292 A.2d at 390-91. The court quoted a passage from the Yoder opinion stating 
that parental power, " 'even when linked to a free exercise claim, may be subject to limitation under 
Prince if it appears that parental decisions will jeopardize the health or safety of the child, or have a 
potential for significant social burdens,' " but noted that the only analogous case that the Yoder opinion 
cited in connection with that passage was one involving a life or death situation. Id. (quoting Wisconsin 
v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,233-34 (1972)). The court also drew on ''the broad holding of Yoder that the 
state's interest in the edueation of its children must fall before a parent's religious beliefs." Id. at 391. 
I I I. I d. at 392. Three dissenting Justices criticized the majority for giving primary consideration to 
the mother's religious beliefs rather than to the health of the son. Id. at 393-95 (Eagen, J., dissenting). 
The court ultimately remanded the case for a determination of the views of the son, but without deciding 
whether the son's preferences would trump the mother's beliefs if they turned out to be inconsistent. Id. 
at 392. The court distinguished the Yoder holding that the views of the Amish children were irrelevant 
sinee the Amish children were not parties to that litigation and not subject to prosecution, on the basis 
that in the case before it the son was directly involved. Id. 
112. 320 A.2d 518 (NJ. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1974). The child in this case was a six-day-old boy 
with jaundice and a high bilirubin count, who would soon have suffered "severe and irreparable brain 
damage" without a blood transfusion. Id. at 519; see also In re Sampson, 278 N.E.2d 918 (N.Y. 1972) 
(upholding order of blood transfusions needed during surgery to improve function and appearonce of 
child's face and neck). Most legal commentary on the subject also favors this view. See, e.g., Mike 
Hulen, Case Note, 27 ARK. L. REv. 151 (1973); Wald,supra note 15, at 1019, 1030; Kenneth P. Walsh, 
Recent Case, 77 DICK. L. REv. 693 (1972-73). 
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the guardian of the religious rights of the individual[] to see that this power 
of the State is not exercised beyond the area where treatment is necessary 
for the sustaining oflife or the prevention of grievous bodily injury."113 In 
other words, even in the view of this court, the Free Exercise Clause does 
secure for parents a right, when their religious beliefs so require, to cause 
their children to suffer avoidable illness or bodily injury, so long as that 
injury is not "grievous."114 
In addition to the spiritual treatment exemption to general abuse and 
neglect laws, many states also include religious objection exemptions in 
statutes mandating specific types ofmedical care for children.115 For exam-
ple, a Massachusetts law requiring that school children receive certain vac-
cinations exempted children of parents who were members of a recognized 
church or religious denomination whose tenets conflict with the practice of 
immunization.116 In Dalli v. Board of Education, 117 Massachusetts' 
Supreme Judicial Court struck down the statutory exemption when it was 
challenged by a parent who objected to vaccination for his child on reli-
gious grounds, but who was not a member of a recognized church or reli-
gious denominationY8 The court found that this preferential treatment of 
some forms of religion over others violated the equal protection guarantee 
of the First and Fourteenth Amendments, 119 presumably because it consti-
tuted an establishment of religion and afforded unequal protection of the 
law for some parents. 
The Dalli decision is striking in its utter disregard for the interests of 
the plaintiff's child. The court expressed sympathy for the plaintiff parent 
and for parents who had previously enjoyed the exemption, and suggested 
that they petition the state legislature for an exemption sufficiently broad as 
not to offend the United States Constitution. The court opined that the orig-
inal exemption was "an appropriate mark of deference to the sincere reli-
gious beliefs of the few which at the same time created a minimal hazard to 
the health of the many," and noted medical evidence that there was no real 
113. Muhlenberg Hosp., 320 A2d at 521. 
114. The importance of parental support for a child undergoing medical treatment may counsel in 
favor of raising the threshold for state-ordered treatment above simply a finding that treatment would 
effect some modest improvement in the child's health. SeeWald, supra note 15, at 1030. On the other 
hand, the common assumption that parents know what is best for a child seems particularly inapposite in 
medical contexts, especially where parents' objections to treatment are based on religious beliefs. 
115. E.g., CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 25-4-1005 (West 1990) (screening ofnewboms for disease or 
physical defects); DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 16, § 122(3)(n) (Supp. 1992) (immunization); HAwAII REv. 
STAT. ANN. § 321-11(22) (Supp. 1993) (immunization); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 410, para. 235/6 (Smith-
Hurd 1993) (immunization); N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 2164(8) (McKinney 1993) (immunization); 
OHio REv. CoDE ANN. § 3701.504(8) (Anderson 1992) (testing for bearing impairment); TEX. HEALTH 
& SAFETY CoDE ANN. § 36.005(b) (West 1992) (screening for vision and hearing disorders); WYo. 
STAT. § 21-4-309 (1992) (immunization). 
116. MASs. GEN. L. ch. 76, § 15 (1982). 
117. 267 N.E.2d 219 (Mass. 1971). 
118. !d. at 222-23. 
119. /d. 
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danger to public health if only a small number of children remained suscep-
tible to the contagious diseases. 120 The court failed to consider that the 
danger to the religious parent's unvaccinated child might itself be a compel-
ling reason for eliminating any exemptions. 
In Brown v. Stone, 121 a Mississippi court likewise struck down a reli-
gious exemption from a state law requiring vaccination of all school chil-
dren as a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment rights of persons not 
covered by the exemption. This court did show sensitivity to the interests 
of the children of religious objectors, asking incredulously: "Is it mandated 
by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution that innocent 
children, too young to decide for themselves, are to be denied the protection 
against crippling and death that immunization provides because of a reli-
gious belief adhered to by a parent or parents?"122 The court answered this 
question in the negative, finding that the immunization requirement "serves 
an overriding and compelling public interest."123 This decision was atypi-
cal in its reference to children's positive claim-rights against their parents 
and parents' correlative duties to provide for the basic welfare of their chil-
dren.124 Even this court, however, did not challenge the notion that parents 
have the right, in general, to decide important matters for their children, and 
to do so even in ways that adversely affect the children's interests, as long 
as the harm neither violates a recognized legal right of the children nor 
gives rise to a compelling state interest in preventing it. In its free exercise 
analysis, the court apparently understood its task to be a balancing of state 
interests in the welfare of the plaintiff's children and of other children 
in the school against what it accepted as the parents' legitimate First 
Amendment claim to religious freedom. 125 
The above cases and others arising in the medical-care context do not 
take up the suggestion in Prince and King County Hospital that parental 
free exercise rights encompass only religious indoctrination and involve-
ment of children in religious practices.126 To the extent that they refer to 
either of these Supreme Court holdings, these lower court decisions gener-
ally focus on the negative statement in Prince that constitutionally protected 
120. !d. at 223. 
121. 378 So. 2d 218 (Miss. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 887 (1980). 
122. !d. at 221. In other passages, however, the court indicated, rather incomprehensibly, that the 
statutory exemption actually violated the equal protection rights of children whose parents were not 
entitled to the exemption, rather than the children who did not receive the vaccination, because "it would 
require the great body of school children to be vaccinated and at the same time expose them to the 
hazard of associating in school with children exempted under the religious exemption who had not been 
immunized." !d. at 223. Apparently the court viewed the children of non-exempt parents as somehow 
vulnerable to harm despite the fact that they had been immunized. The court implied that this latter 
group of children would receive the equal protection that was their due if they too were not immunized. 
123. Id. at 222. 
124. !d. at 223. 
125. See id. at 222-23. 
126. See supra text accompanying notes 28-34. 
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religious rights do not include a right to expose one's children to ill health 
or death or to make martyrs of them.127 This is a significantly lesser limita-
tion than would be posed by a rule confining those rights to religious cere-
monies and indoctrination. 
In sum, in the areas of religious schooling and medical care, lower 
federal courts and state courts have consistently interpreted the Free 
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment to guarantee parents a right to 
control the mental and physical lives of their children. This right is not 
always controlling, but only a compelling state interest can override it. 
Often courts have found the State's interest in protecting children's welfare 
to be compelling, but few decisions have even suggested that children 
themselves might have rights that should override or limit parents' rights. 
Yoder, in fact, casts doubt on the viability of such a claim.128 And except 
perhaps for the Miskimens decision, no court has suggested that it is alto-
gether a mistake to :find that parents have a right to determine the course of 
their children's lives merely on the basis of parents' religious preferences. 
Moreover, state legislatures have shown substantial deference to the reli-
gious interests of parents, even beyond that required by the Constitution. 
Thus, in the area of education, parental free exercise rights entitle par-
ents to send their children to religious schools rather than public schools, or 
to educate their children at home if they belong to a centuries-old religious 
community isolated from the rest of society. These rights generally do not 
prevent states from requiring that religious schools go through a minimally 
intrusive approval process. However, by subjecting any state regulation or 
oversight of religious schools to strict scrutiny, parental free exercise rights 
prevent the State from undertaking any substantial efforts to ensure that 
children in these schools receive an adequate education and are not sub-
jected to demeaning or traumatizing indoctrinatory practices. 
In the area of medical care, most state legislatures defer to parental 
free exercise rights by excusing parents from the usual obligation to secure 
medical care for their children, as long as the children do not die as a result. 
In addition, courts will intervene to order medical care for a child when 
parents have religious objections only in those extreme cases where the 
child is threatened with grievous injury. Thus construed, the Free Exercise 
Clause gives parents a right to harm their children to any lesser extent.129 
Of course, adults do not enjoy the same rights of control over the edu-
cation or medical care of children not in their legal custody. The Seventh 
127. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944). 
128. See discussion supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text. 
129. I have not even touched on the situation of children whose parents belong to religious cults. 
For a description of the routine maltreatment of children in these cults, and of the difficulties facing 
child welfare workers who might seek to identify such abuse, see Susan Landa, Children and Cults: A 
Practical Guide, 29 J. FAM. L. 591 (1990-91). There appear to be no published opinions concerning 
state intervention to protect children in religious cults, which suggests that such interventions are rare. 
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Circuit's decision in Palmer v. Board of Education 130 is instructive in thls 
regard. The plaintiff in that case was a public school teacher and a 
Jehovah's Witness who demanded the right not to implement aspects of 
"the prescribed curriculum concerning patriotic matters," whlch she 
claimed conflicted with her religious principles. 131 In rejecting thls 
demand, the court intimated that the teacher's free exercise rights extend 
only to her self-determining behavior: "Plaintiff's right to her own reli-
gious views and practices remains unfettered, but she has no constitutional. 
right to require others to submit to her views and to forego a portion of their 
education they would otherwise be entitled to enjoy."132 
If the Supreme Court had applied thls same principle to the parents in 
Yoder, its analysis would have been much different and the State of 
Wisconsin might have prevailed. Instead, currently the law grants parents a 
unique right to require certain other persons-their chlldren-to submit to 
their views, even if that means the chlldren must "forego a portion of their 
education they would otherwise be entitled to enjoy."133 
I note finally that the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Free 
Exercise Clause recently took a sharp turn toward a non-accommodationist 
position in Employment Division v. Smith. 134 There the Court upheld the 
denial of unemployment compensation to Native Americans who were fired 
for ingesting peyote in violation of Oregon law.135 The majority opinion 
enunciated a general principle that facially neutral and generally applicable 
laws that incidentally burden religious practice do not violate the Free Exer-
cise Clause.136 Taken at face value, however, Justice Scalia's majority opin-
ion in Smith would not change the doctrinal course of free exercise cases 
involving parenting because it exempted from thls general rule laws that 
also burden other fundamental rights, such as the substantive due process 
right of parents to direct the upbringing of their chlldren.137 Thus, ironi-
130. 603 F.2d 1271 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied. 444 U.S. 1026 (1980). 
131. /d. at 1272. 
132. /d. at 1274. 
133. !d. 
134. 494 u.s. 872 (1990). 
135. /d. at 878-79. 
136. !d. at 879. 
137. /d. at 881-82. Here the Court was attempting to distinguish past decisions, such as Yoder, 
which clearly did hold on free exercise grounds that certain facially neutral and genemlly applicable 
laws were unconstitutional as applied. See id. It is ironic that Justice Scalia deemed the Yoder holding 
legitimate only because there the parents' substantive due process claim lent additional support to the 
free exercise claim: the Court in Yoder found that a substantive due process claim by itself would have 
been inadequate to support the Amish parents' objection to the Wisconsin law, and that the Free 
Exercise Clause extended the scope of protected parental freedom and authority beyond that which the 
non-religion-based parental right afforded. See discussion supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text. In 
addition, Justice Souter has argued that Justice Scalia's attempt to distinguish Yoder was flawed because 
there was no substantive due process claim in Yoder; the Yoders advanced only a free exercise claim. 
See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City ofHialeah,ll3 S. Ct. 2217,2244 n.4 (1993) (Souter, J., 
concurring). 
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cally, adults cannot now claim a religious exemption from neutral laws 
intended to prevent them from harming themselves, but they can claim a 
religious exemption from neutral laws intended to prevent them from harm-
ing their children. 
In Parts II and ill, I argue that the very notion of parental rights that 
the courts have developed and that has taken on its strongest form in reli-
gious contexts is illegitimate because it is inconsistent with a proper under-
standing of the limited purpose of rights in our legal system. Part II 
discusses the concept of legal rights as reflected in numerous areas of the 
law not involving children, and shows that rights in these contexts are prop-
erly limited to protecting self-determining conduct. Part ill demonstrates 
that the justifications typically offered for the anomalous set of "other-
determining" rights held by parents do not withstand scrutiny. The Article 
concludes that judicial analysis in cases such as Yoder has been severely 
flawed. Rather than granting parents a right to treat their children as instru-
ments of the parents' religious aspirations, courts should decide disputes 
relating to child-rearing based on the fundamental interests and rights of the 
children involved. 138 
II 
THE LIMITS OF RIGHTS IN NoN-PARENTING CONTEXTS 
In this Part, I develop the proposition that, as a general rule, our legal 
system does not recognize or bestow on individuals rights to control the 
lives of other persons. In other words, there is an in-principle limitation on 
legal rights that confines them to protection of a right-holder's personal 
integrity and self-determining activities. As such, it is illegitimate to con-
strue an individual's rights to include an entitlement to exercise extensive 
control over another person, or any control over a non-consenting person 
apart from self-defensive measures. To deem one individual entitled to use 
another non-consenting person as an instrument to advance his own inter-
ests free from interference by the State or other third parties is to commit a 
conceptual and moral mistake. 
In considering the validity of this proposition, one must keep in mind 
the distinction between a right and a privilege. Of course, the law permits 
individuals in particular circumstances to direct some aspects of the life of 
another adult who cannot act on his own behalf. These individuals can act 
as agents in order to advance the interests of that adult, even where he 
cannot consent to being so represented. However, the law does not accord 
any individuals a right to direct the life of another adult, such that those 
138. This alternative approach might yield the same practical outcome as the present approach in 
some cases. See e.g., Robert A. Burt, Developing Constitutional Rights Of, In, and For Children, 39 
LAw & CoNTEMP. PRoBS. 118, 127-31 (1975) (offering a child-centered defense of the result in Yoder). 
In many other cases, it would not. 
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individuals would have cause to complain on their own behalf if denied the 
ability to direct the other person's life as they wished. 
That no one has a right to control the life of another adult may seem 
self-evident. Nevertheless, it is difficult to demonstrate the truth of this 
proposition due to the lack of clear statements by the judiciary that this is in 
fact a controlling principle of law in this country. This silence might be 
attributable to the self-evident nature of the proposition. It might also be a 
consequence of the fact that, outside the parenting context, people simply 
do not claim a right to direct the lives of others, and thus do not present 
courts with the question of whether the law should recognize such a right. 
The fact that people do not make such claims, in turn, may reflect not only 
widespread recognition that other people have a right to personal autonomy, 
but also an understanding that the scope of individual rights is inherently 
limited to the sphere of one's own life. 
In view of judicial silence on this issue, I proceed first by making the 
negative case that, except in the parenting context, no court has expressed 
an opinion contrary to the proposition that no one possesses a right to con-
trol another's life. To make this negative case, Section A begins by dis-
cussing judicial interpretations of a number of particular rights that suggest 
the limited scope for rights advocated here, i.e., that construe rights as pro-
tections of a right-holder's self-determination and personal integrity. Sec-
tion B develops the positive case that principles applied in areas of the law 
unrelated to child-rearing affirmatively support this conclusion. To this 
end, I examine areas of law pertaining to situations of de jure or de facto 
subordination of adults and situations in which adults are, like young chil-
dren, unable to articulate rational preferences with respect to important life 
decisions, or to assert rights on their own behalf. In each of these situations 
the law explicitly denies individuals rights of control over the lives of 
others. By ordering the discussion so that the situations considered are 
increasingly analogous to the situation of children, I eliminate in turn cer-
tain factors that might at first appear to be appropriate bases for distinguish-
ing the relationship between a parent and minor child from all other 
relationships. 
A. The Rhetoric of Rights 
While judicial opinions frequently address the content and purpose of 
specific rights, they rarely enunciate any theory of what a "right" is. In 
particular, there has been no clear judicial statement affirming or denying 
that in our legal sy~em one generally has no right to control the life of 
another. I suggest that it is simply universally understood that rights protect 
only a right-holder's self-determination and personal integrity. Support for 
this conclusion can be found in language the Supreme Court has used to 
articulate a number of particular constitutional rights. 
For example, the Supreme Court has described the religious liberty 
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protected by the Free Exercise Clause as "the right of every person to freely 
choose his own course" with respect to religious training, teaching and 
observance;139 as "rights to one's own religious opinion";140 and as a per-
son's liberty ''to worship God according to the dictates of his own con-
science."141 The Court has never suggested-again, apart from parenting 
cases-that the Free Exercise Clause entitles anyone to force others to 
espouse certain religious beliefs or engage in particular religious practices, 
or otherwise to control the life of another person in accordance with the 
dictates of one's religion. 
Not surprisingly, none of the free exercise cases that the Court has 
considered has involved any such claim. One can imagine that if a plaintiff 
asserted a right to compel another adult to go to the plaintiff's church, to 
receive religious training of the plaintiff's choice, or to forego medical 
treatment prohibited by the plaintiff's religion, any court would summarily 
dismiss the claim. It would do so regardless of how passionately the plain-
tiff felt that he must indoctrinate the other adult or prevent the religiously 
objectionable medical treatment, and regardless of whether the other adult 
had any opinions or preferences of her own regarding religion. Moreover, 
courts would not find that state action preventing a plaintiff from forcing 
other adults into conformity with the dictates of the plaintiffs own religion 
burdened the plaintiff's constitutionally-protected religious liberty, and 
then go on to consider whether compelling state interests outweighed this 
burden. Courts would instead simply refuse to recognize the type of right 
that the plaintiff asserts.142 
One type of free exercise case that some state courts have addressed 
does involve a situation in which one person claims a religiously grounded 
right to control to some degree the life of another adult". This is where one 
spouse raises a religious objection to a State's granting a civil divorce to the 
other spouse. This kind of objection falls far short of a demand to dictate 
the religious training or medical care of another person, however, and, in 
any event, state courts have summarily dismissed such claims. 
Sharma v. Sharma 143 is typical of these cases. There, a woman who 
was an adherent of Hinduism argued that the State of Kansas violated her 
free exercise right by granting her husband's request for a divorce, because 
her religion did not recognize divorce. The court found that civil divorce in 
139. School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963) (emphasis added). 
140. Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 282 (1901) (emphasis added). 
141. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (emphasis added). 
142. The same would be true if the plaintiff claimed a right to indoctrinate someone else's children, 
even if those children and their parents had no views of their own on religious matters. Yet, when adults 
seek to indoctrinate their own children, courts find that they have a constitutional right to do so. This 
right includes a negative claim-right against efforts by the State to protect and promote the health and 
intellectual development of the children, and may even include the power to override the preferences of 
the children regarding religion. See discussion supra Part I. 
143. 667 P.2d 395 (Kan. Ct. App. 1983). 
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no way impaired the woman's religious freedom. The divorce did not 
change the status of the marriage under Hindu ecclesiastical law or other-
wise interfere with the wife's practice of Hinduism, and she remained free 
to take any view of the relationship that she liked. 144 
In construing the First Amendment Free Speech Clause, the Supreme 
Court has similarly spoken in terms suggesting that it views the protected 
right as limited in scope to the right-holder's sphere of personal autonomy. 
The Free Speech Clause protects the ''right of self-determination in matters 
that touch individual opinion and personal attitude,"145 and embodies the 
"concept of 'individual freedom of mind.' "146 People simply do not claim 
a right under the Free Speech Clause to force another adult to profess their 
beliefs, 147 and it is inconceivable that a court faced with such a claim would 
find that such a right exists and must be weighed against competing 
interests. 
Likewise, the Supreme Court construed the Due Process Clauses of the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments as protecting a right-holder's control 
over her own person and property. Liberties warranting due process protec-
tion include "the right to make contracts for the sale of one's own labor,"148 
"the right to build on one's own property,"149 and the right of the individual 
"to plan his own affairs" and "to shape his own life as he thinks best."150 
The Court has described the right to make medical decisions as ''the right of 
144. /d. at 396 (citing a similar decision by an Oklahoma court in Williams v. Williams, 543 P.2d 
1401 (Okla. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 901 (1976)). The Sharma decision stands in sharp contrast to 
Yoder: in Yoder the Supreme Court failed to recognize that compulsory school attendance for the 
children of Amish adults would in no way affect the parents' beliefs nor lessen the parents' religious 
authority over their children. See supra text accompanying notes 40-42. Nor did the Sharma decision 
suggest that the civil divorce might have burdened the wife's free exercise of religion by making it more 
difficult for her to carry out the spousal obligations that her religion imposed on her. In contrast, Yoder 
suggests that an impediment to fulfillment of religiously-imposed familial obligations is a legitimate 
basis for finding a burden. See supra text accompanying note 44. Finally, while the court in Yoder 
factored in the preservation of the Amish community and way of life, see supra text accompanying 
notes 45-46, the Sharma court did not consider the social value of marriage or of preserving the Hindu 
way of life in America. 
145. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 631 (1943) (emphasis added). 
146. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977) (quoting Barnette. 319 U.S. at 637) (emphasis 
added); see also First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 816 (1978) (White, J., dissenting) (noting 
that the Free Speech Clause protects "the right to adhere to one's own beliefs and to refuse to support 
the dissemination of the personal and political views of others''); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 211 
(1973) (Douglas, J., concurring) (noting that the First Amendment protects the right of "autonomous 
control over the development and expression of one's intellect, interests, tastes, and personality'') 
(emphasis omitted). 
147. Plaintiffs have claimed a free speech right to be allowed to express their views in certain 
privately-owned public fora, such as a newspaper or a shopping mall, but they have not claimed that the 
owners of these venues must endorse their views. The Court has granted such claims only when doing 
so would not effectively force the venue-owners to speak and would not make it appear that the owners 
endorsed the views expressed. See discussion infra notes 214-22 and accompanying text. 
148. Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 172 (1908) (emphasis added). 
149. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834 n.2 (1987) (emphasis added). 
ISO. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. at 213 (Douglas, J., concurring) (quoting Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 
116, 126 (1958)) (emphasis added). 
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every individual to the possession and control of his own person" and ''to 
determine what shall be done with his own body."151 These statements 
confirm that rights are guarantees of "physical freedom and self-
determination."152 
The Court has used similar language in discussing the right to counsel 
in criminal actions. The Sixth Amendment guarantees the " 'right to con-
duct one's own defense,' "153 not a right to control the defense of other 
accused adults, and a "right to choose one's own counsel,"154 not a right to 
so choose for another. Likewise, the Fifth Amendment guarantees the 
"right to testify on one's own behalf,"155 not a right to testify when others 
are charged. 
In the abortion context, members of the Court have described the rule 
of law that Roe v. Wade and its progeny established as "a woman's funda-
mental right to self-determination,"156 resting on the "'moral fact that a 
person belongs to himself and not others nor to society as a whole.' "157 
Other members of the Court have characterized the constitutionally pro-
tected choice to have an abortion as among the "choices central to personal 
dignity and autonomy."158 They argue that "[a]t the heart of liberty is the 
right to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, 
and of the mystery of human life."159 
151. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261,269 (1990) (quoting Union Pac. Ry. v. 
Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891), and Scbloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E.2d 92, 93 
(1914), respectively) (emphasis added). 
152. !d. at 287 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis added). Similarly, Justice Brennan pointed 
out that" 'Anglo-American law starts with the premise of thorough-going selfdetermination [sic].'" !d. 
at 305 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Natanson v. Kline, 350 P.2d 1093, 1104 (Kan. 1960)). 
153. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 816 (1975) (quoting United States v. Plattner, 330 F.2d 
271, 274 (2d Cir. 1964)) (emphasis added). 
154. Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159 (1988) (emphasis added). 
155. Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 51, 53 n.10 (emphasis added). 
156. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 216 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (joined by Stevens and 
Marshall, JJ.). 
157. Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetrians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 777 n.5 
(1986) (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting Charles Fried, Correspondence, 6 Pmr.. & PuB. A.FF. 288, 288 
{1977)), overruled in nonrelevant part by Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992). 
158. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2807 (1992) (plurality opinion of O'Connor, 
Kennedy, & Souter, JJ.). 
159. !d. (emphasis added); see also Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 777 n.S (Stevens, J., concurring) 
(" 'What a person is, what he wants, the determination of his life plan, of his concept of the good, are the 
most intimate expressions of self-determination, and by asserting a person's responsibility for the results 
of this self-determination we give substance to the concept of liberty.''') (quoting CHARLES FRIED, 
RIGHr AND WRONG 146-47 (1978)). 
The Court has clearly established that it is the adult woman alone, not her husband, who is entitled 
to decide what will happen to her body. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) 
(invalidating state statutory provisions requiring husband's consent). Where minors seek abortion, this 
right to self-determination may be circumscn"bed by parental consent requirements, so long as provision 
is made for judicial bypass of parental consent when a minor is mature enough to make the decision for 
herself or when she can show that it is in her best interest to have an abortion. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 
U.S. 622, 643-44 (1979); see also Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992) (reaffirming the 
Bellotti holding). 
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In sum, the courts consistently interpret rights as protections of indi-
vidual self-determination. Curiously, though, the Court has also intimated 
that decisions regarding the education and upbringing of one's child are in 
fact aspects of the parents' self-determination. For example, in Doe v. 
Bolton, Justice Douglas asserted in his concurrence that the term "liberty" 
in the Fourteenth Amendment implies "freedom of choice in the basic deci-
sions of one's life respecting marriage, divorce, procreation, contraception, 
and the education and upbringing of children."160 There is a paradox inher-
ent in this understanding of personal liberty, arising from the fact that deci-
sions regarding children's education and upbringing are actually a form of 
"other-determination," and from the fact that insulating the family from 
state intervention can operate to destroy children's own "ability indepen-
dently to define [their] identity."161 This paradox has apparently escaped 
the awareness of the Court. 162 Surprisingly, this remains the case even after 
the Court's decision in Eisenstadt v. Baird, 163 which emphasized that con-
stitutional liberties pertain to individuals, not to intimate relationships as 
unitary entities. It is also surprising given that, in contexts not directly 
involving parents, the Court has recognized children as distinct persons 
160. 410 U.S. 179, 211 (1973) (Douglas, J., coneurring) (emphasis omitted); see also Roberts v. 
United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 619 (1984) ("Protecting these [family] relationships from 
unwarranted state interference therefore safeguards the ability independently to define one's identity that 
is central to any concept of liberty."). 
161. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 619. 
I 62. This paradox has also largely escaped notice by legal scholars. See, e.g., STEPHEN L. CARTER, 
THE CuLTURE oF DJSBEUEF 172, 179, 199 (1993) (arguing for greater parental control over the 
education of children as an aspect of the parents' religious autonomy); FruED, supra note 159, at 152 
("[T]he right to form one's child's values, one's child's life plan and the right to lavish attention on that 
child are extensions of the basic right not to be interfered with in doing these things for oneself."); 
Ferdinand Schoeman, Rights of Children, Rights of Parents, and the Moral Basis of the Family, 91 
Ennes 6, 17 (1980) ("To set terms for ..• parenting more stringent than required for the protection of 
children from abuse and neglect constitutes an interference in a person's claim to establish intimate 
relations except on the society's terms."). But see David AJ. Richards, The Individual, The Family, and 
the Constitution: A Jurisprudential Perspective, 55 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 45 (1980). In reaction to Yoder, 
Richards writes: 
Chief Justice Burger's opinion in Yoder put[s] great weight on the non-majoritarian life 
style of the Amish, as if the case were protecting the right to personal autonomy that underlies 
the Constitution. But, again, let us observe the morally indisputable: parents and children do 
not possess unitary interests. Whatever considerations may justify protecting the right of 
adults to control their own lives do not validate the unqualified right of adults to deprive their 
children of the right to decide, as free and rational persons, what kinds of lives they will 
choose to lead. This is another instance of the intellectual confusion and moral error 
engendered by regarding the constitutional right to privacy as, quintessentially, a family right. 
!d. at 45 (footnote omitted). . 
163. 405 U.S. 438 (1972). In ruling that unmarried persons have the same privacy right to use 
contraception that the Court recoguized for married persons in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 
(1965), the Court stated that: 
[T]he marital couple is not an independent entity with a mind and heart of its own, but an 
association of two individuals each with a separate intellectual and emotional makeup. If the 
right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free 
from unwarranted governmental intrusion • , •• 
Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453. 
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with rights of their own under the Constitution.164 
Of course, the foregoing survey of Supreme Court rhetoric regarding 
rights outside of the parenting context does not amount to a conclusive 
demonstration that the Court subscribes to the proposition that rights are 
inherently limited to self-determining choices and activities. It is, however, 
entirely consistent with that proposition, and thus provides support by way 
of negative inference for finding the proposition to be true. The next 
Section provides positive support for this hypothesis by examining several 
areas of law in which controlling precedents expressly deny rights to 
engage in other-determining behavior. The next Section also shows that 
judicially recognized rights that appear to involve some element of control 
over other persons do not constitute counterexamples to the proposition 
that, as a general rule, rights in our legal system are properly limited in 
scope to protecting self-determining conduct and cannot include an entitle-
ment to control the lives of other persons. 
B. Supporting Doctrines and Possible Counterexamples 
The Thirteenth Amendment's prohibition of slavery and involuntary 
servitude165 is the strongest and most obvious embodiment of the principle 
that no person should have a right to control the life of another person. The 
Supreme Court has interpreted this constitutional provision as proscribing 
not merely the formal institution of slavery, 166 but also all the "badges and 
incidents" of slavery, including any "state of bondage" or "control by which 
the personal service of one man is disposed of or coerced for another's 
benefit."167 In one case, the Court defined slavery as "the state of entire 
subjection of one person to the will of another."168 
This broad principle underlying Thirteenth Amendment proscriptions 
is reflected in a number of rules in modem contract law, most notably the 
refusal of courts to order specific performance of personal service con-
tracts.169 This same unwillingness to allow the subjection of individuals to 
164. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969) (holding that a 
child's First Amendment free speech rights protect the wearing of a black armband to school to protest 
government policy); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967) (holding that children have due process rights 
entitling them to procedural safeguards prior to confinement in an institution for juvenile delinquents). 
165. ''Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party 
shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their 
jurisdiction." U.S. CoNST. amend. XIII, § 1. 
166. For a description of the constitutive elements of slavery, see ORLANDo PATIERSON, SLAVERY 
AND SoCIAL DEATH 1-14 (1982). 
167. Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 241 (1911). 
168. Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1, 17 (1906) (internal quotation omitted), overruled in part 
by Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968). 
169. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRAcrs, § 367 & cmt. a (1981); see also American 
Broadcasting Cos. v. Wolf, 420 N.E.2d 363, 367 (N.Y. 1981) ("[A] court nonnally will not decree 
specific enforcement of an employee's anticompetitive covenant unless necessary to protect the trade 
secrets, customer lists or good will of the employer's business ••.. And, an otherwise valid covenant 
will not be enforced if it .•• would operate in a harsh or oppressive manner •..• '') (citations omitted). 
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inordinate control by others also underlies rules limiting a creditor's right to 
the future income of a debtor who defaults on a loan, as well as rules giving 
bankrupts a "fresh start" free from the prior claims of creditors.170 
The principle of non-subjection has also been applied outside the com-
mercial realm. Rules pertaining to :financial aspects of divorce reflect the 
same reluctance of judges and legislators to allow one person to retain sub-
stantial control over the life of another person after the severance of a vol-
untary relationship. For example, equitable distribution of property 
following divorce has generally involved only material assets; most courts 
have not treated professional degrees and licenses as property subject to 
distribution. 171 At least one court has indicated that part of the reason for 
refusing to do so is a concern that this would infringe the Thirteenth 
Amendment. 172 
One might argue that toleration of slavery at the time of the drafting of 
our original Constitution shows that the idea of some persons having rights 
to control the lives of other persons has not been entirely alien to our legal 
system at all times. In actuality, however, the formal institution of slavery 
was not contrary to the thesis of this Part, because under that institution 
enslaved blacks were not, in the eyes of the law, persons at all-they were 
170. See generally Stewart E. Sterk, Restraints on Alienation of Human Capital, 79 VA. L. RBv. 
383 (1993). Federal legislation limits to 25% the portion of a debtor's income that is subject to 
garnishment, and a number of states have even more stringent limitations on garnishment of wages, id. 
at 415 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1673 (1988), and TEX. CoNST. art. 16, § 28), while bankruptcy law leaves 
creditors with no claim on the future earnings of a bankrupt, id. at 419-23. One of the rationales, and 
arguably the most compelling one, for limiting creditor's claims to future earnings is the fear that 
"unless human capital receives protection against creditor claims, debtors will be subjected to a form of 
involuntary servitude." /d. at 423, 431-32. 
171. See, e.g., Marriage of Graham, 574 P .2d 75 (Colo. 1978) (holding that an M.B.A. degree is not 
marital property); Mahoney v. Mahoney, 453 A.2d 527 (N.J. 1982) (holding that an M.B.A. degree is 
not marital property per se, but creating a new remedy, "reimbursement alimony," for the supporting 
spouse). But see Inman v. Inman, 578 S.W.2d 266, 269 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979) (finding a dental license to 
be marital property, but limiting the wife's interest to the amount of her investment in her husband's 
education); O'Brien v. O'Brien, 489 N.E.2d 712 (N.Y. 1985) (holding that a medical license constitutes 
marital property and awarding the supporting spouse an equitable share of its present value). 
172. Sterk, supra note 170, at 434,443 (citing Severs v. Severs, 426 So. 2d 992,994 {Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1983)). Courts have also spoken of the unfairness of effectively preventing an ex-spouse from 
changing to a less lucrative career by locking that spouse into tixedjilture payments based upon his or 
her cu"ent income level. /d. at 443-44 (citing Stevens v. Stevens, 492 N.E.2d 131 (Ohio 1986), and 
O'Brien v. O'Brien, 489 N.E.2d at 720 (Meyer, J., concurring)). Sterk notes that, in those few states 
where courts have treated a degree or license as property subject to equitable distribution, ''no court has 
awarded one spouse a share of the other's future eaming capacity. At most, courts have awarded a share 
of the estimated present value of that future eaming capacity." Sterk, supra note 170, at 438. The 
difference between awarding an ongoing claim to the earnings of an ex-spouse, on the one hand, and 
awarding a share of the estimated present value of the ex-spouse's future earnings, on the other, is 
merely a formal difference as long as a judge can accurately estimate future earnings. However, the 
difference in form marks a difference in the symbolic import of the award. The one-time award conveys 
a sense that the degree-holder is thereafter free and independent of the former spouse, except to the 
extent of owing the former spouse a debt. On the other hand, ongoing participation in the earnings of an 
ex-spouse would convey a sense that the relationship is never entirely severed; that the degree-holder 
can never be entirely free from the claims of the ex-spouse. 
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considered "property." Moreover, even if ante bellum slavery were incon-
sistent with the proposition advanced here, it would not lessen the force of 
the claim that present-day legal principles uniformly support that 
proposition. 
Parental control over the lives of children certainly differs in important 
respects from the institution of slavery, but it nevertheless can manifest 
some of the "badges and incidents" of slavery. One recent scholarly work 
argues that parents' substantive due process right to physical custody of 
their children can amount to state-enforced slavery ''when a parent perverts 
this coercive authority by systematically abusing and degrading his ward-
treating his child not as a person but as a chattel, acting as if he had title 
over the child rather than a trusteeship on behalf of the child."173 The 
authors of this work caution that "custody alone should not be confused 
with slavery:• because custody can be justified as an exercise of control to 
promote the child's interests.174 Parental free exercise rights, which are not 
tied to the interests of the child, and which ensure parents the freedom to 
exercise nearly complete domination over their children, arguably come 
closer to this understanding of slavery than to a legitimate custody 
privilege. 
The subordination of African Americans under the formal institution 
of slavery represents one, admittedly imperfect, analogy to the control par-
ents exercise by legal right over their children. Women, particularly when 
they have entered into marriage, have also been subjected to legally sanc-
tioned domination by other persons (i.e., men, and especially husbands) for 
much of our nation's history. The legal status of wives in the past therefore 
presents an additional analogy to the situation of children and, as such, 
another potential counterexample to the proposition that our legal system 
does not generally recognize rights of control over other persons. 
Under common law rules of marriage, a husband held rights of consor-
tium with respect to his wife. These included positive claim-rights to the 
wife's services in the home and to sexual intercourse with her.175 The hus-
band was head of the family, meaning that he held the right "to direct the 
family's affairs, to determine where and what the home of the family shall 
be ... .'0176 Correlative to the husband's rights were the wife's duties to 
submit to the husband's ''reasonable governance" of the family, "to afford 
him her society and her person, ... and to labor faithfully to advance his 
interests.'0177 The wife also suffered certain legal disabilities under the 
173. Akhil R. Arnar & Daniel Widawsky, Commentary, Child Abuse as Slavery: A Thirteenth 
Amendment Response to Deshaney, 105 HAR.v. L. REv. 1359, 1364 (1992). These authors define 
slavery as "[a] power relation of domination, degradation, and subservience, in which human beings are 
treated as chattel, not persons." Id. at 1365 (internal quotation omitted). 
174. !d. at 1364. 
175. See generally 41 AM. JUR. 2o Husband and Wife§§ 9-10 (1968). 
176. !d. § 10 (footnote omitted). 
177. Id. §§ 9-10 (footnotes omitted). Wives also had positive claim-rights against their husbands, 
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common law; she was, for example, unable to sue or be sued.178 In particu-
lar, a wife was unable to sue her husband, even for such harmful conduct as 
forcible rape. 179 
Significantly, even these common law rights of husbands were predi-
cated on the idea that women consented to certain duties and limitations 
when they married. Underlying the common law rules was the assumption 
that, by entering into a contract of marriage, a woman voluntarily gave up 
her separate identity and was subsumed under the identity of her hus-
band.180 She also gave up certain negative claim-rights which she previ-
ously enjoyed against the man she married, 181 and in essence agreed to 
become the property of her husband. 182 Thus, because a man was entitled 
to largely unfettered control over his own person and property, he was also 
entitled to such control over his wife. Further, the fact that a man could not 
commit crimes against himself or against his own property constituted a 
conceptual barrier to any criminal prosecution of a husband for crimes 
against his wife. 183 
The law of marriage has changed substantially in the last three 
decades. Although vestiges remain of the early common law view of wives 
as property and as lacking a separate identity, courts have removed many of 
the traditional instruments of husbands' control over their wives. Perhaps 
the most important change has been the advent of no-fault divorce laws, 
which make it easier for a woman to exit from a marriage. Wives have also 
obtained greater control over their reproductive choices under Supreme 
Court decisions establishing rights to obtain and use contraceptives184 and 
to have an abortion without a husband's consent.185 In the cow;se of grant-
ing these rights, the Court has dismissed the view of a married couple as a 
unitary legal entity, and instead has characterized marriage as an association 
of two individuals, each having separate, personal rights of privacy.186 
including the right to support and protection, and negative claim-rights against cruel and inhuman 
treatment. Id. § 8. However, a wife's inability to sue her husband must have weakened these rights 
substantially. See id. § 6. 
178. Jd. § 6. 
179. See People v. Liberia, 474 N.E.2d 567, 572 (N.Y. 1984) (noting one archaic notion underlying 
the marital exemption for rape: ''by their mutual matrimonial consent and contract the wife hath given 
up herself in this kind unto her husband, which she cannot retract'') (citing 1 HALE, HISTORY OF PLEAS 
OF THE CRoWN 629), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 1020 (1985). But see id. at 573 (rejecting Hale's view and 
overturning the State's marital rape exemption). 
180. Jd. (''[f)he legal existence of the woman was 'incorporated and consolidated into that of the 
husband.''') (citing 1 WILUAM BLACKSTONE, CoMMENTARIES 430 (n.p., 1966)). 
181. Jd. at 572; see also 41 AM. JUR. 2o Husband and Wife § 2 (1994). 
182. Liberta, 474 N.E.2d at 573. 
183. See Warren v. State, 336 S.E.2d 221,223 (Ga. 1985) ("Since a married woman was part of her 
husband's property, nothing more than a chattel, rape was nothing more than a man making use of his 
own property.''). 
184. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
185. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976). 
186. Jd. at 70 n.ll (quoting Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972)). 
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Growing judicial hostility to marital exemptions in state rape laws 
exemplifies the present-day rejection of the early common law view of 
wives as property and the interpretation of the marriage agreement that sup-
ported it. In People v. Liberta, New York's highest court conveyed the now 
prevailing view: 
We find that there is no rational basis for distinguishing 
between marital rape and nonmarital rape. The various rationales 
which have been asserted in defense of the exemption are either 
based upon archaic notions about the consent and property rights 
incident to marriage or are simply unable to withstand even the 
slightest scrutiny . 
. . . Indeed, "[n]owhere in the common-law world-[ or] in any 
modem society-is a woman regarded as chattel or demeaned by 
denial of a separate legal identity and the dignity associated with 
recognition as a whole human being."187 
The court in Liberta rejected the husband's claim to be protected by a 
right of marital privacy because "this right of privacy protects consensual 
acts, not violent sexual assaults."188 In Warren v. State, 189 Georgia's high-
est court similarly refused to find that a husband has a right to force his wife 
to have intercourse with him. The court held that construing the marriage 
contract to include a woman's consent to rape would be unreasonable; 
given that rape represents " 'almost total contempt for the personal integrity 
and autonomy of the female victim' " and, short of homicide, "is 'the ulti-
mate violation of self,' " no reasonable person would consent to it.190 
Thus, in the area of husband/wife relations, as in slave-holder/slave 
relations, the rights of some persons to control and dominate the lives of 
certain other persons rested on a characterization of the subordinated per-
sons as ''property," on a denial of their very personhood. These rights have 
been deemed illegitimate as the law has over time come to recognize the 
subordinated individuals as persons, distinct from those with whom they 
share intimate relationships. 
Husbands and wives still enjoy by law some measure of control over 
each other, and the reality of the respective economic power of women and 
men today translates into some inequity in the degree of de facto control 
187. People v. Liberta, 474 N.E.2d 567, 573 (N.Y. 1984) (quoting Trammel v. United States, 445 
U.S. 40, 52 (1980)) (alterations in original), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1020 (1985). The Liberta court 
noted that only one other state court in recent years had concluded that there was a rational basis for the 
marital exemption to rape laws. This supposed rational basis was the hope that the exemption " 'may 
remove a substantial obstacle to the resumption of normal marital relations' " and "'avert[] difficult 
emotional issues and problems of proof inherent in this sensitive area.'" Id. at 575 n.lO (quoting People 
v. Brown, 632 P.2d 1025, 1027 (Colo. 1981)). 
188. Id. at 574 (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965)). 
189. 336 S.E.2d 221 (Ga. 1985). 
190. Id. at 224 (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 599 (1977)). 
HeinOnline -- 82 Cal L. Rev. 1416 1994
1416 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82:1371 
that husband and wife hold over one another. Nevertheless, the formal, de 
jure rights and privileges that husbands now possess with respect to their 
wives by virtue of the marriage contract are no different from the rights and 
privileges that wives enjoy with respect to their husbands and, as under 
earlier common law, are predicated upon the parties' voluntary consent. 
Indeed, in any contractual relationship the parties exert by right some 
measure of control over one another-e.g., rights to compel another to 
deliver money or other property or to perform some service. However, the 
legality of a contract depends critically upon the consent of the parties and 
upon mutuality of consideration. Moreover, as discussed above, contractual 
rights now cannot be so extensive as to amount to domination of one person 
over the life of another. In sharp contrast, parental rights of control over 
children's lives under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause and 
the First Amendment Free Exercise Clause do amount to legally sanctioned 
domination. And the courts have not predicated recognition of parental 
rights on any hypothetical "contract," i.e., on imputed consent or receipt of 
reciprocal consideration by the child. Rather, as in the case of the slave or 
wife of old, parental rights today appear to rest on an assumption of owner-
ship or on a denial of the child's separate existence. 
In addition to the rationales mentioned above, the subjection of 
African Americans and wives to the legal control of other persons was often 
defended as necessary because those under subjection were seen as being 
naturally suited to governance by others.191 This alleged justification lost 
its force with the recognition that the capacities of women and African 
Americans are as great as those of white males. There are, however, other 
groups of persons who unquestionably are less capable of furthering their 
own interests, and one might think that genuine incompetence provides a 
legitimate rationale for giving some persons rights to govern the lives of 
such individuals. Children at birth certainly fall into the category of per-
sons lacking self-governing capacities, and they gain competence only 
gradually over the course of many years. However, certain disabled adults 
fall into this category as well. One would expect that if incompetence alone 
were sufficient reason to give another person the right to determine the 
course of someone's life, these adults too would have someone deciding by 
right what will happen to them. This turns out, however, not to be the case. 
In Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, 192 the Court 
considered the case of a woman in a persistent vegetative state whose par-
ents wished to have the hospital remove her life-support system. Missouri 
law permits a surrogate to make various medical decisions on behalf of a 
patient in a persistent vegetative state, but only as a spokesperson for the 
patient herself; the surrogate must show by clear and convincing evidence 
191. See, e.g., JoHN S. MILL, THE SUBJECTION OF WoMEN 12 (Susan Moller Okin ed., Hackett 
1988) (1869) (disparaging this view). 
192. 497 u.s. 261 (1990). 
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that his decision conforms to the wishes of the patient before she became 
incompetent.193 Thus, the surrogate, in effect, advances and effectuates the 
rights of the patient herself to decide on her medical treatment because she 
cannot exercise these rights directly. 194 The surrogate does not exercise any 
right of his own to decide what the hospital will do with the patient. In this 
case, the Missouri Supreme Court held that Nancy Cruzan's parents had not 
provided clear and convincing evidence of their daughter's alleged wish to 
have hydration and nutrition withdrawn if she were ever in such a condi-
tion, and so upheld the hospital's denial of the parents' request.195 
The parents in Cruzan insisted that Missouri should accept the judg-
ment of close family members regarding what should happen to an incom-
petent patient, even in the absence of clear and convincing evidence that 
their own views matched those of the patient. The Supreme Court rejected 
the notion that the parents possessed a right to decide what would happen to 
their adult daughter: "[W]e do not think the Due Process Clause requires 
the State to repose judgment on these matters with anyone but the patient 
herself."196 The Court recognized that close family members generally will 
have very strong feelings about what happens to the patient in such situa-
tions, but also that these feelings may not be entirely disinterested: 
"[T]here is no automatic assurance that the view of close family members 
will necessarily be the same as the patient's would have been had she been 
confronted with the prospect of her situation while competent."197 
Nowhere in Cruzan did the Court imply that family members would 
possess a right to make decisions for an incompetent adult patient if the 
decision were less momentous than one involving life and death. 198 Nor 
did the Court suggest that it would have been appropriate to balance the 
parents' free exercise rights against the daughter's interests or preferences if 
the parents had had religious objections to artificial life support. Rather, 
Cruzan stands for the bald proposition that nobody is entitled to make deci-
sions for an incompetent adult patient.199 In the absence of certainty as to 
193. !d. at 280. The Court noted that a number of other states (e.g., Illinois, Connecticut, New 
York, Maine, New Jersey, and Ohio) also had in place a substituted-judgment procedure for such 
situations, and that all required clear and convincing evidence of ''the prior expressed wishes of the 
incompetent individual," or, in some cases, more generally ''what the individual's decision would have 
been." /d. at 284-85. 
194. /d. at 280. 
195. /d. at 285. 
196. !d. at 286. 
197. !d. 
198. The gravity of the decision was a factor only in the Court's consideration of which standard of 
proof was appropriate with respect to demonstrating the patient's wishes. !d. at 282-83. 
199. In the very similar case of Karen Ann Quinlan, a New Jersey state court explicitly rejected a 
claim by the parents of a woman in a persistent vegetative state to have a right, based on their religious 
beliefs, to have the hospital discontinue artificial life support. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 661-62 
(NJ.) ("[W]e do not recognize an independent parental right of religious freedom to support the relief 
requested.''), cert. denied sub nom. Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S. 922 (1976). In Quinlan, the court 
ordered cessation of artificial life support based on a right of privacy, making plain that it was Ms. 
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what the patient herself would want, the State permissibly elected to act on 
its own presumption that the patient would wish to continue to live; it was 
not required even to consider the preferences of close family members. 
Thus Cruzan, which focused on the integrity and distinct personhood 
of the incompetent individual whose fate was being decided, stands in sharp 
contrast to decisions under both the Due Process Clause and the Free 
Exercise Clause upholding parents' rights to determine the life course of 
their minor children. In Yoder, for example, the Court expressed indiffer-
ence to the children's wishes, going so far as to say that the parents' prefer-
ences for the children's future would likely outweigh any contrary 
preferences of the children themselves, were it required to consider the lat-
ter.200 In Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 201 the Court treated the children's 
interests even more cursorily, and gave no consideration to what rights chil-
dren themselves might have with respect to education.202 That decision 
rested on the constitutionally guaranteed "liberty of parents and guardians 
to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control" and 
on the liberty of private school operators to conduct their business. 203 In 
contrast to Cruzan, the Court in Yoder and Pierce was apparently uncon-
cerned that parents' feelings regarding the children's education might not 
be entirely disinterested. 204 
Quinlan who had a right of privacy at stake, not the parents, and that the court would simply "permit the 
guardian and family of Karen to render their best judgment" as to what her "putative decision" would be 
in the circumstances. Id. at 664 (emphasis added). The court stated: 
Regarding Mr. Quinlan's right of privacy, we agree [with the lower court] that there is no 
parental constitutional right that would entitle him to a grant of relief in propia persona. 
Insofar as a parental right of privacy has been recognized, it has been in the context of 
determining the rearing of infants . . .. Karen Quinlan is a 22 year old adult. Her right of 
privacy in respect of the matter before the Court is to be vindicated by Mr. Quinlan as 
guardian •.. • 
Id. (citations omitted); see also John A. Robertson, Cruzan: No Rights Violated, HASTINGS CENT!!R 
REP., SeptJOct. 1990, at 8-9 (dismissing the notion that parents or other family members should have 
any right to decide to terminate medical treatment of a comatose person). 
200. 
Our holding in no way determines the proper resolution of possible competing interests 
of parents, children, and the State in an appropriate state court proceeding in which •.• [it] is 
asserted ... that Amish parents are preventing their minor children from attending high school 
despite [the children's] expressed desires to the contrary. Recognition of [such a] claim ... 
would, of course, call into question traditional concepts of parental control over the religious 
upbringing and education of their minor children recognized in this Court's past decisions. It 
is clear that such an intrusion by a State into family decisions in the area of religious training 
would give rise to grave questions of religious freedom •• , , 
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 231 (1972). 
201. 268 u.s. 510 (1925). 
202. The Court found that the private schools were "engaged in a kind of undertaking not 
inherently harmful, but long regarded as useful and meritorious" and that there was ''nothing in the 
present records to indicate that they have failed to discharge their obligations to patrons, students or the 
State." Id. at 534. The Pierce opinion reveals that the State of Oregon did not file an answer to the 
complaints in Pierce, so the "present records" may have consisted entirely of the factual assertions of 
the schools themselves as to their own merits. Id. at 533. 
203. Id. at 534-35. 
204. In Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979), in which the Court held that no formal adversary 
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A comparison of judicial and legislative treatment of parental rights 
over mentally retarded adults is also illuminating. Like young children, 
some mentally retarded adults whose medical treatment or residential place-
ment is judicially contested will never have formed or expressed rational 
judgments regarding their situation. While some legislatures have granted 
parents authority to participate in the decision-making process regarding 
the institutionalization or medical treatment of adult offspring who are men-
tally retarded, they have not granted parents the right to actually make deci-
sions for their offspring. 
For example, in Heller v. Doe, 205 the Court voted to uphol4 a 
Kentucky statute giving guardians and immediate family members PartY 
standing in proceedings for institutional commitment of mentally retarded 
adults.206 The statute did not, however, give the parents' judgment or pref-
erences dispositive weight or presumptive authority in those proceedings.207 
The Court found that the statute was consistent with mentally retarded 
adults' due process rights. The Court reasoned that, even though guardians 
and family members might have interests adverse to those of the person 
facing commitment and their participation might increase the likelihood of 
commitment, their PartY status would not alter the focus of the proceedings 
on the welfare of the retarded adult nor increase the risk of an erroneous 
decision.208 In fact, it might lessen that risk because the family would usu-
ally be in a position to contribute important information to the fact-
finder. 209 Three members of the Court, in dissent, rightly pointed out that it 
was not necessary to give guardians and family members PartY status in 
order to obtain information from them, because a court could simply call 
proceedings are necessary when a parent seeks to commit a child to a state mental institution, the Court 
did recognize that parents sometimes act primarily out of self-interest rather than out of concern for the 
well-being of their children. However, the Court insisted that the presumption should be that parents are 
acting in their child's best interests. Id. at 602-03. The Parham Court also made explicit what the 
Pierce and Yoder decisions had only suggested: that the rights of parents operate to circumscribe the 
rights of children. The Court found that with respect to commitments of a child to institutional care, the 
traditional right of parental authority outweighed most due process rights of the child. I d. at 603-04. 
205. 113 S. Ct. 2637 (1993). 
206. Id. at 2648-49. 
207. KY. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 202B.160(3) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrilll991). Butcf Parham, 442 U.S. 
at 604 (holding that parents have presumptive authority to commit their minor child to a mental health 
institution, subject to review by the institution's superintendent). 
208. Heller, 113 S. Ct. at 2648 • 
209. Id. at 2648-49. The Court also suggested that parents have an independent stake in the 
commitment proceedings, because the costs of caring for their child might become overly burdensome 
as they reached old age. Id. at 2649. The overriding assumption, however, seems to be that parents of 
mentally retarded adults act in accordance with the interests of their offspring. It is interesting that, in 
dealing with children and mentally retarded adults, the Court reverses the presumption on which it 
operated in dealing with a normal adult in a persistent vegetative state in Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't 
of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990). The presumption in Cruzan was that parents may seek to act in 
furtherance of their own interests and at the expense of their offspring. See supra text accompanying 
notes 196-99. The Court's reversal of this presumption may be easy to explain (e.g., judicial 
squeamishness about letting people die), but it is difficult to justify. 
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them as witnesses to testify.210 
In cases involving proposed medical treatment for mentally retarded 
adults, courts have used a substituted-judgment procedure in which the 
court attempts to discern what the incompetent person's decision would be 
if he were competent. 211 This approach allows parental input but does not 
treat parents as parties, nor does it confer on them a right to make decisions 
for their adult offspring.212 Thus, the law ensures parents of a mentally 
retarded adult some role in important decisions regarding their offspring's 
life, in furtherance of their offspring's rights. However, the parents' author-
ity is substantially more limited than that which parents exercise over minor 
children, and certainly it does not amount to a right of control over the life 
of their adult offspring. 
As pointed out in the previous Section, courts simply have not been 
called on to address claims that one individual possesses a right to make 
life-determining decisions for another, competent adult.213 I have sug-
gested that the absence of such claims lends support to the conclusion that, 
outside of the parenting context, it is accepted without question in our legal 
system that rights are inherently limited to protecting self-determination. 
To further support this proposition, it is wQrth considering a few right-based 
claims individuals have made to be free to act in certain ways that would 
effectively diminish the autonomy of other competent, non-consenting 
adults. 
In the First Amendment context, the Supreme Court has pronounced as 
a general rule that individuals may not be forced to express any belief/14 or 
to subsidize the expression of others' beliefs.215 Nevertheless, in 
Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins,216 the Court upheld a state court 
ruling that California's constitution required owners of a large shopping 
mall to allow a group of students to solicit signatures for petitions in the 
common area of the mall. The Court emphasized, however, that because 
the shopping center was a business establishment open to the public, "[t]he 
210. Heller, 113 S. Ct. at 2656 (Souter, J., dissenting, joined by Blackmun & Stevens, JJ.). The 
dissenting Justices objected to giving the parents party status principally because doing so would subject 
the incompetent adult not only to a second advocate for institutionalization, but also to a "second 
prosecutor with the capacity to call and cross-examine witnesses, to obtain expert testimony and to mise 
an appeal that might not otherwise be taken." /d. at 2657. 
211. See infra notes 257-59 and accompanying text. 
212. For a discussion of the potential application of a substituted-judgment procedure in coses 
involving minor children, see infra notes 254-68 and accompanying text. 
213. See supra text accompanying notes 139-64. 
214. See, e.g., Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (holding that a state may not require an 
individual to display an ideological message on his car license plate); West Virginia State Bd. ofEduc. 
v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (holding that a state may not compel students to recite the pledge to the 
flag); see also S.D. CoDIFIED LAws ANN. § 22-27-2 (1988) (making it a misdemeanor to compel another 
person by threats or violence to adopt, pmctice, or profess any religious belief). 
215. See, e.g., Miami Hemld Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (holding that a state 
may not require a newspaper to publish a political candidate's reply to a previously published criticism). 
216. 447 u.s. 74 (1980). 
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views expressed by members of the public in passing out pamphlets or 
seeking signatures for a petition ... will not likely be identified with those 
of the owner."217 In addition, the mall owners were free to make clear to 
the public that the students' use of the mall did not constitute an endorse-
ment of their views.Z18 
In their concurring opinion, Justices Powell and White clarified that 
the First Amendment rule against compulsory speech or endorsement 
applies not only to state-compelled speech, but also to state-mandated rights 
of access which entitle some persons to speak on the private property of 
others. Where such access rights amount to compelled affirmation of the 
speakers' views, or otherwise force the property owner to speak, they con-
flict with the First Amendment.219 They further indicated that their deci-
sion would have gone the other way if the commercial establishment had 
been smaller, since the public would then be more likely to assume the 
property owners endorsed the students' position,220 or perhaps if the mall 
owners had objected to the ideas contained in the students' petitions.221 
Thus, the more a situation involves the imposition of one individual's view 
on another, the less likely are the first individual's efforts to be deemed a 
matter of right, deserving of constitutional protection.222 Nevertheless, 
courts maintain that parents are entitled to impose their beliefs on their chil-
dren, and to isolate them from competing cultural and intellectual 
infl.uences.223 
The abortion debate presents a number of control issues. The Court in 
Roe v. Wade declared that a fetus is not a person,224 so it has not had to face 
the question whether a pregnant woman could possess a right to decide that 
another person will die, nor the question of whether an unborn child has a 
positive claim-right to be carried to term. However, in dictum, the Court 
intimated that if the fetus were a person, its claim-rights would be control-
ling on the abortion question.225 A number of commentators have objected 
that even if the fetus were a person, according it a right to life would be to 
use the pregnant woman as a non-consenting instrument to further the inter-
217. /d. at 87. 
218. /d. The Court distinguished Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977), noting that there the 
State sought to compel the display of an ideological message on personal property used in daily life, 
which was an appreciable encroachment on personal autonomy. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 
447 u.s. 74, 87. 
219. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr., 447 U.S. at 97-98. 
220. /d. at 99. Justices Powell and White were uncomfortable with the majority's suggestion that 
the mall owners could simply disavow any endorsement of the students' views. In a situation where 
property owners must express such a disavowal to avoid attribution of another party's speech to them, 
they are effectively compelled to speak, in violation of their free speech rights. /d. 
221. /d. at 97-98, 101. 
222. /d. at 100-01 n.4. 
223. See discussion supra Section I.A. 
224. 410 u.s. 113, 158 (1973). 
225. /d. at 156-57. 
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ests of another person.226 
An additional control issue arises when persons opposed to abortion 
seek to disrupt the activities of abortion clinics. Significantly, these pro-life 
activists, to the best of my knowledge, do not claim that the Free Exercise 
Clause or the Due Process Clause grants them a right to control pregnant 
women's lives. Rather, they claim a right of self-expression and, as justifi-
cation for their more disruptive activities, claim to act as agents for the 
unborn child, asserting the unborn child's right to life.227 Courts have uni-
formly rejected this agency argument, and have held pro-life activists crimi-
nally liable when they have crossed the line between self-expression and 
obstruction of the activities of pregnant women and their doctors.228 
Thus, even though abortion evokes the strongest of feelings about how 
other people should act and offends fundamental principles within some 
religious belief systems, these abortion cases and the debate surrounding 
them are entirely consistent with the proposition that in our legal culture, 
individual rights are understood to be limited, outside the parenting context, 
to self-determining conduct. Even the most fanatically religious partici-
pants in the debate appear to accept a distinction between what their reli-
gious beliefs legally entitle them to do to their children and what their 
beliefs legally entitle them to do to other adults. Even though they might 
desperately wish to control what a pregnant woman does with her body, 
pro-life advocates seem to understand that their constitutional freedom of 
religion simply does not include a right to do so. Thus, they appeal instead 
to what they regard as the claim-rights of the unborn child. 
Of course, there is one class of persons other than parents who do 
possess rights that impose quite substantial burdens and restrictions on 
other persons-namely, children themselves. Children possess not only 
negative claim-rights against grievous harm, but also positive claim-rights 
to on-going care and support from their parents. These claim-rights may 
continue to operate to some extent even after a parent relinquishes or loses 
custody of a child, as often occurs following divorce. Parents' legal duties 
to feed, clothe, shelter, supervise, and obtain medical care for their children 
226. See, e.g., Donald H. Regan, Rewriting Roe v. Wade, 77 MICH. L. REv. 1569, 1622, 1630-31 
(1979); Judith Jarvis Thomson, A Defense of Abortion, 1 PHIL. & Ptm. APP. 47 (1971). One way out of 
this dilemma that would be consistent with the conception of rights advanced here would be to recognize 
no rights-neither a right of the unborn child to be carried to term nor a right of the woman to abort-
and to either prohibit or permit abortions simply as a matter of public policy. 
227. See Allison v. City of Birmingham, 580 So. 2d 1377, 1381-82 (Ala. Crim. App.) (citing 
numerous cases in which persons charged with criminal trespass in connection with abortion clinic 
protests have raised, and courts have rejected, the defense that their actions were necessary to protect the 
lives ofunbem children), cert. denied. 580 So. 2d 1390 (Ala. 1991). 
228. See, e.g., id.; State v. O'Brien, 784 S.W.2d 187 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989); Cmbb v. State, 754 
S.W.2d 742 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 815 (1989). In the parental free-exercise 
context, in contmst, the courts have dmwn no such line between self-expression and other-
determination. See discussion supra Part I. 
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can effectively limit parents' life choices and dictate a large part of what 
they must do on a daily basis. 
There are, however, at least two reasons why children's claim-rights 
against their parents do not constitute a counterexample to the proposition 
that in our legal culture no one, other than parents of minor children, pos-
sesses rights to control the life of another, non-consenting person. First and 
most importantly, the adults who bear the duties corresponding to children's 
claim-rights have, as far as the law is concerned, undertaken these duties 
voluntarily. Those adults who do not wish to shoulder the obligations of 
parenthood are legally free not to conceive children, to abort a fetus before 
the stage of viability, or to give up a child for adoption or care by the 
State.229 Children, therefore, do not possess rights of control over non-con-
senting adults. 
Second, the self-imposed constraints of parenthood are quite different 
from the control that parents are currently deemed entitled to wield over 
their non-consenting children. The purpose and priinary effect of children's 
claims on their parents are to protect and promote children's interest in their 
own self-determination and personal integrity, not to determine the course 
of parents' lives. Thus, children have no right to determine which faith 
their parents will adopt, what schooling their parents will receive, where 
and whether their parents will work, or what medical treatment their parents 
will undergo. 
In sum, the presumption of parental consent to obligations owed to 
children, and the absence of rights reposing in children to control the lives 
of their parents in a manner even remotely similar to the way that parents 
are deemed entitled to control the lives of their children, establish that chil-
dren's rights do not represent a counterexample to the proposition advanced 
in this Part. Parental rights remain the sole exception to the general rule 
that rights in our legal system are limited to protecting self-determination 
and personal integrity. Unless there is some rational justification for this 
anomaly, the extensive set of other-determining rights held by parents is 
indefensible. Part ill therefore explores whether there are any characteris-
tics of children or of the parent-child relationship, not present in the situa-
tions discussed thus far, that might justify subjecting children to rights of 
control held by other persons. 
m 
JUSTIFICATIONS FOR PARENTS' RIGHTS 
On the rare occasions when legal scholars or philosophers offer any 
justifications for parental rights, they typically invoke one or more human 
229. Of course, circumstances are such that many women are coerced into conceiving, bearing, and 
raising children they would otherwise not have, but the denial of self-detennination in such cases comes 
not from the children but from other adults, whether they be husbands, boyfriends, rapists, parents, or 
church leaders, and is not directly sanctioned by law. 
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interests that parenting rights are supposed to protect: the interests of chil-
dren, the interests of parents, and/or the interests of society as a whole. I 
consider each of these categories of interests in turn below. However, 
before doing so, it is important to address the one justification on which the 
courts have principally relied-one which does not fall into any of these 
categories. The main rationale the courts have offered for according rights 
of parental control protection under either the Free Exercise Clause or the 
Due Process Clause is simply that parents have traditionally held such 
rights.230 
That some practice or rule has a long tradition does not, however, 
mean that it is in anyone's interest; a tradition might persist even though on 
the whole it diminishes the well-being of all concerned parties, including 
those who appear to be its beneficiaries.231 In such a case, it is difficult to 
imagine what reason there would be for maintaining the practice or rule, 
other than an irrational attachment to the past. Nor does a long tradition 
mean that a practice or rule is just, or that it is consistent with fundamental 
moral and legal precepts. For example, African slavery and the legal subju-
gation of women persisted for hundreds of years, but few today would 
argue that these ''traditions" were worthy of preservation. 
Nevertheless, certain members of the Supreme Court continue to 
advance the jurisprudential line that it is a sufficient condition for finding a 
liberty to be fundamental and protected by the Constitution that it is "deeply 
rooted in this Nation's history and tradition."232 Other recent members of 
the Court, have, on the other hand, disparaged reliance on this criterion as a 
means of identifying constitutionally-protected liberties. In his Bowers v. 
Hardwic!i233 dissent, Justice Blackmun invoked the following justly famous 
words of Oliver Wendell Holmes: 
"[I]t is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that 
230. See, e.g .• Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (plurality opinion) ("Our 
decisions establish that the Constitution protects the sanctity of the family precisely because the 
institution of the family is deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition.''); see also CARTER, 
supra note 162 at 184: 
Even [Justice] Douglas did not quite suggest [in Yoder] that the state should intervene to 
prevent the parents from forcing the dissenting child to accept their religion, and that is a good 
thing. The right of parents to choose a religious upbringing for their children is older than 
America, and ought to stand as an unshakable fundament of national life. 
231. One might argue, for example, that the traditional marital exemption from criminal rape laws, 
discussed supra text accompanying notes 179-90, did not enhance anyone's well-being before the courts 
abolished it, and that it in fact made both wives and husbands worse off by encouraging attitudes and 
permitting behavior destructive of the emotional bonds between them. 
232. Moore, 431 U.S. at 503. Several recent opinions by members of the Court-principally 
Jnstice Scalia-reflect this reliance on ''tradition." See, e.g .. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 
497 U.S. 261, 294, 295 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting that there is no tradition and therefore no 
liberty to commit suicide); Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 122-23 (1989) (plurality opinion of 
Scalia, J., joined by Rebnquist, CJ., and in part by O'Connor & Kennedy, JJ.) (requiring an asserted 
liberty to be "rooted in history and tradition''). 
233. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (holding that freedom to engage in homosexual 
activity is not a h'berty rooted in the Nation's traditions). 
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so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolt-
ing if the grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished long 
since, and the rule simply persists from blind imitation of the 
past."234 
Justice White once pointed out that "[w]hat the deeply rooted traditions of 
the country are is arguable; which of them deserve [due process protection] 
is even more debatable."235 Justice Brennan expressed similar skepticism 
of"tradition" as a criterion: "Even ifwe could agree ... on the content and 
significance of particular traditions, we still would be forced to identify the 
point at which a tradition becomes . . . too obsolete to be relevant any 
longer."236 
A more sensible approach would be to engage a rebuttable presump-
tion that a long-standing social practice or legal right is beneficial and just, 
234. !d. at 199 (Blackmun, J. dissenting, joined by Brennan, Marshall, & Stevens, JJ.) (quoting 
Oliver W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HAR.v. L. REv. 457,469 (1897)); see also Roe v. Wade, 410 
U.S. 113, 117 (1973) (holding that simply because the moral judgments expressed by an anti-abortion 
statute are " 'natural and familiar,' " we should not assume that " 'statutes embodying them [do not] 
conflict with the Constitution of the United States''') (quoting Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 
(1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting)). 
235. Moore, 431 U.S. at 549 (White, J., dissenting); see also LAURENCE H. TRIBE & MICHAEL C. 
DoRF, ON READING nm CoNsrmmoN 98 (1991) ("[r]he extraction of fundamental rights from societal 
traditions is no more value-neutral than is the extraction of fundamental rights from legal precedent 
.•• .''); J.M. Balkin, Tradition, Betrayal, and the Politics of Deconstruction, II CARDOzo L. REv. 1613, 
1618 (1990) ("[W]hat is most troubling about Justice Scalia's call for respecting the most specific 
tradition available is that our most specific historical traditions may often be opposed to our more 
general commitments to liberty or equality.''); Joseph D. Grano, Judicial Review and a Written 
Constitution in a Democratic Society, 28 WAYNE L. REv. 1, 26 (1981) ("Societies do change, however, 
and cognizant of this, the Court could not have intended to become constitutionally committed to every 
practice rooted in our history and tradition. In particular, progress toward racial and sexual equality 
depends upon success in freeing ourselves from the yoke of history and tradition."); McCarthy, supra 
note 6, at 984 ("[A]lways looking backward in time to see whether tradition would support a claim of 
right can freeze in time very specific rights, but no others, and ..• requires that tire entire argument be 
moved to a different level of abstraction for which the tradition itself provides no direct support.''). 
236. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 138 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by 
Marshall & Blackmun, JJ.). For a defense of the practice of relying on tradition to define the contours of 
protected liberty, see Developments, supra note 18, at 1186-87. The main argument is primarily a 
negative one: that reliance on other criteria, such as the requirements of ordered liberty or the Court's 
own theory of politicallroerty, would leave too much room for judicial arbitrariness in decisionmaking. 
!d. Tradition, on the other band, is a ''relatively objective" criterion. !d. at 1187. 
An objective criterion is not, of course, necessarily a good criterion. In any event, Supreme Court 
Justices have amply demonstrated their ability to manipulate tradition to reach desired outcomes. 
Compare Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (finding no tradition of privacy regarding 
consensual homosexual activity in the home, and therefore, no protected liberty) with Eisenstadt v. 
Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (finding that heterosexual activity between unmarried persons is within the 
realm of traditionally protected privacy). 
It is also worth noting that the traditional understanding of parents' status has changed over time. 
The notion that parents have inherent rights of control over their children is a relatively recent 
development See discussion supra Section l.A; Developments, supra note 18, at 1223. In the 
nineteenth century, American society regarded parents' custody of children as a delegation of the State's 
responsibility for the weB-being of children, and the ''presumption of parental custody was based upon 
the extent to which the parent successfully served the state's [sic] interest in promoting the child's 
welfare ••. .'' Developments, supra note 18, at 1223; see also McCarthy, supra note 6, at 975-76. 
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and deserving of constitutional protection. However, when good reason 
exists for challenging such a traditional practice or rule, courts should ask 
whether it does in fact serve the interests supposed to underlie it, and 
whether it is indeed just and consistent with other legal principles. If a 
traditional rule or Q._ractice fails this test, then it no longer merits constitu-
tional protection. 
The remainder of this Article endeavors to demonstrate that a break 
with tradition is warranted in the case of parents' rights of control over their 
children. 237 As shown in Part II, these parental rights are inconsistent with 
the general rule against granting individuals rights to control the lives of 
others. In the past, such other-determining rights have been granted only 
where the subjugated individual was regarded as "property'' or as subsumed 
under the identity of the right-holder. Today, however, the law recognizes 
that children are not chattel, but persons, who themselves hold rights under 
our Constitution. Thus, parental rights of control may be no more just than 
was the centuries-old institution of slavery or the longstanding legal sanc-
tion of marital rape. We should seriously consider, then, what interests par-
ents' child-rearing rights do serve, and on that basis determine whether it is 
rational and just to perpetuate these rights. 
This Part addresses these questions and concludes that, because any 
interests that allegedly only parental rights can protect are in fact illusory or 
illegitimate, these rights are indefensible. It shows that a parental child-
rearing privilege,238 coupled with an appropriate set of children's rights, are 
all that is necessary to protect the legitimate interests at stake in the raising 
of children. 
A. Justifications Based on Children's Interests 
Legal scholars usually justify parents' rights, if at all, on the ground 
that they are necessary to protect the interests of children. 239 There is wide-
spread agreement among academic commentators today that children 
should be respected as distinct persons, rather than treated as appendages or 
property of their parents.240 Nevertheless, many commentators argue that 
because children are incapable of protecting or providing for themselves, or 
of making rational, informed decisions about important aspects of their 
lives, some adult must be in a position to direct their lives and make impor-
tant decisions for them.241 Moreover, many child-development experts 
believe that an optimal upbringing includes an intimate, continuous rela-
237. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2808-09 (1992) (plurality opinion of 
O'Connor, Kennedy, & Souter, JJ.) (enumerating criteria for exceptions to the rule of stare decisis). 
238. See supra notes 7-13 and accompanying text. 
239. See, e.g., McCarthy, supra note 6, at 1017 ("Virtually every discussion of parental rights 
begins by focusing on the needs of children.''). 
240. See, e.g., Ruddick, supra note 6, at 127-29. 
241. See, e.g., GoLDSTEIN ET AL, supra note 7, at 7; Francis Schrag, Rights Over Children, 7 J. 
VALUE INQUIRY 96, 98 (1973); Wald, supra note 7, at 645. 
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tionship with a single parent or set of parents that is largely insulated from 
interference by third parties.242 Conventional wisdom further holds that 
parents are in the best position to know· what is best for their children and 
are likely to care more than any other adult about their children's well-
being. 
These beliefs are not entirely uncontroversial. There is disagreement, 
for example, about the age at which children become competent to make 
certain decisions for themselves and to engage responsibly in certain activi-
ties.243 Some writers also dispute the presumption that parents know what 
is best for their children.244 However, even if the assertions above have 
some core of truth, it simply does not follow from them that parents should 
have child-rearing rights, including plenary rights to effectuate their own 
ideologically-based judgment concerning how a child's life should proceed. 
There are at least four problems with invoking children's interests to 
defend the courts' sanctioning of parental rights. First, at least with respect 
to parental free exercise rights, the courts themselves have never taken this 
approach.245 As noted above, courts have granted parents rights against 
state intervention intended to protect children's interests simply because 
there is a long tradition246 of letting parents do what they want with their 
children absent a threat of grievous harm. 247 They have not focused on 
whether, for the child, the costs of intervention by the State would exceed 
the costs of non-intervention. If the courts did focus :first and foremost on 
the interests of children in discussing parents' rights, the scope of those 
rights would undoubtedly be much different from what it presently is.248 
A second problem with the child-centered approach to defending par-
ents' rights is relevant only in the free exercise context. It is not self-evi-
dent that a connection exists between parents' religious beliefs and 
children's interests. Anyone promoting the child-centered justification 
exclusively would have to demonstrate such a connection, it would seem, in 
order to justify the Supreme Court's determination that parents should have 
greater rights of control over their children's lives when parental prefer-
ences regarding the upbringing of children arise from religious rather than 
242. See, e.g., GoLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 7, at 4, 8-10; MichaelS. Wald, Children's Rights: A 
Framework for Analysis, 12 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 255, 277 (1979). 
243. See DAVID ARCHARD, CHn.oREN: RIGHI'S AND CHILDHOOD 49-50 (1993); Wald, supra note 
242, at 272-75. 
244. See, e.g., McMullen, supra note 7, at 594-96. 
245. The Supreme Court has occasionally drawn a connection between parents' rights and 
children's interests in the substantive due process context. See, e.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602-
03 (1979). 
246. See supra notes 230-37 and accompanying text 
247. See generally supra Section I.B.2. 
248. See Carl E. Schneider, Rights Discourse and Neonatal Euthanasia, 76 CALIF. L. REv. lSI, 
l 59 (1988) ("[I]f we attribute rights to parents because doing so generally helps children, may we not, 
ought we not, deny parents rights in any class of situations in which attributing rights to parents would 
generally not help children?"). 
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secular beliefs.249 It is necessary to show that the very fact of adhering to a 
religion-any religion-whose tenets include preferred modes of parenting 
makes a parent better able or more disposed to further the temporal interests 
of the child. 
The qualification "temporal" applied to "interests" in the preceding 
passage is critical, and calls for explanation. · Naturally, religious parents 
are concerned about more than the temporal interests of their children. 
Consistent with the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, how-
ever, temporal interests are the only interests with which the State can prop-
erly concern itself in carrying out its responsibility to protect the well-being 
of children. For the State to take account of children's supposed spiritual 
interests would require it to assume the truth of particular religious 
beliefs-e.g., that children have spiritual interests in the first place, that 
those interests are of a certain nature, and that they are best served by living 
in a certain way. It would therefore require the state to endorse a particular 
religious view, which the State may not do.250 
This is not to say, however, that the State may not acknowledge the 
effect of parents' particular religious beliefs on the temporal interests of the 
child-for example, the psychological trauma that might result if a child's 
parents came to believe that they or the child will be eternally damned. 
Any defensible interpretation of the Establishment Clause, however, would 
recognize that it does preclude the State from assuming that the parents' 
belief is true and from weighing the child's alleged spiritual interests 
against her temporal interests based on that assumption. In addition, neither 
the Establishment Clause nor the Free Exercise Clause requires that the 
State allow individual citizens to determine for themselves the legality of 
their actions by balancing the temporal and spiritual interests of other per-
sons affected thereby. It is for legislators and judges to determine the legal-
ity of people's actions, based on the material they have to work with-the 
temporal interests of the people whom the actions affect. In our legal sys-
tem, religious belief has never been an excuse for harming the temporal 
interests of other, non-consenting adults, and it should not be any more so 
when it is a child who is harmed. 
While the motives of persons who promulgate or interpret religious 
teachings concerning child-rearing are undoubtedly quite complex, there is 
249. WISconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215, 233 (1972); see also text accompanying notes 50-52. 
250. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 593-94 (1989) (holding that religious 
displays on government property are impermissible because "[t]he Establishment Clause, at the very 
least, prohibits government from appearing to take a position on questions of religious belief"); Texas 
Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 8 (1989) (plurality opinion) (striking down a tax exemption 
benefiting only religious publications because "the Constitution prohibits, at the very least, legislation 
that eonstitutes an endorsement of one or another set of religious beliefs or of religion genemlly''); 
Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987) (striking down on Establishment Clause grounds a statute 
that forbade the teacl!ing of evolution science in public schools where creationism was not also taught 
because the statute endorsed o particular religious doctrine). 
HeinOnline -- 82 Cal L. Rev. 1429 1994
1994] PAREm'S' REUGION AND ClllLDREN'S WELFARE 1429 
no reason to suppose that in most or even many cases their primary motive 
is concern for the temporal well-being of children. Indeed, parents 
embroiled in conflicts with the State over schooling and medical-care for 
children commonly invoke their own spiritual interests, as well as those of 
their children, in support of their parenting choices-against what the larger 
community perceives to be the temporal interests of the children. There-
fore, whatever the deficiencies of the child-centered approach in justifying 
the more limited parental rights courts have carved out under the Due 
Process Clause, this approach seems particularly unpromising with respect 
to parental free exercise rights. 
A third problem with invoking children's interests to justify parents' 
rights is that it is very odd to tie one person's rights to another person's 
interests.251 In our legal culture, rights ordinarily protect the right-holder's 
interests, not the interests of other persons. Thus, it is fitting to ask why, if 
what we are most concerned with is protecting children's interests, we do 
not grant children themselves the rights necessary to protect those interests. 
Why, instead, do we rely on the conceptually awkward notion of parents' 
rights? 
All of the important interests one might attribute to children can give 
rise to a right of one kind or another residing in the child. For example, we 
could attribute to children a positive claim-right to the exclusive and contin-
uous care, protection, and guidance of a single set of parents, as well as to 
equal educational opportunity and medical care. We could also grant chil-
dren a negative claim-right against any interference by the State in the par-
ent-child relationship that would do more harm than good to the child. 
One objection to this substitution of one set of rights for another might 
be that it locates the new set of rights in persons who are not in a position to 
effectuate them. Most children are not capable of invoking the necessary 
institutional mechanisms for asserting rights-police protection and investi-
gation, litigation, and the legislative process. However, this objection has 
no greater force in the case of children than it does in the case of incompe-
tent adults. Persons other than the right-holder can and do act as agents to 
prosecute an incompetent person's rights. 
Thus, in a world without parents' rights but with an appropriate set of 
children's rights, the law could recognize parents as their children's agents, 
with the responsibility to assert the children's rights and invoke the neces-
sary institutional mechanisms when actions by third parties threaten the 
children's interests. Such actions would include unwarranted attempts by 
the State to intervene to protect what it mistakenly perceives to be the tem-
poral interests of the child. 252 If a conflict over child-rearing practices were 
251. See McCarthy, supra note 6, at 1019. 
252. While it is rare for judges or legal scholars to think of parental authority in terms of children's 
rights, it is not an entirely novel approach or locution. See, e.g., ARcHARD, supra note 243, at 103 ("My 
loving you does not give me rights over you. But if you have a right to certain kinds of treatment and 
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to arise between parents and the State under this legal regime, courts would 
not balance the child's interests against the parents' child-rearing rights, 
because the parents would have no such rights. Rather, courts would deter-
mine as best they could which outcome-that which the parent recom-
mends or that which the State recommends-is more consistent with the 
rights of the child. 
The analogy between children and incompetent adults suggests a way 
for courts to make this determination that perhaps best embodies a proper 
respect for the personhood of the child. As in the case of adults who are 
mentally retarded or in a persistent vegatative state,253 courts could employ 
a substituted-judgment procedure for imputing preferences to children. 
Under this approach, the parents, acting as agents for the child, would have 
to argue that their judgment is the same as what the child would choose for 
herself if rationally able to do so, given the child's existing desires, values, 
iticlinations, and needs, as well as her likely future interests.254 If the 
child's rational preference would likely be that her parents not be prevented 
from directing her life in the manner they prefer, then courts might find that 
the child has a negative claim-right against state interference. Likewise, if 
parents were to challenge any authority the State might assume over their 
child,255 the State would have to argue that it has accorded due weight to 
my love for you guarantees that treatment. then it may follow that I am the person to love you. This, 
however, is your right not mine."); JoHN locKE. SEcOND TREATISE oF GoVERNMENT § 67, at 37 (C.B. 
Macpherson ed., Hackett 1980) (1690) (parents' authority over the child ''to speak properly ••• is rather 
the privilege of children, and duty of parents, than any prerogative of paternal power"); Schwartz, supra 
note 2, at 1733 ("Habilitation choices are the kind of choices parents traditionally make for their 
children, and retarded children should have a right to have their parents, and not other adults, make 
them.''). 
253. See discussion supra notes 192-212 and accompanying text. 
254. The substituted-judgment framework could also generate the procedural rules governing the 
litigation of disputes between parents and the State. For example, given the potentially high cost of 
intervention for the child, we might impute a hypothetical preference to children that the State be 
required to present "substantial" or ''persuasive" evidence that a particular child would benefit from the 
State stepping in to restrict or mandate certain parental behavior-before the parents are required to 
present a case in opposition. 
255. An appropriate procedural rule in these cases might be to permit parents to establish a prima 
facie case against state action by presenting evidence or arguments sufficient merely to lend plausibility 
to the claim that their own way of treating their children is more consistent with what the child would 
prefer than the State's way. Again, we should think about which procedural rules or presumptions 
would be best from the child's point of view, rather than crafting rules to accord deference to the 
supposed rights of parents. 
Legislatures also might use the substituted-judgment framework for deciding which child-rearing 
deeisions should presumptively reside with parents and which decisions, if any, should presumptively 
reside with appropriate state agencies. For example, it may be reasonable to impute to children a 
hypothetical preference that the State, rather than parents, have presumptive authority to decide what 
type of school they attend or whether they require medical treatment, but that parents be permitted to 
have input into and the ability to challenge the decisions of state offieials. At the same time, it may be 
reasonable to impute to children a hypothetical preference that their parents have presumptive authority 
to decide such things as whether the children will participate in religious activities outside of school, 
what they will eat. and what time they will go to bed. 
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the hypothetical rational preferences of the child herself.256 
Of course, unlike an adult who prior to his incompetency made his 
preferences known, a young child probably has never developed and 
expressed rational preferences regarding her schooling, medical care, or 
other important aspects of her life. This fact eliminates one important basis 
for making a substituted judgment determination, but it does not render the 
substituted-judgment framework unworkable or inappropriate in the case of 
children. Judicial resolution of disputes involving proposed medical care 
for mentally retarded adults supports this conclusion. For example, in In re 
Moe, 257 Massachusetts' highest court held that state courts could approve a 
parent's request for sterilization of a mentally retarded adult woman ''by 
finding the incompetent would so choose if competent.'0258 The court 
explained: 
We are aware of the difficulties of utilizing the substituted 
judgment doctrine in a case where the incompetent has been men-
tally retarded since birth. The inability, however, of an incompetent 
to choose, should not result in a loss of the person's constitutional 
interests .... We admit that in this case we are unable to draw upon 
prior stated preferences the individual may have expressed. An 
expression of intent by an incompetent person while competent, 
however, is not essential. . . . "While it may thus be necessary to 
rely to a greater degree on objective criteria ... the effort to bring 
the substituted judgment into step with the values and desires of the 
affected individual must not, and need not, be abandoned."259 
256. There is certainly reason for skepticism about the courts' ability to decide what a child's 
reasoned judgment would be if he were not incompetent, just as there is reason for skepticism 
concerning the ability of courts to discern a child's best interests. See e.g., Robert H. Mnookin, Foster 
Care-In Whose Best Interest?, 43 HARv. Enuc. REv. 599, 615-22 (1973). However, this concern in 
and of itself does not justify establishing a presumption that parents' preferences should determine the 
life of the child. The substituted-judgment framework would simply require that we take this skepticism 
into account in deciding which procedural rules children would likely prefer. It would also require 
taking into account that, with respect to some important aspects of children'~ lives, parents are likely to 
be less competent to judge their child's best interests or hypothetical rational preferences than are people 
who spend their lives studying and thinking about what is best for children. Courts should acknowledge 
and draw upon a parent's unique knowledge about the particular characteristics of her child, and should 
take into account that the parent in all likelihood cares a great deal about the child. But once the court 
has elicited such information from the parent and factored in the parent's benevolence, what reason is 
there for according the parent's judgment decisive weight? And shouldn't the court also factor in that 
parents may be motivated primarily by ideological beliefs that have nothing to do wilh the child's 
temporal interests? The costs of intervention for the child should also bo a factor, but this is not to say 
that courts should presume that the parents' judgment is accurate. 
257. 432 N.E.2d 712 (Mass. 1982). 
258. !d. at 721. 
259. !d. at 720 (quoting Superintendent ofBelchertwon State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 
430-31 (Mass. 1977)) (citations omitted). Several other state courts have also relied on the doctrine of 
substituted judgment to decide cases involving severely retarded adults. See, e.g., In re Grady, 426 A.2d 
467, 474-75 (N.J. 1981) (establishing standards for the authorization of proposed sterilization of 19-
year-old woman with Down's Syndrome); In re Weberlist, 360 N.Y.S.2d 783, 787 (N.Y. Sup. Ct 1974) 
(approving dental work, facial restoration, and surgery on hand, cleft palate, and jaw for 22-year-old 
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The idea of using a substituted-judgment framework for achieving just 
treatment of children has been suggested by John Rawls,260 and there is 
growing interest among scholars in the field of children's rights in develop-
ing this approach.261 Rawls relies on the notion of primary goods to 
address cases in which children do not have settled rational preferences 
regarding certain aspects of their care and education. Primary goods are 
those basic things that any rational person would want to ensure for herself 
if forced to choose, in a hypothetical situation of ignorance as to her partic-
ular social circumstances, personal attributes, and conception of the good, 
principles to govern the basic institutions of society, including the family 
and the education system.262 These might also be thought of as fundamen-
tal needs or, in Joel Feinberg's terminology, ''welfare interests" that must be 
satisfied before a person can pursue her individualized ''ulterior interests" 
or higher aims in life.263 The less we know about a particular person's 
actual preferences, values, inclinations, and other characteristics, the more 
we must rely on such generic descriptions of basic interests in determining 
what that person would choose for herself if able. As such, using the sub-
stituted-judgment framework with respect to a very young child would in 
man with an I.Q. of20, based on ''what [he] would choose if he were in a position to make a sound 
judgment''). 
Before making a substituted judgment, a lower court must first detennine whether the ward, despite 
being mentally retarded, is capable of making an informed decision about the proposed procedure. If 
not, then in construing what the incompetent person's judgment would be if competent, the court must 
take into account that person's existing preferences, if any. The court should also, however, assume that 
a competent person contemplating how she should be treated if she were incompetent would regard the 
fact of her incompetence as justifying some check on, or protection from, her expressed preferences to 
the extent they are clearly irrational. In re Moe, 579 N.E.2d 682, 686 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991). 
260. JoHN RAWLS, A THEoRY oF JuSTICE 249 (1971). 
261. See, e.g., M.D.A. FREEMAN, THE RIGHTS AND WRONGS OF CHiLDREN 55-60 (1983); John 
Eekelaar, The Importance of Thinking That Children Have Rights, in CIDLDREN, RIGHTS, AND THE LAW 
221 (Philip Alston eta!. eds., 1992); Richards, supra note 162, at 16. 
262. Rawls writes: 
[T]he principles of paternalism are those that the parties would acknowledge in the original 
position to protect themselves against the weakness and infirmities of their reason and will in 
society. Others are authorized and sometimes required to act on our behalf and to do what we 
would do for ourselves if we were rational, this authorization coming into effect only when we 
cannot look after our own good. Paternalistic decisions are to be guided by the individual's 
own settled preferences and interests insofar as they are not irrational, or failing a knowledge 
of these, by the theory of primary goods. As we know less and less about a person, we act for 
him as we would act for ourselves from the standpoint of the original position. We try to get 
for him the things he presumably wants whatever else he wants. We must be able to argue 
that with the development or the recovery of his rational powers the individual in question will 
accept our decision on his behalf and agree with us that we did the best thing for him. 
RAWLS, supra note 260, at 249. Rawls goes on to clarify that the assent of the child upon reaching 
maturity should not be the result of brainwashing, but rather the result of an objective assessment and 
uncoerced approval of her past treatment. I d. at 249-50. 
263. I JoEL FEINBERG, THE MoRAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAw: HARM TO OTHERS 37 (1984). 
Feinberg describes ulterior interests, in contrast, as individually determined desires for higher forms of 
accomplishment, meaning, and fulfillment. Id. He argues that only welfare interests warrant legal 
protection. Id. at 62-63. 
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practice not differ greatly from a best-interest calculation.264 Even in that 
case, however, the substituted-judgment framework encourages the deci-
sion-maker to see the child as a distinct and equal person deserving of 
respect, rather than simply as an object of paternalistic concern, and to 
avoid making decisions for the child based on the decision-maker's own 
particularized values and ideals. 
This Article cannot fully develop the implications of the substituted-
judgment procedure for different aspects of child-rearing, nor address all the 
questions that skeptics might raise about this approach. I will simply sug-
gest here that it is reasonable to impute to all children a hypothetical prefer-
ence that they receive certain basic forms of care: medical care to prevent 
avoidable sickness and physical injury, not only death; protection from 
adult behaviors that may cause them to suffer physical, psychological, or 
emotional trauma; and an education that develops in them independence of 
thought, keeps open for them a substantial range of alternative careers, 
lifestyles, and conceptions of the good, and is sensitive to their developing, 
individual inclinations as they gain maturity.265 A strong case can be made 
that each of these things is a primary good or an aspect of a child's welfare 
interests.266 It would therefore be rational for any child to want these things 
264. Depending on how one interprets ''interests," it may be possible to conceive of situations 
involving young children in which the substituted-judgment approach would yield outcomes different 
from what a best-interest analysis would yield-in particular, where it is reasonable to impute other-
regarding motives to a child. One such situation might be a decision to make a non-life-threatening 
organ transplant from a young child to a sibling in order to save the sibling's life. Many adults consent 
to removal of one of their organs to save the life of a family member. Likewise, in some cases it might 
be plausible to impute to the potential donor child, unable to give rational consent to such an operation, a 
hypothetical preference that the operation take place, even though we normally think of organ donors as 
sacrificing their own interests for the benefit of the recipient 
Some courts, though, have in fact justified a transplant from an incompetent donor to a sibling on 
the basis of the donor's interests. These courts have reasoned that the donor child's interests include the 
benefits to be derived from the continued companionship of the sibling, from avoiding the grief oflosing 
the sibling, and from experiencing the happiness ofhaving helped save the sibling's life. See, e.g., Hart 
v. Brown, 289 A.2d 386, 390-91 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1972); Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145, 146 (Ky. 
1969). 
265. See generally Richards, supra note 162. Richards argues for a liberal education as a matter of 
equal opportunity: 
[f]he purpose of education is not merely to prepare the child for the specialized skills 
that industrial society demands. Education also plays a critical role in fostering the values of 
autonomy that are fundamental to those liberal principles of justice that require that persons be 
treated as equals. Accordingly, such education should eschew indoctrination in rigid sectarian 
ideology. Instead, it should seek to develop the general capacities that any person would want 
in order to determine her or his vision of the good life. Thus, schools should cultivate self-
critical capacities such as precise expression, logic, various forms of analysis, sensitivity to 
evidence and rational weighing of it, and an open curiosity and readiness to take the risk of an 
experimental attitude toward problems and life. 
Richards, supra 162, at 22 (footnote omitted). 
266. In contrast, satisfaction of a parent's desire to mold his children in his own likeness and to 
control every aspect of the children's upbringing should be viewed as an ulterior interest. Similarly, 
satisfaction of a desire to control the minds and bodies of other adults, no matter how strong that desire, 
is merely an ulterior interest Frustrating that desire closes off one aim in life for a person but does not 
threaten his welfare interests, so he remains free to pursue any number of other ulterior aims-
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for herself.267 
As children approach adulthood, they are free to adopt whatever con-
ception of the good they like, to engage in any lawful religious rituals they 
choose, and to forego medical care of their own free will. It seems unlikely 
that any individual, upon reaching adulthood, would resent having had a 
range of options in matters of belief, lifestyle, and health preserved for her 
during her childhood. It seems reasonable to believe that she might want to 
make her own choices as an adult in accordance with the personal attitudes 
and ambitions she has developed, rather than having almost all options 
closed off to her just because her parents wished to determine her life for 
her.268 
These comments are intended to be merely suggestive. Determining 
what types of education and medical care best serve the welfare interests of 
children generally or of any particular child requires extensive analysis. 
This point leads to the fourth problem associated with using parental rights 
including, for the parent, the aim ofloving and guiding a child while also recognizing and appreciating 
the child's equal personhood and individuality. 
267. It also seems reasonable to impute to children a hypothetical preference that their parents not 
feel disempowered, incompetent, or embattled as a result of state interventions or regulations. See 
Wald, supra note 242, at 280 (noting that it is important to successful parenting that parents feel 
competent and empowered). This preference should be weighed against children's other hypothetical 
preferences. The outcome of this balancing might be some compromise between the position of the 
parents and what the child might ideally choose for herself. For example, such a compromise might 
result in genuine regulation and monitoring of church-run schools to ensure that such schools provide 
the components of a liberal education identified above, rather than compulsory public school attendance. 
Such a compromise might satisfy to a large degree the standard developmental interests of the child 
without generating extreme resentment and frustration in the parents. In other situations, compromise 
may not be called for or even feasible, as when a child requires a specific medical procedure in order to 
improve his health or to avoid significant injury. 
268. This is not to say that parents can or should make their offspring's adult options limitless. Nor 
would I deny that creating an open future for a child might irrevocably close off a certain type of 
religious experience. For example, it might preclude an unquestioning commitment to religious faith 
combined with a sense of belonging by birth, rather than by choice, to the community that embraces that 
faith. I submit, however, that unless and until it is shown that this type of experience generates greater 
well-being than does the experience of open possibility and self-determination in matters of belief and 
lifestyle, it would be easier for the State to justify to the offspring of religious parents having ensured the 
latter experience for them, out of respect for them as individuals, than to justify having enabled someone 
else to determine their faith for them. 
Regarding the nature of chosen commitments, Professor Waldron writes: 
To retain the capacity to review our commitments, we do not always have to be holding 
something back from them. Having the capacity to reflect means being able to make an effort 
when one needs to, to wrench away and construct the necessary psychological distance. It 
does not require a continuous reserve of commitment and energy which could have been 
associated with one's attachment but is not, and it certainly does not mean sitting baek all the 
time in the isolated citadel of self treating the attachment as a curious and contingent event in 
which one has no interest. In modem experience, intensity, whole-heartedness, and the sense 
of having identified comprehensively with a project or commitment, are as mueh features of 
the commitments that people choose and the ones they could give up if they wanted to, as of 
the commitments which people discover they have and find they cannot question-many 
modems would say more so. 
Jeremy Waldron, When Justice Replaces Affection: The Need for Rights, II HARv. J.L. & Puo. PoL'Y 
625, 646-47 (1988) (emphasis omitted). 
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to protect children's interests: the legal categories courts employ inevitably 
affect the way judges and lawyers think about the interests at stake, leading 
them to focus on some of these interests and deemphasize others. Estab-
lishing and giving priority to parents' rights seems to have fostered the ten-
dency of courts to analyze parent-state conflicts as if there were no other 
party involved, as if children were merely appendages or property of their 
parents.269 Characterizing the shield against unwarranted state intervention 
as the claim-right of the child, rather than a right of the parent, might go a 
long way toward refocusing the attention of judges and legislators on the 
interests of the child, and away from the desires of the parent. 
Were this to occur, we could expect a much more thorough investiga-
tion and public discussion of the effects of various child-rearing practices 
on children than that which presently takes place. For instance, we cur-
rently know very little about the relative costs and benefits to children of 
various forms of religious education, because state officials have been 
reluctant to encroach upon the rights of parents. This reluctance has pre-
vented them from seriously studying what goes on inside church-run 
schools and what effects these schools are having on the children in 
them.270 Making children's rights, rather than parents' rights, the dominant 
motif in legal and popular discourse concerning children's education might 
make it more likely that state officials could muster the political will to 
investigate the educational practices of these schools and to initiate appro-
priate regulation of them. 
Before moving on to adult-centered rationales for parents' rights, two 
variations on the "children's interests" rationale deserve mention. The first, 
an application of the maxim that "ought implies can," contends that because 
the law imposes on parents substantial duties of care with respect to their 
269. See Schneider, supra note 248, at 162-63. Schneider argues that the courts' emphasis on 
parents' rights may also encourage parents to be self-concerned, rather than concerned about the well-
being of their children: ''Thinking in tenns of rights encourages us to ask what we may do to free 
ourselves, not to bind ourselves. It encourages us to think about what constrains us from doing what we 
want, not what obligates us to do what we ought." /d. 
270. As noted above, states currently do very little to monitor the quality of church-run schools. 
See Burgess, supra note 69, at 76; see also SusAN D. RosE, KEEPING THEM OUT OF THE HANDs OF 
SATAN: EvANGELICAL SCHOOLING IN AMERICA 36 (1988) (''It is difficult to determine how many 
Christian schools exist because in many states they do not need and generally do not choose to be 
accredited.''). Even if such a school must go through an initial approval process, it may thereafter have 
no contact with state officials, except possibly for the periodic submission of standardized test scores or 
enrollment data. Should anyone suggest that the State closely scrutinize the educational practices in 
these schools, a hue and cry of parents' rights and religious freedom is raised. See, e.g., PARSONS, supra 
note 78, at 141-42, 146-47 (describing court and legislative battles Fundamentalist Christians have 
successfully waged to prevent state regulation of their schools). 
Even if lawmakers viewed parents' rights as limited in scope to protecting the interests of children, 
thinking in tenns of parents' rights would lead them to identify the children's interests with what the 
parents believe are the children's interests. However, the parents' view is likely to derive more from 
religious commands than from a concern for the intellectual growth or psychological and emotional 
well-being of the child. Transforming the rhetoric to focus on children's rights would make it more 
difficult for public officials to make this mistake. 
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children, parents must also have substantial child-rearing rights, in order to 
be able to fulfill their duties.271 Importantly, this argument would justify a 
set of parental rights that extended only as far as parents' legal obligations. 
It thus clearly would not support rights to send one's children to a religious 
school or to refuse necessary medical treatment for a child. Moreover, apart 
from this issue of scope, the reasoning of this argument is simply flawed. 
The fact that one person owes duties to another person certainly does 
not logically entail that the first person has any rights-not even rights that 
might be necessary as a practical matter to fulfill her duties. The logical 
corollary of a legal duty owed to another person is simply a claim-right 
residing in that other person, not any right residing in the individual under 
the duty. For example, a doctor owes a duty of care to his patients, but this 
duty of care does not itself entail rights against her patients or against third 
parties. 
In addition, it is not necessary as a practical matter that the State con-
fer on parents any rights in order to ensure that they are able to fulfill their 
legal obligations to their children. As indicated above, it is sufficient for 
this purpose to grant parents a legal privilege to engage in parenting prac-
tices not incompatible with their children's temporal interests, and to recog-
nize the children's claim-rights against unwarranted interference by the 
State or other third parties in the parents' efforts to fulfill their duties.272 
Moreover, when the State prevents a parent from performing some action or 
from making some decision for the benefit of a child, it also to that extent 
lessens the legal responsibility of the parent, implicitly declaring that that 
action or decision is no part of the parent's legal responsibility. Since it is 
the State that establishes the legal responsibilities of parents in the first 
place, there cannot be any conflict between those responsibilities and 
restrictions that the State imposes on parents.273 It is thus nonsensical to 
assert that parents need rights against the State as a practical matter in order 
271. See, e.g., ARCHARD, supra note 243, at 109; J.W. DOCKlNO, PRIMARY SCHooLS AND PARENTs: 
RtoKrS, REsPoNSIBILITIES AND RELATIONSHIPS 34 (1990); Amy Gutmann, Children, Paternalism, and 
Education: A Liberal Argument, 9 PHIL. & PuB. AFF. 338,343 (1980); Peter Hobson, Some Reflections 
on Parents' Rights in the Upbringing of Their Children, 18 J. PHIL. Eouc. 63, 64 (1984). As noted 
above, the Supreme Court's reference to parents' moral obligations in Yoder and Pierce is not an 
argument that parental rights follow from parental responsibilities. See discussion supra note 59. The 
Court has drawn such a connection more explicitly outside the free exercise context See, e.g., Lchr v. 
Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 257 (1983) ("[T]he rights of the parents are a counterpart of the 
responsibilities they have assumed.''). 
272. Analogously, to ensure that an attorney is able to fulfill her duties to her client, it is sufficient 
to accord the attorney a privilege to guide and act on behalf of her client, and to repose in the client 
rights against unwarranted outside interference in the attorney's performance of her responsibilities. 
Thus, for example, if a state denies a criminal defendant's access to her client, the lawyer will assert that 
the State has violated her client's Sixth Amendment rights, but need not and cannot plausibly claim that 
the State has violated any rights of her own. 
273. It is difficult to imagine a state prosecuting parents for failing to perform some action that state 
law prohibited them from doing. Were a state ever to do so, the legal prohibition would, of course, be a 
complete defense. 
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to carry out their legal responsibilities to their children.274 
The second variation on the childrens' interests rationale contends that 
the desire of adults to raise children as they see fit is so strong that, if they 
did not have extensive rights of parental control, adults would forego hav-
ing children.275 This situation, so the argument goes, would be contrary to 
the interests of children.276 Under this view, a parental privilege limited to 
allowing parents to serve as the primary caretaker, within bounds defined 
by the child's interests, would simply be too meager a benefit to make 
parenting worthwhile.277 
This argument is unpersuasive. The premise that parenting constitutes 
such a large part of an adult's personal fulfillment is directly at odds with 
the conclusion that any substantial limitations on how adults may satisfy 
their parenting desires would discourage them from parenting altogether. 
This is akin to arguing that if a person is starving, and is prohibited from 
eating the foods he most desires, he will opt not to eat at all. To reconcile 
these two claims would require adding the further premise that having to 
operate within bounds defined by a child's temporal interests would be so 
unpleasant that the suffering it occasioned parents would outweigh any sat-
isfaction they could still derive from the parenting experience. While this 
may be the case for a few people, it is very unlikely to be true for the vast 
majority. Of course, parents may feel frustration and even great anguish 
when the larger community disagrees with their child-rearing practices and 
imposes restrictions on them.278 It would be very surprising, though, to 
hear a parent say that because of this it is simply not worth having children. 
Indeed, there is no evidence to suggest that members of any particular reli-
gious order would forego parenting if they were to lose control over, for 
example, their children's medical treatment. In any event, we would regard 
274. Of course, some protection is needed against state officials acting ultra vires in a way that 
prevents parents from carrying out legally mandated actions. This protection would be a right of the 
child in the legal regime I propose. 
275. See, e.g., David Bridges, Non-Paternalistic Arguments in Support of Parents' Rights, 18 J. 
PHIL. Eouc. 55, 59 (1984). 
276. There are conceptual problems with asserting that a child is worse off for never having been 
born, but these problems need not be addressed here. 
277. I assume here that, within the substituted-judgment framework, it is reasonable to impute to 
any child a preference that the best judgment of the professional child-care community as to the 
temporal interests of children serve as a constraint on parental behavior and decision-making, when the 
risk and severity of potential harm to the child's well-being are sufficient to outweigh the costs to the 
child's interests associated with state interference in the child's relationship with the child's parents. I 
also assume, however, that the child hypothetically would want his parents to have input into any 
determination of his interests, since the parents would be most familiar with the child's individual 
characteristics and inclinations. They would know, for example, the child's medical history, 
temperament, preoccupations, and skills. As noted above, it is also to a child's advantage that his 
parents feel engaged, respected, and empowered in the process of raising him. 
278. In a world without parental rights, however, perhaps parents might have lesser expectations of 
control, and would therefore be less frustrated when the larger community demands adherence to its 
standards, rather than those of the parents. 
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such a person as one who is unlikely to be a very good or loving parent-as 
someone who is in the parenting profession for the wrong reasons. 
A more plausible version of this argument posits that should the role of 
parent become too onerous because of excessive state interference, many 
parents will become less attached to the children they do choose to bear and 
rear. These parents would feel either powerless to direct their children's 
lives or resentful of the aggravation that their children have occasioned, and 
children would suffer as a result.279 The problem with this version of the 
argument is that it rests upon an exaggerated view of the restrictions on 
parents that eliminating parents' rights would occasion. In fact, eliminating 
parents' rights would not in itself permit or encourage an increased level of 
state regulation or intrusion into the family. Instead, the scope of permissi-
ble regulation and intervention would be determined by reference to the 
child's interests, with the parent acting as an agent for the child against the 
State when it intrudes too far. Because the child has an interest in the par-
ent deriving satisfaction from parenting, adopting this approach would be 
unlikely to result in a drastic increase in the level of state regulation. 
Rather, the likely result would be a significant, but limited, lowering of the 
threshold of harm necessary to justify state intervention to protect a child. 
Further, it would be implausible to claim that parents could never be 
satisfied in their role without the particular form of social recognition that 
having rights entails. Countless people in our society-teachers, judges, 
and doctors, for example--derive great satisfaction simply from being 
entrusted with imporqmt responsibilities in roles to which they have no 
right, but which they are accorded the privilege of performing. 
Finally, it is worth pointing out that anyone who wishes to improve the 
lives of children, and who believes that the family is the best environment 
for raising children, should also be committed to making all parents suc-
cessful and happy in their role. This includes helping those parents who 
find it particularly difficult to meet the needs of their children. If we as a 
society did this successfully, there would be a need for state intervention 
only when parents were determined to take actions contrary to the temporal 
interests of their children. 
Thus, child-centered rationales for parents' rights fail to show that 
these rights are necessary to protect and promote the interests of children. 
An adequate and more appropriate means of protecting and promoting chil-
dren's well-being is to attribute certain rights to children themselves, and to 
complement that right with a parenting privilege. This approach is prefera-
ble not only because it eliminates a category of rights that is anomalous and 
279. See Wald, supra note 242, at 280. Wald expresses concern that "if parents lose ultimate 
authority they will be less willing to assume responsibility for the child." !d. at 277. However, he also 
suggests that ''the legal system and the granting or withholding oflegal rights may have little to do with 
how parents view their role." !d. 
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that rests on a dubious notion of entitlement, but also because it more 
directly focuses attention on the child's interests. 
B. Justifications Based on Parents' Interests 
Less common in scholarly writing is the claim that parents should have 
child-rearing rights in order to protect their own interests.280 Raising chil-
dren is, indisputably, a large component of most parents' happiness. For 
many people, raising children is their greatest good, their highest accom-
plishment, their most profound emotional experience, and a coalescence of 
their most important beliefs, values, and hopes. The struggles many adults 
endure just to bear or adopt a child, and the sacrifices they make to provide 
for a child, attest to the high priority they give to parenting within the hier-
archy of their desires. Where this desire is coupled with a sense of religious 
duty, an even greater portion of a parent's happiness may be bound up in 
directing the life of the child. Parental rights, so the argument goes, are 
necessary to protect this aspect of well-being, to enable parents to achieve 
this noble form of human ful:fillment.2si 
This argument is deficient for at least three reasons. First, the intensity 
of parental urges by itself is not a justification for generating rights to sat-
isfy those urges.282 Second, this argument fails to explain the anomaly of 
280. See, e.g., Edgar Page, Parental Rights, 1 J. APPLIED PHn.. 187, 195-96 (1984); Richards, 
supra note 162, at 28; Schoeman, supra note 162, at 14; Schrag, supra note 241, at 101. 
281. Some writers have hinted at an additional, equal protection type of rationale-that poor adults, 
like wealthy adults, are equally entitled to enjoy the benefits of child-rearing, even though they-may not 
he equally equipped to satisfy children's temporal interests. Thus, under this rationale, a regime of 
strong parental rights is necessary to give equal protection to the poor, because an exclusive or primary 
focus on the interests of children might result in less parental freedom and authority for poor parents 
than for wealthy parents, or the wholesale removal of children from the homes of parents living in 
poverty. See, e.g., In re Rinker, 117 A.2d 780, 783 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1955) (''The welfare of many 
children might be served by taking them from their homes and placing them in what the officials may 
consider a better home. But the Juvenile Court Law was not intended to provide a procedure to take the 
children of the poor and give them to the rich .... "), cited with approval in Wald, supra note 15, at 
1004 n.llO; see also New Jersey Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. A.W., 512 A.2d 438 (N.J. 1986) 
(reversing trial court decision to excuse parents' neglect of children on the basis of the parents' poverty). 
This line of argument suffers from all of the defects identified below: a morally dubious notion of 
entitlement, a willingness to sacrifice the interests of children in order to satisfy the interests of adults-
or to satisfy a broader social interest in justice among adults-and a failure to explain why the inequity 
concern justifies rights of control over children but not rights of control over other adults. Gross 
disparities of wealth in our society certainly impose unjust burdens on the poor, but transferring the 
costs of injustice from poor adults to children hardly seems a defensible response. Of course, those who 
raise this equity concern would prefer that no parent have to labor under the burden of economic 
deprivation, and that no child suffer as a result of poverty. SeeWald, supra note 15, at 1000. It should 
also be noted that poverty of the parents generally does not by itself make removal the best option for 
the child. 
282. Nor would a presumption that parental urges are genefally benevolent make the case for 
parental rights. 
An interest in having a child that we might recognise as of real value would be to bring into 
existence another human who could be the object of our disinterested love, concern and care. 
But this would suggest a child-centered argument. It is the child's interest in a loving 
upbringing which does the moral work. The parents' interest in offering such an upbringing 
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granting parents rights of control over their children when the courts have 
abolished or refused to create such other-determining rights in every other 
area of the law. Given the general rule that no individual's desire to control 
the life of another person, no matter how intense, properly gives rise to a 
right to do so, anyone who advocates parents' rights over children must 
identify some unique feature of parents' interests with respect to children 
that justifies a departure from the general rule. 
One possible distinguishing feature of parents' interest in their children 
is the desire to recreate themselves in another human being, to shape an 
entire life as a reflection of their own.283 Parents have a uniquely propitious 
opportunity to do so, given the young child's relatively unformed state. 
While this desire may reflect negative character traits such as selfishness 
and narcissism, it also may involve benevolent motives. In either case, 
however, it does not deserve the protection of a right. One simply does not 
have a fundamental interest in creating a copy of oneself. 
A third objection to the argument based on parents' interests is that it 
is simply not true that parents must have child-rearing rights in order for 
them to be able to satisfy their interest in caring for a child. As noted 
repeatedly above, a child-rearing privilege is sufficient to enable parents to 
maintain an intimate parent-child relationship and carry out parental respon-
sibilities. The negative claim-rights of the child could serve as an appropri-
ate and adequate basis for opposing interference by third parties, 
particularly the State. 
At bottom, parental rights are necessary only to ensure that parents can 
treat their children in a manner that is contrary to the children's temporal 
interests.284 For example, suppose that a parent's faith requires that he 
involve his infant daughter in a religious ritual that the State can demon-
strate to be inimical to the daughter's temporal interests. Suppose further 
that non intervention would leave the daughter to suffer greater harm than 
state intervention might cause her. In such a case, having rights himself 
gives the parent a legal basis for objecting to state intervention, while he 
could not plausibly object to intervention in such a case by asserting the 
child's rights. With parental free exercise rights, he has presumptive 
authority to treat his daughter in this way regardless of her interests, simply 
because he wants to. 
Thus, to show that it is rational for parents to demand child-rearing 
does not of itself justify their claim to rear. Rather it qualifies them to be good rearers given 
that this is what the child deserves. 
ARCHARD, supra note 243, at 105. 
283. See Page, supra note 280, at 195. 
284. Given the costs of state intervention for the child, the child's negative claim-rights would 
preclude state intervention where parents' aetions are in the child's interests, have no clear effect on the 
child's interests, or negatively affect the child's interests to a lesser extent than would the intervention. 
Given this assumption, parental rights would be necessary only to raise the threshold of harm to children 
that must be reached before the State may intervene. 
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rights, one must argue that it is in parents' interests to be able to treat their 
children in ways contrary to their children's temporal interests. To show 
that parental rights are just, one must also argue that these parental interests 
are legitimate and outweigh any competing interests or considerations 
against creating those rights. 
Arguably, it is rational of parents, within their scheme of values, to 
demand child-rearing rights if they believe themselves bound by their faith 
to raise their children in a way that is inconsistent with the children's tem-
poral interests. Within their conception of the good, spiritual aims may 
conflict with and outweigh some worldly aims. In addition, some parents, 
whether religious or not, may derive some immediate satisfaction from 
enjoying unfettered discretion to direct their child's life in the way they see 
fit. 
However, even if rights to control a child's life in ways inimical to the 
child's temporal interests would further some interests of the parents, these 
rights may not serve other, long-term parental interests. For example, not 
having such rights might better lead parents to recognize their children as 
separate persons whose well-being is also the concern of other people. It 
might lead parents to consider that their own views of what is right for their 
children may not be the same as what the children would choose for them-
selves if able to do so. These realizations might, in turn, lead parents to 
adopt certain attitudes-humility, greater respect for their children, open-
ness to dialogue about child-rearing with other persons-that would likely 
benefit not only the children, but also the parents. Much of the conflict and 
hostility that arises between parents and children, particularly as children 
become older and begin to form opinions about the justness of their 
upbringing, might be avoided if parents were less possessive of their chil-
dren and less demanding of their rights as parents. Any determination of 
whether it is rational, from any perspective, for parents to demand parental 
rights should take these additional considerations into account. 
Moreover, even if it does on the whole further parents' interests to 
possess rights to direct their children's lives in ways that are harmful to the 
children, the state should deem such interests illegitimate and refuse to give 
them precedence over the interests of children. The problem with such 
"interests" is that they entail treating children instrumentally, using children 
in ways that sacrifice their welfare interests in order to further the ulterior 
interests of parents.285 This instrumental view of children is inconsistent 
285. This is true whether the parents' motives are self-regarding or solely concerned with the well-
being of the child (e.g., if the parents believe they are sacrificing the child's temporal interests in order 
to further the child's spiritual interests). If state decision-makers themselves believe certain parenting 
practices or decisions to be hannful for a child. then their advocating parental rights to undertake those 
practices or decisions necessarily means that they are willing to aceept the sacrifice of the child's 
interest for the sake of satisfying the parents. The reluctance of liberals, in particular, to take a stand 
against religiously motivated parenting of which they personally disapprove is, I believe, due largely to 
their believing that liberal values of tolerance and respect for diverse ideological views require the state 
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with the moral principle that we should treat all persons as ends in them-
selves, giving equal consideration to their interests, and not merely as 
means to the furtherance of others' ends. 
From another perspective, though, one might argue that because par-
ents give so much to children, it is fair to give parents rights to direct the 
lives of their children286 even in ways that may be contrary to their chil-
dren's welfare interests, so long as they do not cause their children grievous 
harm. The responsibilities of parenting are a substantial burden, and some 
freedom to satisfy one's own desires or to allow one's religious views to 
trump the temporal interests of one's child might be appropriate compensa-
tion for carrying that burden. This quid pro quo reasoning may underlie the 
sense some people have that parents are entitled to determine the course of 
their children's lives, that parental authority should be seen as a right and 
not merely a privilege. However, this reasoning fails to distinguish rights to 
control one's minor children from rights to determine the lives of adult 
offspring who remain in or have returned to a parent's care because of some 
disability-rights that the courts have refused to establish. Indeed, this 
argument, if generalized, might require that a whole host of people who 
shoulder the burden of caring for other people receive, as a matter of fair-
ness, rights of control over the lives of those people: adult offspring caring 
for elderly parents, teachers nurturing children's minds, nurses tending to 
the sick, shelter operators caring for homeless persons, and many others. 
The law does not, however, confer such rights in these cases, and few if any 
persons would sincerely contend that it should. Even with respect to care-
providers who receive no monetary compensation for their labors, fairness 
does not seem to require this result. 
In sum, the parental interest justification is unconvincing. It ultimately 
depends either on a suspect understanding of the interests of parents and a 
morally unacceptable, instrumental view of children, or on an aberrant and 
unsupported notion of fairness. 
C. Justifications Based on Social Interests 
An argument for parents' rights might also rest on the supposed inter-
ests of society as a whole that are served by the existence of these rights. 
to defer to the viewpoint of the parents in determining whether particular parenting practices should be 
permissible. See, e.g., Gutmann, supra note 271, at 352-53. This might be a defensible position from 
which to determine the permissibility of what individuals do to themselves or what consenting adults do 
to each other. However, it is a mistake in the case of children, who are not the same persons as their 
parents, nor, in general, consenting participants in the religious practices of their parents. Liberals 
should instead view the child-rearing behaviors of parents the same way they view actions affecting any 
other nonconsenting persons. As was demonstrated in Part II, we simply do not give people rights to use 
other, nonconsenting persons as instruments for the advancement of their own interests. Nor do we 
permit people to inflict what a majority of the community considers to be hann on other, non consenting 
persons, regardless of their motivations for doing so. 
286. See, e.g., Bridges, supra note 275, at 59-60. 
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One such interest might be in the preservation of a particular form of social 
and political life, such as our liberal democracy. The Supreme Court has in 
fact in some contexts decided whether asserted liberties are fundamental, 
and therefore merit heightened protection under the Fourteenth Amendment 
Due Process Clause, by evaluating whether they are " 'implicit in the con-
cept of ordered liberty' such that 'neither liberty nor justice would exist if 
[they] were sacrificed.' "287 Such liberties are "the logical implications of a 
system that recognizes both individual liberty and democratic order."288 In 
Palko v. Connecticut, 289 for example, the Court held that the right to trial by 
jury and to immunity from prosecution except as the result of an indictment 
are "not of the very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty."290 Thus, these 
are not among the liberties that the Fourteenth Amendment protects against 
state encroachment. These rights are not so important that "a fair and 
enlightened system of justice would be impossible without them"; they 
"might be lost, and justice still be done."291 
In light of the Palko holding, it would appear frivolous to contend that 
it is implicit in the concept of ordered liberty that underlies our political 
culture that the religious preferences292 of parents should translate into 
rights to determine the lives of their children, or indeed, that parents should 
have any such other-determining rights.293 Such rights are no more implicit 
in the concept of ordered liberty than would be a right to direct the lives of 
other adults based on one's religious preferences. 
This becomes clearer when one realizes that parental rights are not 
necessary to preserve the institution of the family, which many people 
believe is necessary to the maintenance of a free society. Instead, a limited 
parental privilege coupled with appropriate claim-rights for children would 
be sufficient for that end, given a child's basic interest in an intimate, con-
tinuous relationship with a parent, free from unwarranted intrusions by the 
287. Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747,790 (1986) 
(White, J., dissenting) (alterations in original) (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325, 326 
(1937)). As noted above, in other contexts, including religious parenting, the Court has looked to 
tradition as a determinant of whether a liberty is fundamental. See discussion supra notes 230-32 and 
accompanying text. 
288. American College, 476 U.S. at 791. 
289. 302 u.s. 319 (1937). 
290. Id. at 325. 
291. Id. 
292. The fact that our nation's founders included the Free Exercise Clause in the Bill of Rights 
naturally suggests that they believed protection of some measure of religious freedom would be 
necessary to a stable system of ordered liberty. The question that arises today in free exercise cases such 
as Yoder, of course, is not whether there should be protection for any religious freedom at all, but rather 
whether a partieular form or aspect of religious exercise should be included within the scope of 
protected religious freedom. 
293. In the substantive due process context. the Court has intimated on a few occasions that 
parental rights are essential to ordered liberty or basic to a free society. See Lassiter v. Department of 
Social Se!Vs., 452 U.S. 18, 38 (1981) (holding that parental rights are among those" 'essential to the 
orderly pursuit of happiness by free men''') (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,399 (1923)); see 
also Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 638-39 (1979); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968). 
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State or other third parties. In fact, parental rights, particularly as extended 
under the Free Exercise Clause, violate one premise of ordered liberty, inso-
far as they enable parents to undermine the "individual liberty'' of their 
offspring. 
An additional argument for parents' rights that rests on an appeal to 
the interests of society is implicit in the Yoder and Pierce opinions. This 
argument states that giving parents the right to direct the upbringing of their 
children in accordance with the parents' religious beliefs allows different 
religious communities to survive and thus fosters cultural and religious 
diversity in our country. In contrast, the argument goes, a uniform, state-
imposed education or list of proscribed parenting behaviors would standard-
ize this nation's citizens and forestall cultural progress. It might even 
weaken the institutions of democracy, which may depend on a substantial 
measure of heterogeneity. This argument may appear compelling to 
some/94 but it rests on a shaky empirical foundation and a dubious nonna-
tive premise. 
The empirical assumption underlying this argument is that such 
increased state control would preclude the survival of diverse ideologies 
and ways of life. Even if states were to make public school attendance 
compulsory, however, parents of different religious faiths could continue to 
model and teach their beliefs to their children at home. The emotional bond 
between parents and their children naturally engenders in children some 
inclination to adopt their parents' faith. Public school attendance would 
simply guarantee that some range of alternative ways of thinking about the 
world and the individual's place in it were genuine options for the child. 
Furthermore, good public school teachers today actively promote individu-
ality and teach children to value diversity. In short, the standardizing effect 
of public schooling is grossly overstated. Indeed, there does not appear to 
be any want of diversity in our society today, despite the fact that for many 
decades now the vast majority of children in this country have attended 
public schools. Further, it is difficult to imagine that diversity would be 
threatened if a state merely regulated private schools stringently enough to 
ensure that the quality of education they provide is comparable to that in 
public schools. 
Pluralism is in fact one of the most poorly articulated of social values. 
Those who invoke it as a reason for opposing increased state control over 
child-rearing rarely offer any definite views on how much and what kind of 
pluralism is desirable.295 There are, on the other hand, quite obvious costs 
294. See, e.g., CAR-rmt. supra note 162, at 174 (arguing that parents should be entitled to remove 
their children from certain components of public school education, such as sex education, to which they 
have religious objections, because this will help preserve "epistemological diversity" in our society). 
295. See Schneider, supra note 248, at 161 ("[W]e lack a sense of the limits of pluralism. 
Pluralism is not an absolute, and is perhaps not even a pre-eminent, value, since some common views 
about behavior and morals are necessary if society is to function at all, to say nothing of functioning 
well.''). 
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to religious diversity; religious difference gives us yet another reason for 
distrusting and doing violence to one another. We should not so readily 
accept promotion of religious diversity as an aim of social policy, then, 
without seeing evidence that it produces benefits outweighing these 
costs.296 It is not unreasonable to ask whether diversity of ethnic back-
grounds, languages, occupations, political beliefs, hobbies, and tastes is not 
itself sufficient to prevent tyrannical majorities from forming and to keep us 
from feeling that we are all too alike. · 
Even if it were true that parental free exercise rights are necessary to 
preserve a high degree of religious diversity and that a high degree of reli-
gious diversity is a good thing, however, the conclusion that parents should 
have such rights to treat their children in ways inimical to the children's 
temporal interests requires a further, normative premise. This premise is 
that it is not only acceptable, but also morally requisite, to sacrifice the 
welfare interests of certain children to promote a social aim like pluralism. 
This is a premise that any adult would surely reject if its principle were to 
be applied to him. 
Suppose, for example, that the State granted members of a dying reli-
gious community a right to force certain adults from outside the community 
to undergo intensive religious indoctrination to ensure the survival of that 
religious community, or that the State itself intended to force such indoctri-
nation. These adults would undoubtedly be outraged by the notion that our 
society, or communities within our society, could treat them in this way-
as non consenting means to promote this supposed public good.297 To be 
consistent in their moral attitudes, adults should concede that this notion is 
equally objectionable when applied to children. The survival of ancient 
creeds and religious communities may be a good thing, but it should occur 
as a result of free choices, not coercion and the sacrifice of children's 
interests.298 
Finally, I note that a desire for cultural diversity is not what motivates 
296. This is certainly not to suggest that discouraging religious diversity should be a goal of social 
policy. 
297. Many people in this country have objected for the same reason to the military draft or to 
taxation-forms of state coercion or forced sacrifice for the community that are in some ways analogous 
to that considered here. Others accept military service or payment of taxes as their obligation to their 
country, as the price they tacitly agree to pay in exchange for the benefits they derive from living in a 
democracy. Therein lies a crucial difference between these situations and that of indoctrination of and 
control over children. Children do not consent to being used as instruments for promoting pluralism. In 
fact, reliance on the notion of a willing exchange would counsel in favor of subjecting adults, rather than 
children, to indoctrination and other forms of religious control in order to promote pluralism, since 
adults are capable of giving consent to the terms of membership in a national community. 
298. 
It might be claimed that some traditional ways of life-for instance, that of the Amish-could 
not survive the requirement that older children be allowed to go to school with childreu from 
the larger community and to learn about science and technology. If this claim is true, then 
such traditional ways of life have no right to survive, for their survival is at the expense of the 
liberty of the children who are born into them. 
Kenneth Henley, The Authority to Educate, in HAVING Clm.DREN, supra note 1, at 254, 262. 
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those religious groups who have been most insistent about the rights of 
parents under the Free Exercise Clause. Their aim is to standardize children 
in their own way.299 The irony of the appeal to pluralism in Yoder is that 
the decision "broaden[s] the range of choices available to adults by decreas-
ing the range of choices available to their children."300 Indeed, the efforts 
of some religious groups today to reintroduce Christian teaching into the 
public school curriculum suggests that, if they could, they would standard-
ize everyone's children in their way. To be sure, ''the child is not the mere 
creature of the State,"301 but the child is also not the mere creature of the 
parent, nor of the religious community to which the parent belongs. Rather, 
the child is his or her own person. A child may lack a fully formed 
independent character, but is nonetheless an individual who deserves the 
same respect accorded adults. 
The discussion in this Part has thus shown that none of the interests 
that may be bound up in the conflict between parents and the State over the 
appropriate forms of child-rearing supports the perpetuation of parents' 
rights. Objections to state interventions that would be detrimental to the 
well-being of a child can stand entirely on an assertion of the child's rights. 
Parents' rights are necessary only to ward off state interventions that would 
on the whole etihance a child's well-being. That aim is illegitimate because 
it entails a willingness to sacrifice the welfare interests of children in order 
to advance uncertain (given the possible long-term harm to the parent/child 
relationship discussed above) and, in any event, non fundamental interests 
of parents or of other members of society. We do not allow adults to be 
treated as mere instruments for the achievement of others' ends, and we 
should not allow children to be treated in this way either. 
CONCLUSION 
Consideration of judicial interpretations of rights in numerous contexts 
has revealed that the notion of parental rights is inconsistent with well-
established legal principles. Rights protect only a right-holder's self-deter-
mination and the integrity of the right-holder's own person and property. 
No one should possess a right to control the life of another person no matter 
what reasons, religious or otherwise, he might have for wanting to do so. 
Children are persons, intimately bound up with but nevertheless distinct 
from their parents. Supposed justifications for parents' rights based on the 
299. See ALAN PEsHKJN, Goo's CHOICI!: THE TarAL WoRUJ OF A FUNDAMENTALIST CHRISTIAN 
SCHooL 190 (1986) (finding, with regard to Fundamentalist Christian education, that "church and school 
consciously, unapologetically work to restrict their students' cognitive associations 'in order to avoid 
contact with people, books and ideas, and social, religious, and political events that would threaten the 
validity of one's belief system'") (quoting MILTON RoKEACH, THE OPEN AND Ct.osm MIND 48 (1960)); 
PARSONs, supra note 78, at 135 (noting that ~ven some Fundamentalists acknowledge that ''too many 
fundamentalist schools have atmospheres that stifle individual thought and development''). 
300. Schneider, supra note 248, at 160. 
301. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925). 
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interests of children, on the interests of parents, or on the interests of society 
simply do not withstand scrutiny. 
These :findings compel the conclusion that parental child-rearing rights 
are illegitimate. A better regime would simply grant parents a legal privi-
lege to care for and make decisions on behalf of their children in ways that 
are not contrary to the children's temporal interests. Children themselves 
should possess whatever rights are necessary to protect their fundamental 
interest in an intimate, continuous relationship with their parents. This 
includes the right to be insulated from any state interference that is not in 
the children's interests. 
Courts should acknowledge the illegitimacy of the parents' rights doc-
trine and decline to recognize claims of parental rights in the future. The 
evolution of our social attitudes toward, and legal treatment of, children in 
recent decades would afford the Supreme Court an adequate rationale for 
departing from the rule of stare decisis302 and for overruling Yoder and 
Pierce to abolish parental child-rearing rights. Subsequently, courts would 
decide cases involving disputes between parents and the State over child-
rearing practices based on the interests and rights of the children involved. 
This approach would encourage a more appropriate social and legal under-
standing of parenthood as a privilege conditioned upon a parent's willing-
ness to operate within limits defined by the temporal well-being of her 
children. It would also foster recognition that children are distinct persons 
deserving of respect equal to that accorded adults, and not merely means to 
the fulfillment of parents' life-purposes. 
302. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct 2791, 2809 (1992) (plurality opinion of 
O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, JJ.) (noting that one factor to be considered in departing from precedent is 
whether facts have "come to be seen so differently, as to have robbed the old rule of significant 
applicaton or justification''). 
